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Albania: Berisha Concedes Vote-Rigging, Plays Down Impact

AU3005172396 Paris AFP in English 1710 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 30 (AFP)—President Sali Berisha conceded on Thursday that there had been vote-rigging in Albania's general elections on Sunday but denied that the irregularities had influenced the outcome.

There have been widespread protests by the opposition in Albania and by international organisations observing the vote about the alleged irregularities.

But the Albanian leader told AFP: "It's impossible to deny that irregularities occurred in the heat of the moment, but they are far from having influenced the final results."

He said free elections had been held. "If irregularities occurred the electoral commission is in the process of investigating them very seriously."

The Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), a multi-nation security cooperation forum linking east and west in Europe which had observers in Albania during the poll, has called for new elections after asserting that serious irregularities marred Sunday's elections.

Albania: Berisha Urges Opposition To Participate in Elections

AU3005191096 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The President of the Republic Press and Information Office has issued the following press announcement: The president of the Republic suggested today that the Central Election Commission prolong until noon tomorrow, 31 May 1996, the deadline for registration of candidates for the second round of elections.

Berisha once again called on the opposition parties to take part in the second round of elections and encouraged the electorate in these constituencies to vote for the best candidate.

Albania: Candidates Asked To Confirm Participation in Election

AU3005205396 Tirana ATA in English 1545 GMT 30 May 96

[Press Release by the Central Election Commission issued in Tirana on 30 May]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 30 (ATA)—The Central Electoral Commission [KQZ], after President of the Republic Sali Berisha's invitation to the opposition to participate in the second round of the elections to the People's Assembly, addresses to all the subjects that have won the right to contest in the second round, according to the attached list, to announce their participation at the respective constituency commissions on May 31, 1996 within 1200 [1000 GMT].

The commissions, based on the last paragraph of Article 8 of the Law on the Elections to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania, are duty bound to declare the candidates for the second round.

The commissions should also be announced of the above.

Albania: Opposition Poll Commission Members Cited on Fairness

AU3105114196 Tirana ATA in English 0911 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Tirana, May 31 (ATA)—Some 40 percent of opposition members of the election commissions have declared that the elections "have been fair and free" until the moment they withdrew from the commissions, Friday's TRIBUNA DEMOKRATIKE reports citing some of these statements.

Commission members of the Socialist Party, the Social-Democratic Party and the Democratic Alliance Party regularly signed the voting protocols in the May 26,1996 parliamentary elections, before pulling out of the commissions, some three hours before the poll closed, by order of their parties' presidencies. The order was given by these presidencies under allegations that the voting had been manipulated by the party in power, the DP [Democratic Party].

Other members of these parties left the polling stations two or three hours before the voting closed. From the statements of these members it turns out that averagely 80 percent of electors have voted and that the people who had been enrolled wrongly have not been allowed to vote. [passage omitted]

Albania: PBDNj To Take Part in 2d Round of Balloting

AU3005173196 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 30 May 96

[Announcer-read statement by Human Rights Union on 30 May; place not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Human Rights Union [PBDNj] will take part in the second round of balloting in three constituencies. A press statement issued today states that, after analyzing the situation created after the

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26 May elections and finding out that, even partially, it was accepted that there were irregularities and violations of the Electoral Law and that elections in several constituencies were to be repeated and many other constituencies will have balloting, the PBDNj Presidency has reconsidered its previous position and declares that it will take part in balloting in the second round in three constituencies. In order not to further complicate the situation created, the Presidency thinks that this new stance is to the country's detriment and leaves room for a necessary dialogue either inside the parliament and with other political forces or with the Euro-U.S. diplomacy, the statement ends.

Albania: Dailies View Postelection Situation, Foreign Reaction

AU3005153396 Tirana ATA in English 1212 GMT 30 May 96

[From the "Press Review"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Tirana, May 30 (ATA)—Albanian dailies today publish the results announced by the Central Electoral Commission in the first round voting.

RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE (RD) under the title "Absolute Victory of the PD [Democratic Party]" publishes the list of candidates who won, and an editorial entitled "Parliament That Avoids Crisis."

It also carries a declaration of President Berisha entitled "Albanians Have Voted For Democracy, For Their Place in Europe" and on its third page the article "Fischer Does Not Accept the Opposition Accuses."

The paper reports of important European institutions' personalities who have congratulated the PD on its victory and express their solidarity with it.

RD also publishes articles of foreign media on elections in Albania and an article "Albanians Voted Like in Alarm Against the PS Danger."

ZERI I POPULLIT reports of an opposition block (left wing) protest against manipulation of May 26 elections which according to the paper continues in some southern districts of Albania.

On page four it holds the article "Police Attacks the PS headquarter in Fier (central Albania)." In another article it writes some dailies and worldwide TV stations denounce "Manipulations of May 26 Elections."

It also publishes the article "A journalist of DITA INFORMACION Tortured Till in Critical Conditions."

REPUBLIKA carries the editorial "Who Is Responsible for May 26 Election Results?" It reports yesterday's press conference of the Republican Party Chairman Sabri Godo under the title "Political Solutions To Open Way to Democracy."

POLI I QENDRES carries the article "OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] May Ask a Renewal of Elections After Some Weeks." It also publishes "Junta Tortured the Journalist Bardhok Lala."

BALLI I KOMBIT editorial is entitled "Albania Is Finally Separated From the Past." It carries the article "The National Front Party Will Fight To Institutionalise True Democracy in Albania." [passage omitted]

LAJMI I DITES carries the declaration of President Berisha under the title "Everyone Should Obey Rules of Democracy" and the communique of Central Election Commission.

Berisha's declaration is also published in RILINDJA entitled "Albanian Democracy Is Surer Than Ever Today." [passage omitted]

ALBANIA carries an editorial entitled "The Democratic Party 95, the Socialist Party 5," and another one entitled "Albania and its Growing Chances for Stability."

It carries the article "Socialists Ask Votes from the Dead" and "The Albanian Democracy Has the Blessing of the People." TRIBUNA's editorial is entitled "Strategy of Tension Has No Future," "Europe Does Not Help Those Who Destroyed Half of it," and "France Congratulates the PD victory."

RD also publishes articles of foreign media on elections in Albania and an article "Albanians Voted Like in Alarm Against the PS danger."

Albania: Foreign Minister To Attend CEI Meeting in Vienna

AU3005210196 Tirana ATA in English 1814 GMT 30 May 96

[Report by F. Vladi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 30 (ATA)—Albania is expected to be admitted member of the Central European Initiative [CEI] during the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Initiative's member countries to be held from May 31-June 1 in Vienna.

Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi will also take part in the meeting. He left for Vienna Thursday [30 May] at the head of a delegation, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry reported.

Albania has been one of the associated members in this initiative.

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The decision for Albania's admission to the initiative was taken in October 1995 in Warsaw at the meeting of the member countries' heads of states and governments.

Admission with full rights to the Central European Initiative enables Albania to complete the whole cooperation framework in this regional organisation and participate in all the work groups and joint projects in all fields of cooperation, the spokesman said.

Albania, according to the initiative's regulations, will preside one of the work groups.

During his stay in Vienna, Serreqi plans meetings with his counterparts of the initiative's member countries. He will also be received by the Austrian President Thomas Klestil, and the Austrian Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Schuessel.

Albania: Defense Ministry Says Troops To Join IFOR

AU3105114396 Tirana ATA in English 0805 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 31 (ATA)—NATO Secretary General Javier Solana has confirmed that the Council of the North Atlantic Alliance has accepted Albania's demand to participate with troops in IFOR [Implementation Force] in Bosnia. Solana has invited Defence Minister Zhulali to attend the meetings of the Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic Council of Cooperation due on June 14, the Defence Ministry spokesman reports.

According to Solana, Albania will now be able to participate in the planning process in the Supreme Staff of the European Allied Powers. The allies and Albania will work to bring peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the context of Albania's participation with troops in IFOR, a German military delegation, headed by the high ranking officer, Naumann, arrived in Albania on Thursday. Experts of Bundeswehr will visit the Albanian peacekeeping company, familiarise themselves with the ongoing achievements and help its training to realise the peace tasks in the framework of IFOR in Bosnia.

Albania: Bundeswehr Team Arrives To Discuss Joint Exercise

AU3005210296 Tirana ATA in English 1847 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 30 (ATA)—In the context of the work to promote relations and cooperation in the field of defence between the Albanian and German armies, another team of the German Army General Staff came to Albania on Thursday. It will plan the Albanian-German exercise "Mati '96," part of the Partnership for Peace Initiative.

Albanian and Bundeswehr experts will jointly discuss ways of holding the exercise, objectives to be attained and new training elements. This will further enrich the experience of the Albanian army after the Western armies' experience, and reach the NATO standards.

In the meantime, the German military officers will be familiarised with the region of the joint exercise. They will also define some of the directions of holding the exercise of a peace keeping character.

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Bulgaria: Videnov Said Resisting Calls for Cabinet Changes

AU3005125796 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 30 May 96 p 1

[Article by Svetlana Belousova: "Videnov Refuses To Accept Resignations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Tuesday, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov categorically told the Democratic Left parliamentary faction that he will not make any changes in the cabinet. The socialist deputies had demanded the removal of Svetoslav Shivarov [deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture], Rumen Gechev [deputy prime minister], Dimitur Kostov [finance minister], and Kliment Vuchev [minister of industry] for incompetence.

The four ministers have contributed with their incompetent actions to exacerbating the bread crisis in the country, and they are undermining confidence in the leftist forces, participants in the meeting said. Many proposals have been made to use the BSP plenum on Friday to make personnel changes in the cabinet, and give a mandate to the prime minister to effect those changes. However, Videnov has refused, saying that "at this difficult moment it is imprudent to raise the issue of resignations." Some 15 deputies tried to convince Videnov that Shivarov does not have the political and professional capacity for a minister of agriculture. The prime minister became indignant at the fact that the deputies allow themselves such caustic remarks about the agriculture minister. He was particularly incensed by Elena Poptodorova's recommendation to remove Shivarov from the Ministry of Agriculture and allow him to deal only with the problems of the church and attend the unveiling of new monuments.

Later the same evening at Zhan Videnov's office at 20 Positano Street [Bulgarian Socialist Party headquarters], in the presence of the BSP Executive Bureau members, Krasimir Premyanov, chairman of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction, told the socialist leader that he could no longer suppress the faction's discontent with the work of the four ministers. The parliamentary leader advised the prime minister to "sacrifice them."

The same morning, at a meeting of the BSP Executive Bureau, Nikolay Kamov directly asked the prime minister whether he intends to replace the minister in charge of key areas of the reform, something that might preserve the Democratic Left's confidence in the prime minister. The prime minister answered with a brief "no." Then Kamov recommended the Executive Bureau to express its gratitude to Svetoslav Shivarov, deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture, for his media presence during the grain crisis.

Sources in the Democratic Left parliamentary faction say that if the four ministers are not replaced within four weeks, the deputies themselves could topple Videnov's cabinet.

Bulgaria: Prime Minister Criticized on Economic Issues

AU3005130696 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 30 May 96 p 5

[Commentary by Genka Markova: "Videnov Is Putting Out Fires"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 29 May, the prime minister briefed parliament on the cabinet's intentions after the agreement with the IMF. He asked in an ultimative tone for the support of the deputies, and for the time being, received only the support of the majority. Krasimir Premyanov, leader of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction, pointed out that prolonging the agony is the only alternative to the existing situation. However, those were only words meant to calm the citizens and convince them that everything is under control.

Actually, Videnov, his team, and the top bankers of the Bulgarian National Bank are behaving like firemen. Only yesterday, the chief of the Bulgarian National Bank basked in IMF praise for not intervening in the foreign exchange market. Yesterday, he began to support the dying lev in its struggle against the dollar. Shivarov [minister of agriculture] is hiding from journalists. Konakchiev [deputy prime minister] continues to claim that there is no grain crisis. Nevertheless, Videnov refuses to make any changes in his team. His logic is that precisely now he needs the support of the majority. Ostensibly, he is right.

Indeed, when one notes the names of the ministers whom the socialist deputies want to remove from the cabinet, it becomes clear that the leaders view the proposed resignations as an instrument to alleviate social pressure, rather than a strategic move to save the country. Videnov could very possibly begin negotiations on making two or three cabinet changes at the moment of his choosing, in exchange for the majority's support. If he does so, he will fall in a trap. There are already signs that such a trap is being prepared, and soon the vacuum around the prime minister will become very visible. Videnov continues to underestimate the scope of the crisis and most likely does not assume at all that the agony Premyanov invoked yesterday refers at this particular moment to the cabinet itself, and then to the BSP. It appears that the firemen are not thinking about the state today.

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Bulgaria: Minister Rejects Aircraft Deal With Russia

AU3005162796 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 30 May 96 p 3

[DUMA PRESS report: "Russia Offers Us Arms Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In 1995, Russia sold weapons for more than $3 billion, and, this year, contracts have been signed for $2.5 billion, says Vice Admiral Oleg Belaventsev, "Rosvooruzheniye" deputy general director, who arrived in Bulgaria for the Khemus '96 international defense equipment exhibition. He pointed out that he sees no serious obstacles for developing military-technical cooperation between Russia and the eastern European countries. [passage omitted]

Yesterday, during a command-staff exercise at the Uzundzhovo Air Force airfield near Khaskovo, Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov said that the deal regarding the two aircraft squadrons proposed by Moscow can not really be implemented. On Tuesday, at the Khemus' 96 exhibition in Plovdiv, Moscow let it be known that it could supply us with two Sukhoy-39 or MiG-29M squadrons in a barter deal or on credit. The Russian offer could provide a long-range solution of the acute crisis of the Bulgarian Air Force combat equipment, but the payment of the $250 million will last 10 to 20 years and, for the time being, it is unrealistic, the minister said.

Bulgaria: Nuclear Plant's Financial, Safety Problems Viewed

AU3005134396 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 30 May 96 p 3

[Interview with Yanko Yanev, chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy, by Veselka Dinova; place and date not given: "IMF Again Forgets the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Dinova] Mr. Yanev, you say that you are concerned about the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. What do you mean?

[Yanev] I mean the financial situation of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. A full-scale training center is constructed there, and it is exceptionally important for the training of personnel. There is a very real danger that it could be forgotten because of the lack of funds. The modernization and reconstruction, which have been underway for four years, are entering a very critical phase, but even the funds for this are not sure. On top of everything, we must begin serious investments in new equipment and systems. [passage omitted]

[Dinova] You are a controlling rather than exploiting organ. Does it not mean that the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant itself should think about its problems?

[Yanev] Article 23, Paragraph 5, of the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy, adopted by parliament, points out that the state—the owner of the nuclear equipment in our country—must provide the financial, economic, and all other means needed for the safe operation of the plant. If we cannot guarantee the necessary financial means for the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, then this would mean that we will have to terminate its operation. Otherwise, we will continue operations without maintaining the necessary level of safety.

[Dinova] The West would hardly be afraid of the prospect of closing Kozloduy down. Is this not precisely what they wanted....

[Yanev] This is not how the things should be viewed. Bulgaria is a nuclear state. When we negotiate with the IMF and the other international financial institutions, we must put Kozloduy on the table. It is true that someone might try to achieve his political, economic, and other goals by imposing certain restrictions on the country, but this person must know that such restrictions cannot be very useful. They will immediately reflect in the nuclear energy. Therefore, no one, from the IMF to the other international financial institutions, should forget that we have the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. [passage omitted]

[Dinova] It has been said that, recently, there have been unpleasant events at the nuclear power plant.

[Yanev] Yes, and they also evoke concern among the experts of the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy. Those events do not have the character of an accident. However, they are anomalies in the operations and show that the comprehensive situation in the country must reflect in the situation of the nuclear power plant.

[Dinova] What are those unpleasant events?

[Yanev] There was an incident with the special structure—radioactive material was spilled into some of its premises. This is inadmissible, since, in the last four years, Kozloduy made great steps in anything related to the safety culture. The "bright ideas" of 1996, for example, to shatter crystallized salts with a hammer and a pipe, are also not normal.

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[Dinova] What happened to the fifth reactor?

[Yanev] The reactor "boiled." This was not a nuclear incident. The safety of the population and the personnel was not threatened, but this was another event. The personnel were warned about such a possibility, and yet it happened. For the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy, this means that there is something wrong in the training of the personnel, because those are human errors. [passage omitted]

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Czech Republic: Article Views IFOR Unit's 'Shortcomings'

AU3005114696 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 28 May 96 p 3

["Analysis" by Jan Gazdik: "Shortcomings Are Also Concealed Behind the IFOR Battalion's Successes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Only the Left Bloc, Grebenicek's communists, Sladek's republicans, and avowed pacifists reject the Army's involvement in the North Atlantic alliance's IFOR [Implementation Force] mission in Bosnia. Thus, they repudiate the fact that the Army's incorporation into a NATO operation is one of the most useful things it has achieved in the almost four years of its existence—whether this involves the international acclaim or harmonization with advanced army corps.

Consequently, it can be of considerable satisfaction to all of those who have gained recognition for dispatching the troops to Bosnia that the Czech battalion is regarded as one of the best units there. Despite this, Army officers maintain that, for this very reason, it is essential to analyze the problems that are cropping up unnecessarily in the preparation and deployment of the IFOR unit, all the more so because the rotation of 350 of the battalion's troops is being planned, to say nothing of the fact that the politicians are considering the possibility of extending the IFOR operation next year.

The troops in Bosnia are mostly concerned that, while they are being compared with the professionals from the NATO armies, other people at home, despite all the efforts by the commanders from the ground forces inspectorate, are, on the contrary, only working "at half-speed." This has been borne out by the tardy expedition of requests for fuel supplies, equipment, and spare parts. The briquettes that the battalion ordered during the frosts of January are only arriving in Bosnia now—at the end of spring. The delivery of spare parts suffered a similar delay, and, because of this, the armored personnel carriers could not be used for several weeks. The experts think that, if there had been a conflict in the battalion's zone of operation, the tardiness in supplying the spare parts could have had tragic consequences. "Someone has been toying with our lives," says an officer from the IFOR mechanized company.

Therefore, the battalion's commanders are rightly comparing the almost superhuman efforts of the people in Bosnia or in the ground forces' inspectorate with the—at times—incomprehensible slowness of the Army's other staff. At the same time, they point to the principle that it is not the one who makes a mistake who is a fool, but the one who is unable to learn from it. The tough theoretical and field preparations begun by the troops getting ready for Bosnia suggest, at the moment, that the second half year of the Czech battalion's Balkans mission may be even more successful than the first six months. The attitude of the General Staff toward the fates of the people who obtained new qualifications in the Balkans and would like to use them in the Army after their return has also improved.

The veterans of Bosnia, however, know better and are not succumbing to enthusiasm. That is, according to them, until the IFOR operation, which has pushed the Republic a considerable step closer to NATO, becomes a matter of personal prestige for all of the Army's officials, they are refusing to draw optimistic conclusions. Namely, the vehicle on its last legs that someone gets rid of by quickly painting it and dispatching it to the IFOR battalion illustrates that there are people serving in the Army who have no place in it.

Czech Republic: Future of Klaus Government Viewed

96CH0107A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 22-28 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Jan Machacek: "Vaclav Klaus's Standard Fatigue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Provided nothing substantial happens, the current government coalition will even strengthen its positions after the elections. Then it is certain that Vaclav Klaus will once more become the Czech prime minister. In this connection, the majority believes that this will not result in a change in the political course of the government. But things are not that simple. What is the actual existing course of the Klaus cabinet and what may we expect from the old again/new again prime minister in the next four years?

Based on what Vaclav Klaus writes in his columns or states in interviews, it is apparent that his conviction is one of classical liberalism. In the United States, Klaus was considered a so-called libertarian, and he himself would apparently not oppose this characterization (incidentally, he is a member of the Hayek Libertarian Montpelier Society). Sometimes, however, he also tends to be characterized as a conservative—in a somewhat simplified manner. But rather than being a conservative in the political sense of the word, Klaus is more a person who is conservative by nature. Essentially, he dislikes experiments, and it is not by happenstance that the only experiment he backed up with his authority was coupon privatization (the authors of that idea, Dusan Triska and Tomas Jezek, took a long time to convince him). Any kind of other experimentation is an anathema to Klaus:

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He has no taste for the radical idea of privatizing social security, according to the Chilean example; he has no liking for the idea of gradually doing away with income taxes in accordance with the example conceived by New Zealand experimenter Roger Douglas, and he downright hates experimenting with the railroads (privatization, competition, breaking up of individual entities according to the British example, and so forth). Klaus sweeps any kind of comparison of the Czech Republic with the tigers of East Asia from the table, saying, "We surely do not want a system of social security such as they have in Thailand."

Klaus's personal attitudes thus, to a certain extent, restrict the ideology that he espouses. For to libertarians no experimentation that has as its goal the limiting of government power is foreign. They do not care whether the ways and procedures that can lead to limiting government power have been tried and tested or whether they are new and not well-traveled. And it is precisely here that disappointment with the "postelection" Klaus can lie.

While it is nice to collect inspiration in developed nations to the west of us, there is no harm in doing some things differently only because we might prove able to sometime draw nearer to these nations at all. For example, it is necessary to have lower taxes than the average tax rates in the West, the social system must be more specific, and so forth. It is also possible to utilize the fact that the bureaucratic institutions are suffering from a certain "lack of being broken in" and from lacking a certain degree of fortification; it is realistic to privatize to a greater extent than in the West—including such progressive branches as telecommunications and transportation; it is possible to demonopolize and to open up to competition more rapidly than the rest of the world. But all of this requires experimentation and it is thus unlikely that the prime minister will resort to this—particularly in a situation in which someone else other than himself might be asserting these ideas.

Another point of view regarding the postelection Klaus stands outside any ideological compartmentation. Every politician can be looked at on the basis of the lawfulness features of the political cycle. The fundamental rules are generally known: A politician has the greatest amount of courage to make changes, reforms, and has the maximum amount of energy after the elections; on the other hand, he is most passive and most susceptible to compromise prior to the elections. As a rule, taxes are raised soon after the elections and are lowered prior to the elections; just like old-age pensions are not excessively manipulated at the beginning of the term of office, toward the end of that term of office things always improve for pensioners. And to keep things from being simple, every politician passes through the political cycle in a specific manner. What kind of an experience do we have with regard to Vaclav Klaus in this respect? A negligible one.

Following the last elections, the situation was specific because the principal political topic involved the breakup of the federation, and everything else was basically shunted aside. At that time, Klaus was virtually brimming with energy, and the method by which he mastered this complex process was undoubtedly one of the pinnacles of his political career. But the difficulty lies in the fact that since that time—in other words, during the three subsequent years—his government began to behave as though there was only one month to go before elections. The most notorious case involves the approach toward rent control. Matters went [illegible] that, at one of the government consultations, wher[illegible]t controls were discussed and at which some ministers were pushing the idea for a more rapid freeing-up of prices, Klaus said roughly the following: "I am aware of all arguments regarding the economic and social harm done by rent control and I could calmly list 10 additional arguments for you. But this does not change the fact that we will not do away with rent control."

Experience tells us that a government that is entering the second election season is always lazier, more sanguine, and slower—briefly, it is more content with itself and with the status quo. Without regard to ideology, the ranks of the opposition provide the cabinet with the impetus to "work more diligently" and provide a clearer platform and a mandate to change things. This is natural: The government must say that things are in order even if they are not in order. If it proposes fundamental changes and reforms, it is as though it was indicating that something needs to be changed and, thus, it is obviously in disorder. So, the government elected to a second term of office becomes, to a certain extent, toothless, because it does not want to admit the necessity for change, even in such cases that are actually "clear." Example: It is understandable that the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] can only say with difficulty that taxes in this country are excessively high and that they are "strangling" the economy. On the contrary, it must claim that taxes will continue to be lowered, even though they actually are already low today. A small coalition party such as the ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance] can understandably claim something different because in this matter it is quite legitimately playing the role of the opposition within the government. The same holds true for other questions: The ODS must say that rent control and government housing policy are in good shape and can unfortunately not support the reforms of the capital market to any great extent.

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Every politician understandably has personal ambitions that are undoubtedly important or perhaps even the most important engine behind his work. Klaus's ambition is to once more become prime minister. What else?

Klaus sometimes gives the impression of a person who has already proven what he needed to prove. He was the leader of the economic transformation, which transpired without major social and political shocks; he established a mass political party, which provided political support for the economic reforms; he pushed through privatization at a pace and to an extent that is unprecedented in history. As he himself says, today we live in a normal country that, except for inflation, is fulfilling all of the criteria of Maastricht. For a Euroskeptic or a Eurorealist (as he himself characterizes himself), it is probably not the greatest ambition to take the Republic into the embrace of the European Union. Not that Klaus would resist entry to the European Union, but it is surely not something that he longs for most in his life. Neither does he long for being a famous innovator and inventor in the social or taxation area. Perhaps some of the prime minister's friends are right when they claim that Klaus's true ambition is to win the Nobel Prize for economics—not for theory, but for the first time ever for economic practice.

The problem that faces the majority of European countries, and thus not only the countries of Central Europe, requires courageous and, to a certain extent, radical solutions. However, these can only be originated by those who have their visions based on certain ambitions. Otherwise, we shall truly become, in the prime minister's words, "a standard country." The difficulty lies in the fact that this will be a standard of the type of Greece, Spain, or Portugal rather than the standard of France, Germany, or Denmark.

Czech Republic: Tony Blair Inspires Czech Social Democrats

96CH0099B Prague RESPEKT in Czech 25-31 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Jan Machacek: "Sincere Participation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] and the Czechoslovak People's Party [CSL], even the Social Democrats have finally come up with a simple ideological slogan. Not "A market without attributes," nor "A social market economy," but "A society of participation." It is precisely this term that the CSSD [Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party] chose to designate one of the chapters in its election program, and it even permeates the speeches of Chairman Zeman. "A society of participation" is a literal translation of the preelection slogan "Stakeholder society," which was used several months ago by Tony Blair, leader of the British opposition Labor Party.

The Blair slogan had been a hitherto unknown expression in the English language. The word "stake" has many meanings (for example, a bet at the races), but here it is clearly meant as the interest, participation, or possible share. A "stakeholder" is then a person who has such an interest (or participation), and a "stakeholder society" is, according to Blair, a society in which everyone is actively interested and no one is completely left to their own fate or thrown overboard. In other words, nothing so earthshaking—previously, this was called solidarity. However, politics needs fresh new formations from time to time, and Blair acquiesced to this need. But the problem lies in the fact that no one knows precisely what all is meant by the catchy slogan. The popularity of the new slogan, even in Great Britain, results primarily from the popularity of the charismatic Tony Blair rather than from the precise outlining of his policies.

The expression "stakeholder society" can, among others, also be perceived as the antithesis of a so-called shareholder society, which can be interpreted as a society of shareholders. Although Margaret Thatcher did not use this term, it is well known, however, that her goal was the creation of the capitalism of small shareholders in Great Britain and a strong middle class. The ideological message of Blair's slogan is, thus, clear: A stockholder ("shareholder") is obviously expected to be a ruthless owner who does not take the needs of others into account, whereas a "stakeholder" is a responsible and solid person who takes account of the needs of the whole unit.

How the Czech Social Democrats perceive the "society of participation" also reflects this understanding. In its program, it states: "Participation is an important source of motivation, of identification with the life of the community or the enterprise, the developmental goals of which are participated in by those whom these intentions impact. It is precisely in the creation of conditions for active participation that we see a road to the rising of a truly civic society, not narrowed down to the activities of individual political parties. For us, the activities of voluntary societies, of nonprofit organizations, are as important as the assertion of ideas of direct democracy and democratic referenda.... As one of the factors of economic growth, we see the motivation of employees, including managers, irrespective of whether this is manifested as a result of the legally guaranteed participation in the management of enterprises or as a result of various forms of employee co-ownership. We reject the exclusion of the trade union organization from the

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decisionmaking process. We want even the communities to have a greater influence upon enterprises...."

In essence, this continues to involve the same thing: the dispute between the corporate and liberal perception of capitalism. This conflict is well-discernible, not only in Great Britain, but also in the United States (among other things, Robert Reich, well-known leftist economist and minister of labor in the Clinton government, stands close to the views expressed by Tony Blair). Although the gross domestic product in both countries is growing and unemployment is relatively low, many people, nevertheless, have the feeling that real wages and living standards are rising slowly. The situation of the middle class is not specifically improving; conditions for the poor classes are deteriorating. And this gives rise to room for social demagoguery: The blame allegedly falls on the owners (stockholders), who are interested exclusively in the vision of fat profits. That is why they are reducing costs, are laying off employees, are lowering wages, and are devastating the environment.

The recipe for rectification is seemingly simple. What if one were to try a more social model of capitalism, such as they have in Germany or in Japan? After all, an owner may be an owner, but this does not mean that he can conduct himself in an irresponsible and inconsiderate manner. After all, he must take into account not only his own interests, but also primarily the interests of the workers, the long-term interests of the community, the interests of the trade unionists, the environment, and so forth. It is true that if a certain volume of operation does not exist or if a firm is not profitable, then the U.S. owner will callously close it down and transfer production elsewhere. It is also true that in Germany representatives of the trade unions, municipal government, and local government sit on oversight councils of enterprises and that German firms pay their employees the most varied social achievements. It is also a fact that a German stockholder, for the greater part, has limited rights and that until recently Japanese firms were extremely loyal toward their long-term employees (and also demanded loyalty). But the success of the German and Japanese models was closely related to the postwar renewal of society and is now in deep crisis in both countries. Japan has been in recession now for five years and the German economy is only growing at a snail's pace. In both countries, there is already open debate about the need to reform the corporate social model.

The uncritical copying of the German model can thus have only a single consequence: Companies will be investing more in the most varied social and municipal obligations than in technologies and will thus lose their competitiveness. And this will lead to a growth of unemployment and protectionism. It is, thus, not surprising that even despite the general popularity of the Blair slogan, a number of people in Great Britain are drawing attention to the fact that the chief of the Labor Party still owes the public a consistent and logical explanation of his slogan. And it is unlikely that anyone will see it: Blair is a charismatic dandy and this is more essential to many voters than is his program.

But for Zeman this moment is escaping. It seems that this time he decided to "go with the times" and to paraphrase the program directly within the cradle of modern democracy. But his slogan has not caught on a whole lot on the domestic scene for the time being and the reason is not only the fact that Tony Blair is a charismatic leader and Zeman an awkward disseminator of witticisms. The difficulty lies in the fact that that which can be the subject of polemics in Great Britain with regard to the vision of a "society of participation" is nonsense in this country about which it is not possible to debate.

The Czech economy suffers more than anything else as a result of the low mobility of the labor force. This has to do with the catastrophic situation in the housing market. Homeowners are compelled to participate in such a solid type of "participation," which is in fact equal to their gradual expropriation by the current renters. In this situation, to support an idea of loyalty with respect to the enterprise or even to support lifelong employment is nonsense. Similarly, stressing the role of the trade unions at a time when, for example, the Czech Railroads are managed on the basis of the dictate of trade union leaders present within the administrative council is a contradiction in terms. And we are not speaking of the fact that the government, with the help of physicians, is creating a "society of participation" in the health-care industry.

In brief, when two people are doing the same thing, it is not the same thing. But in order for Milos Zeman to become a Czech Tony Blair requires more than taking over a popular slogan.

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Slovakia: Daily Details Kovac's Charges Against Meciar

AU3005181396 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 30 May 96 p 2

[Article by Julius Gembicky: "Michal Kovac Lodged a Criminal Complaint Against Vladimir Meciar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak President Michal Kovac filed charges with the Bratislava I District Prosecutor's Office against Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar for the statements made by the latter on Slovensko 1 Radio in its regular "Interview With the Prime Minister" program broadcast on 24 May 1996. In his petition, Kovac objects primarily to Meciar's claim that he knew about the planned abduction of his son and took no measures to prevent it. He also objects resolutely to the accusation that he has thwarted and influenced the process of investigation. The third reason the head of the state lodged a criminal complaint is the statement made by the prime minister that if Technopol and the so-called abduction is investigated, a pardon cannot be granted by a person who, if he did not have presidential immunity, would most likely be one of the defendents in the case.

Kovac rejects all three claims by the prime minister as untrue. He denies the veracity of the first one completely. He states in the petition that he did not know that an attack and abduction of his son abroad were planned. Otherwise, he would not have remained passive in the face of his suffering, the trauma of his family, and the extraordinarily high expenditures connected with his stay, abroad, defense, and support of his family. Kovac also denies the veracity of Meciar's second claim. He says that he has been in contact with the investigators only on official occasions (submission of material, questioning, etc.) and as a mediator between his son and the investigators because, as a result of the erroneous proceeding on the part of the Slovak Police Corps, his son was not questioned by an investigator but rather by an official of the Slovak Police Corps. Moreover, the objective of the abduction abroad—if the operation were not messed up—was to discredit myself, the Slovak president states, and therefore I still consider myself a person suffering other damages, i.e. I am an injured party according to Law 43 of the Penal Code.

The Slovak president also rejects the third accusation because at the time Technopol was damaged, he was but a rank-and-file opposition deputy, and therefore did not even have an opportunity to do what the prime minister accuses him of. Kovac adds in the petition that if he were charged as an accessory, the charges could only be brought by the relevant investigator or prosecutor. If the prime minister has arrived at such conclusions, he has obviously exceeded his powers because the investigator is independent in the process, and the Office of the Prosecutor is subordinated neither to the government nor to the prime minister.

In justification of the petition, Kovac observes that by the first, second, and third claims, Vladimir Meciar, LLB [expansion unknown], has committed the crime of slander according to Article 206, Paragraph 1 and 2 of the Penal Code. According to Kovac, there is no doubt that the aforementioned false data can result in substantial damage to him, jeopardizing respect for his person by fellow citizens and in political life.

The same claims would also mean the crime of false accusation according to Article 174 of the Penal Code. The text is not satisfied only because the Slovak president enjoys immunity and cannot face criminal prosecution. This does not diminish but rather augments the social danger of the deeds committed by the prime minister. In the conclusion of the petition, the Slovak president believes that Meciar has assumed powers that do not belong to him, that he exceeded the powers of a public official according to Article 158, Paragraph 1, Letter b) and Paragraph 2, Letter c) of the Penal Code. All the aforementioned claims constitute the crime of libel of the president of the Republic according to Article 103 of the Penal Code, and if, for any reason, the readiness to apply the stipulations in effect were absent, the statements by Prime Minister Meciar would also satisfy the definition of the crime of an attack against a public official according to Article 156, Paragraph 3 of the Penal Code.

We will carry more details on the reaction of Slovak President Kovac to the statements made by Prime Minister Meciar and to the Report on the Work of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] presented to parliament by SIS Director Ivan Lexa in tomorrow's edition of NARODNA OBRODA.

Slovakia: President Said Ready To Declassify Letter to SIS

AU3005191596 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 29 May 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Julius Gembicky: "M. Kovac Is Ready To Declassify Top Secret Documents"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak President Michal Kovac is ready to declassify his letter to SIS [Slovak Information Service] Director Ivan Lexa, and also the letter he sent to Slovak Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek—Vladimir Stefko, director of the Press Department of the Office of the Slovak President, told the NARODNA OBRODA daily. He reacted this way to the statement

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by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, who said in his regular Friday interview for Slovak Radio last week that he would approve the declassification of all documents that the president described as top secret.

The staff of the Office of the President and the Slovak president himself were surprised, according to his spokesman Stefko, that Meciar's administration failed to point out to the prime minister the essential detail, enshrined in Law No. 100/96 of the Code, which clearly stipulates that only the person that classified the material can declassify it. So, if the president addressed a letter to SIS Director Lexa, and denoted it top secret, only President Michal Kovac can declassify it. Thus, the prime minister does not have the authority to declassify something classified by the head of the state, or what he feels like—Stefko emphasized.

Similarly, even the much more interesting answers by Engineer Lexa to the president cannot be declassified by either president or prime minister, but exclusively by the SIS director.

According to Stefko, the president is willing to declassify also the letter to Hudek, to which he has not received any answer. President Kovac is of the opinion that if these documents were declassified, it would be natural to expect a similar approach by SIS Director Lexa, who should declassify his certainly much more interesting answer to the president of the Republic. If Lexa does not do so, the president will declassify his letter to the SIS director because he is interested in the public learning that there is nothing nefarious there, that could put him under suspicion of abuse of the powers of public official. The letter from the president has been used with gusto to discredit the author not only by the prime minister but also by the chairman of the Special Supervisory Body [OKO] of the National Council of the Slovak Republic for the work of the SIS, Igor Urban; and SIS head Lexa. I believe, Stefko said in conclusion, that the time is here to show the cards because the public has the right to know.

Slovakia: Meciar Issues Statement on Conflict With President

LD3005151996 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1400 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The information department of the Slovak Government announces the following concerning President Kovac's complaint against Prime Minister Meciar:

Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar sees the complaint lodged against him as another action by President Michal Kovac aimed at discrediting the prime minister and increasing the social and political tension in Slovakia. He presumes that once he is not sentenced [odsudeny], the president will be under moral and political pressure to resign.

The statement, given to TASR by Magda Pospisilova, the prime minister's spokeswoman, stresses that the prime minister believes that the truth will prevail.

Slovakia: Military Command-Staff Exercises Begin Near Presov

AU3005122796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 May 96 p 2

[Report by "ar": "Presov Exercises"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Presov—Three-day command-staff exercises of the 2d Army Corps of the Army of the Slovak Republic (ASR) began at the expanded command post at the Ruska Nova Ves military training facility near Presov on Tuesday [28 May]. The exercises are controlled by Major General Julius Humaj, deputy Army Chief of Staff of the ASR. On Thursday, President Michal Kovac, as supreme commander of the Slovak Armed Forces, will also take part in the exercises. He will get acquainted in Ruska Nova Ves with command planning and preparation of military operations of the ASR. PRAVDA was informed about this by Michal Hanes, public relations officer of the 2d Army Corps. In the current staff exercises, the Presov Army Corps is perfecting reactions to an assumed enemy attack, with the enemy just having crossed the state border and overcome the resistance of the first lines. The command-staff exercises are oriented toward eliminating the adversary and recovering the territorial integrity of the state.

Slovakia: Council Ammends Defense Law, Reduces Service Time

AU3005164096 Bratislava ZMENA in Slovak No 22, 29 May-4 Jun 96 p 9

[Interview with Imrich Andrejcak, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Committee for Defense and Security Affairs, by Andrea Hinkova; place and date not given: "Under the Amended Defense Law, Commitments Will Be Concluded Only for a Set Period That a Soldier Wants To Serve in Peacekeeping Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At the 15th meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [held from 15 to 24 May], deputies approved an amendment to the Defense Law. We discussed this amendment with Imrich Andrejcak, chairman of the NRSR [National Council of the Slovak Republic] Committee for Defense and Security Affairs.

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[Hinkova] What is the gist of the Defense Law amendment?

[Andrejcak] The gist of the amendment dwells in the reduction of the minimum commitment that a soldier must sign when entering upon further duty [beyond national service]. Under the Defense Law valid to date, a member of the Slovak Army serving in UN peacekeeping forces had to stay in the armed forces for two to five years. This was too long a commitment, which was unsuitable. It is sufficient to undertake to serve in the armed forces for seven months—the time of preparation for the peacekeeping mission and its realization—and to provide for the possibility of extending the period of duty if the soldier operating in peacekeeping forces decides to serve another term [turnus].

[Hinkova] Most of the soldiers being assigned to UN peacekeeping forces are reserve soldiers. Why is this so, and what problems did the commitment to serve two to five years entail?

[Andrejcak] The UN does not care whether soldiers performing basic military service or soldiers on further duty serve there. Following the experience of soldiers performing their basic military service on the territory of former Yugoslavia, we adopted the principle that only soldiers on further duty will be sent to peacekeeping missions. Regarding the time commitment, it complicated the situation for both those applying for service in peacekeeping missions and for the Army. After returning from six months on the peace mission, for example, the soldier could not leave for civilian life, but had to apply to be discharged from the Army. The Army was facing a fairly complicated and often unsolvable situation with finding jobs for soldiers whose assignment abroad ended but who did not apply to be discharged from service prematurely, before their commitment expired. For example, in the peacekeeping mission, we needed a bulldozer driver, but in the Army we have no need for this profession. He was needed in the peacekeeping mission because he was repairing roads there. What were we supposed to do with him after his return? We kept moving him from one place to another, he was dissatisfied, and so was the Army. In other words, the amendment is to the benefit of both soldiers operating in peacekeeping missions and the Army. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Penal Code Amendment Denounced by EU

96CH0102A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 17-23 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by Emma McClune: "EU Is Latest To Denounce 'No Lies' Bill in Slovakia"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A scorching declaration from the European Union has added to the swelling barrage of criticism, both at home and abroad, from those who fear for the future of democracy in Slovakia.

In an April 3 statement, the EU's Italian chair urgently requested that the Slovak government reassess what is considered the most menacing piece of legislation in the country's post-revolution history: the proposed "protection of the republic" amendment to the penal code.

Under the amendment—now in Parliament for the final reading—organizers of public gatherings "intended" to subvert the republic and those "spreading false information" about Slovakia abroad could face jail sentences of up to five years.

The EU stressed that the bill poses a severe threat to the cornerstones of democracy—freedom of speech and of association. In a veiled warning the EU also reminded the government of the human-rights standards that, as an associate member, Slovakia is committed to uphold.

Replying to the statement, Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kalman said the bill is both constitutional and democratic, and the EU's protest is merely a subjective "point of view."

Parliament handled the bill using the correct procedures, in accordance with the Slovak constitution, he said, hinting that the EU is meddling in Slovakia's internal affairs.

Nicolaas Wegter, press spokesman for the EU, said that if Slovakia continues to ignore warnings, the EU will exert diplomatic pressure. Theoretically, the EU could suspend Slovakia's associate membership, he said, although this would be a precedent-setting case.

The controversial bill was proposed by Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), and was first passed by a 77-57 majority in a rancorous March 26 parliamentary sitting.

In accordance with the political system, Parliament passed the bill on to President Michal Kovac, who returned it unsigned April 9, along with a damning reprise.

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Kovac urged parliament to delete the three sections that call for prosecution of crimes against the republic. These measures are "undemocratic, violating freedom of speech, information and assembly," he warned.

Parliament can now do one of three things: Pass the bill a second time in its original form, amend it, or reject it. Whatever the decision, the bill could soon become law, with or without the blessing of the EU or Kovac.

According to Daniel Butora of Radio Free Europe's Slovak service, if the bill passes parliament a second time, a group of no less than 30 dissenting deputies can appeal to the constitutional court to make a final decision.

However, the time lag between the law's being passed and a constitutional court hearing is vital, Butora said. Due to the court's backlog, issues awaiting a hearing are usually held for between three months and five years, he said. But if Parliament pushes the bill through, its effect could be published and enforced within a matter of weeks. During this time, the government could apply the law strategically, imprisoning a handful of high-profile scapegoats, in order to "create an atmosphere of fear" to sway the court's decision, Butora said.

But the furor of criticism sparked by the bill could cause Parliament to balk at passing the controversial legislation a second time around, he said.

Further, Parliament may not need to pass it.

According to opposition politicians, the "protection of the republic" bill was a tradeoff to appease a minor coalition member, the Slovak National Party (SNS), and win their support on the recent ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty.

Now that the treaty is signed, HZDS may not feel under such pressure to sign a piece of legislation that has already met with fierce opposition, Butora said.

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B-H: Izetbegovic Asks U.S. Envoy To Help Release 7 Muslims

AU3005145296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Alija Izetbegovic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency today received U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina John Menzies. The talks were attended by Muhamed Sacirbegovic, Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to the United Nations.

Ambassador Menzies delivered to President Izetbegovic a letter from U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in which Christopher stresses the importance the United States attaches to the implementation of the Dayton agreement, the elections in Mostar and the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in September, the strengthening of the federation, the arbitration on Brcko, and other issues.

Speaking about the problems in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, President Izetbegovic singled out the event when the Implementation Force handed over seven members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army to the Serb side in violation of all the rules and agreements, and asked Ambassador Menzies to do everything in his power to have these men released.

B-H: 'Hundreds' of Muslims Expelled From Serb-Held Teslic

AU3005192596 Paris AFP in English 1915 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 30 (AFP)—Hundreds of Moslems have been expelled from their homes in a Serb-held town in northern Bosnia in recent days, Moslem officials said Thursday.

A spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said it was the biggest case of "ethnic cleansing" since the Dayton peace accord had been signed.

The officials from the Serb-held town of Teslic told AFP around 600 Moslems had been kicked out of their homes by Bosnian Serbs in the past month, most of them in the last ten days.

Mujo Alagic, head of the Teslic civil defence committee, which meets in "exile" in the Moslem-held town of Tesanj, said the Moslems of all ages had been expelled from their homes by Serbs from nearby villages.

The Serbs had made telephone threats to some of the 1,400-1,500 Moslems still living in Teslic a few weeks ago, he said.

Ten days ago, they had followed that up with visits to their houses by masked men late at night, ordering people to leave the next day or face violence, he added.

UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski on Wednesday confirmed the expulsions of at least 100 Moslems from Teslic. It was the biggest case of "ethnic cleansing" since the signing of the Dayton agreement in December, he said.

"They received threats by phone, explosives were thrown at their houses, some were beaten up.

"Since Dayton, its the first significant wave of expulsions in Republika Srpska.... It's running against the entire idea of rebuilding a multi-ethnic society. It's a very alarming phenomenon," the spokesman added.

Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic told Bosnian radio Thursday that over 300 people had been forced to leave Teslic.

Safet Kunovac, secretary of the Teslic council in exile, who said he knew personally of "dozens and dozens of families" forced out of Teslic in the past week, criticised the NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR) and UN police for "doing nothing" to protect the Moslems remaining in the town.

The campaign, dubbed "ethnic cleansing," which marked the Bosnian war, has forced some 2.4 million people to leave their homes and transformed the ethnic map of Bosnia.

Teslic, which before the war was 55 percent Serb, 21 percent Moslem and 16 percent Croat, according to the 1991 census, is now considered a hardline Serb town whose authorities reject any return of Moslems or Croats, a UNHCR official in the nearby town of Tuzla told AFP.

B-H: Official Describes Serb Expulsion of Bosniaks From Teslic

AU3005150096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 May 96

[Report by Mirudin Aldobasic from "the free Teslic territory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbs have expelled several more Bosniak families from Teslic. So the ethnic cleansing continues in this area before the very eyes of the Implementation Force and the UNHCR.

Over the last 15 days, over 500 Muslim and Croat citizens have been expelled. We were told this today by Teslic municipality governor Fadil Osmanovic, who stressed at a news conference that life for the Bosniaks on the territory of the Serb entity in Teslic had become

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intolerable. Almost every day—with hearty assistance by the official Serb police—a group of Serbs visits Bosniaks and, using threats, gives them very short deadlines to leave their homes with their families. There were several cases when some Bosniaks did not heed the threats, and very late at night they were visited by masked Serbs who threw hand grenades into their homes, and so forced them to leave the Serb entity territory.

I think that the latest negotiations between us, the Bosniak representatives, and the representatives of the Serb entity are not only not taking us in the desired direction—toward the implementation of the Dayton agreement—but on the contrary, they are doing everything they can to preserve the existing borders, and ethnically cleanse their territory completely of the Bosniaks and Croats. That is why we have lodged a sharp protest, demanding full protection for the remaining Bosniaks living in the Teslic part of the Serb entity, Osmanovic said.

As the officials from the Teslic municipality stress, recently there have been several joint meetings on the implementation of the Dayton agreement, particularly Annex 7 that guarantees the right to every citizen to return home. Very little has been done so far; what is more, the Serbs are continuing their ethnic cleansing operation in Teslic. They are expelling the Bosniaks and settling into their homes fellow Serbs who have left the Sarajevo suburbs and who moved into this area.

B-H: Muratovic Comments on Latest Expulsions From Teslic

LD3005222996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Helmut Schaefer, German deputy foreign minister, has paid an official visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The talks he held with Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic focused on general elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the strengthening of the Federation, and the return of refugees. Amir Zukic has a report. [passage omitted]

[Zukic] After the meeting, Prime Minister Muratovic and the German deputy foreign minister addressed the assembled journalists. [passage omitted]

[Zukic] Commenting on more than 300 people being expelled from Teslic, Prime Minister Muratovic said:

[Begin Muratovic recording] This is a sign that the Pale regime has the impression that things are improving—relations are settling, visits by refugees have started. So, now they have to create new incidents so that things go one step backward. [end recording]

[Zukic] Prime Minister Muratovic pointed out that by expelling 300 people from Teslic the Serb authorities wanted to show that there will be no return of refugees, but that ethnic cleansing will continue until the final separation.

B-H: Teslic Authorities Suspend Contact With IFOR, UNHCR

AU3105144796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 31 May 96

[Report by Mirudin Aldobasic from "the free Teslic territory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In spite of all the agreements and efforts to implement the Dayton accords, and therefore put an end to the ethnic cleansing in Teslic municipality, the repression of Bosniaks has increased and expulsions have become more frequent. Serb terrorist groups are still storming Bosniak houses and threatening and harassing the owners; moreover, the deadlines they give these people for moving out of Teslic and its suburbs are extremely tight.

Therefore, negotiations and mediation efforts by Implementation Force [IFOR] and UNHCR representatives are not helping to stop the ethnic cleansing and have not protected the Bosniaks in the Serb entity.

So far, this has not yielded any results. That is why we have decided to suspend all contact with the international police and with IFOR and UNHCR representatives until concrete measures are taken to stop the expulsion of Bosniaks from Teslic. We were informed of this today by Teslic municipality Governor Adil Osmanovic. Osmanovic added that several families had been expelled from their homes overnight. They were not even allowed to take their personal belongings.

Expelled Bosniaks have confirmed that life in Teslic has become intolerable, and that if Serbs continue the expulsions, the town will soon be completely ethnically pure. The example of Teslic clearly shows that the implementation of the Dayton agreement, particularly Annex 7, is being called into question.

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B-H: 'Anonymous' Officers Say Delic Planning Assassination

AU3105105196 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 30 May 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Delic Ordered Assassination of Muslimovic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The main topic in the recent issues of Muslim newspapers is the discovery of a plan to assassinate retired General Fikret Muslimovic, Alija Izetbegovic's adviser on military matters.

The affair was discovered through the publishing of an anonymous and unsigned letter by eight officers of the military intelligence service of the Muslim army, who directly accused Gen. Rasim Delic of organizing the assassination, as the person in charge of giving orders, and Jusuf Jasarevic, head of the military intelligence service.

According to the unidentified officers, Muslimovic, who was retired at the age of 37, and appointed Izetbegovic's adviser as a spy, knows too much about the murky activities of the Muslim army.

"The conspirators" in the Muslim army are also revealing a number of other affairs, such as criminal activities under the auspices of the police and the army in the central parts of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Silajdzic Views Economic Situation, Threat to Borders

AU3005161596 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 29 May 96 p 13

[Report by O. Delic: "Dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina Is Job Done in Vain"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The founding assembly of the Municipal Council of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina has been held in Gracanica and attended by Party President Dr. Haris Silajdzic and Spomenka Micic and Muhamed Begovic, vice presidents of the party.

Addressing the people present, Dr. Silajdzic said that the way out of the complex economic situation in which we are is to open up the economy, reduce the bureaucracy, reduce the role the state plays in the economy, and separate political and economic power. The great burden of the reconstruction and renewal of the country should be borne by young and professional people and, in order to reconstruct Bosnia-Herzegovina, we must have that land and that state.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is now threatened. Its borders and its integrity are threatened. We cannot talk about the reconstruction of the country and our economy without having the protected external borders and the customs service as they should be. People are playing with our borders, using and abusing them to their advantage. The Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina is stressing the protection of borders at all places and at all times. I am working upon putting our relations with other countries on the right basis, and that right basis is respecting the country's sovereignty and integrity. I warn those people who are still working for the country's division that their job is in vain. Bosnia cannot be divided, Dr. Silajdzic said among other things. [passage omitted]

B-H: Izetbegovic Greets Tudjman on Croatian Statehood Day

AU3005151996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Alija Izetbegovic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency has sent greetings on behalf of the presidency and in his own name to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on the occasion of the Republic of Croatia statehood day. The message says:

I am taking this opportunity to express my readiness for full cooperation between our two countries based on equality and mutual respect, and based on full implementation of the Washington and Dayton agreements.

I wish the friendly Croatian people progress in peace and freedom, in the conviction that all the parts of the Republic of Croatia will soon be peacefully reintegrated.

B-H: Muratovic Accuses Bosnian Croats of Undermining Federation

LD3105153496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1508 GMT 31 May 96

["Pool" item; by Zdravko Milanovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 31 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Muslim Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic on Friday accused Bosnian Croat authorities of constantly undermining the foundations of the Muslim-Croat Federation.

Muratovic, a Muslim, said that last week's decision that the Bosnian Croat state of Herzeg-Bosnia set up its own intelligence service was the last straw in the creation of parallel authorities.

The Dayton Agreement clearly says that Herzeg-Bosnia can no longer adopt any regulations, Muratovic told the Sarajevo daily DNEVNI AVAZ in an interview.

Muratovic said that the intelligence service had been set up "with the blessing of President of the Muslim-Croat

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Federation Kresimir Zubak (Croat)." Zubak had previously accused the Muslim side of adopting laws "which violate provisions of the Federation's constitution and the Dayton constitution for Bosnia-Herezgovina."

In a letter to Muslim authorities, Zubak explained that the "adopted laws will not be implemented in the parts and certain [word indistinct] of the Federation's authorities."

The conflict in the Muslim-Croat Federation, which has been going on since the Federation was formed, has recently been defined by head of the Herzeg-Bosnia Presidential Council Ivan Bender.

"The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina does not interest us at all in the way it used to be. We will never let Bosnia-Herzegovina be a unitary and civil state. If we are not able to prevent it with political means, other necessary means are also available," Bender said.

Bosnian Muslims and Croats ended one year of fighting for territories in central and southwestern Bosnia under U.S. pressure in March 1994 by agreeing to form a Federation which has malfunctioned in practice.

Since the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the Federation's sponsors, primarily the United States and Turkey, have been trying to mediate between Croats and Muslims in order to revive the alliance.

Observers believe that the fate of the future union of Bosnia-Herzegovina largely depends on this.

B-H: Defense Minister Censures Deputy on Talks With Croats

LD3005215496 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Hasan Efendic, deputy defense minister of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, has issued a statement saying that he has decided to break off further talks on the defense law of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

The statement says that the reason for the break-off is that six days after the incident, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Defense Ministry have failed to acquire any information about the fate of two members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army who—judging by all appearances—were kidnapped in the Kiseljak area in violation of the basic principle of the Dayton agreement on freedom of movement. The talks with Croat representatives on the defense law will resume when the two members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army are released, or when their bodies are handed over.

After this statement was released, the office of the defense minister of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation issued a statement saying that the deputy minister's act was incomprehensible, and the public was reminded that on 25 May members of the military police of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army arrested six member of the Croat Defense Council [HVO] in Fojnica, and are still holding them hostage. The military police explained this action by what they say is the disappearance of the two members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in Kiseljak. The same statement says that the two members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army were arrested by members of the Serb army and that they are currently held in the Lukavica army base.

B-H: Gen Delic Views Forum on Federation Results

AU2405170496 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 18 May 96 p 5

[Interview with General Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Sefko Hodzic; place and date not given: "In Three Years a Unified Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the Washington Forum on the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an agreement was unexpectedly reached on the adoption of the federal Defense Act. It seems that the Defense Act was put on the agenda of the Forum of the Federation only later, because no representatives of either the Defense Ministry, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina [BH Army], or the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], had traveled to Washington. However, it is important that our politicians, with the help of the United States, have found solutions to disputed questions regarding the defense of the Federation, questions on which they were not able to reach agreement while in the country.

Military Reasons

Let us recall that the disputed questions involved the possibility for draftees to choose the place of their army service, and a deadline within which the BH Army and the HVO were supposed to become integrated into the federal army. From statements issued so far, it can be concluded that in Washington a Solomonic solution was found—the choice of the place of army service has been left up to draftees, while the final deadline for full integration by the BH Army and the HVO has been limited to three years.

What is the essence of the agreement in Washington, and in particular what will follow after the agreement that will enable us to form the unified army of the Federation within three years? We discussed these

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issues with General Rasim Delic, commander of the BH Army.

[Delic] The decisions made in Washington are more a result of political compromises than military reasons. However, it is clear that those solutions are the only possible ones at the moment. The conclusion that within three years the integration of all the armed forces in the Federation should be completed is the crucial element that renders all other reasons relative, even nonmilitary ones.

[Hodzic] What do you mean by nonmilitary reasons?

[Delic] Well, that has to do with the possibility given to draftees to choose the place of their army service, the length of the process of integration, and also the fact that in the first phase the integration of corps will not come about. Nevertheless, I repeat—this is not so important when one knows that the final deadline for full integration has been agreed upon. We got from Warren Christopher precise guidelines on what will be implemented and when, and what certain terms mean. And this is the guarantee that the process will lead to full integration.

[Hodzic] What issues are going to be dealt with right now in the process of integration?

[Delic] The joint Defense Ministry, and then the decision on the election of leading people to the joint command. One month from now the commander of the joint command and his deputy are supposed to be designated, and in two months members of the staff of the joint command will be designated. Then follows the decision on standardized uniforms and insignia. When you sum up everything, the army of the Federation could start operating in early 1997.

Navy and Inland Fleet

[Hodzic] Who will be the commander of the federal army, a Bosniak or a Croat?

[Delic] As the defense minister is Croat, it would be logical for the commander to be Bosniak, and for his deputy to be Croat.

[Hodzic] Who will act as the supreme command of the federal army?

[Delic] The army is federal, which means that in the majority of the army's activities the president and the vice president of the Federation will have a decisive say. However, when speaking of the protection of state integrity and the sovereignty and territorial borders of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which refers to mobilization and the use of the army for combat purposes, then, until the next elections, two members of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one being Bosniak and the other Croat, will have the final say. Our proposal is that, on behalf of the Bosniak people, that role should be given to President Izetbegovic, and we shall see whom the Croats will propose.

[Hodzic] Will there be in the federal army any units that will indicate by their names a national or religious affiliation, like Bosniak, Muslim or Croat?

[Delic] No, there will not. Units will not have any national identity. They will be called, for instance, the 1st Motorized Unit of the federal army, and such things. Likewise, the language of commanding will be uniform, which also applies to the training program, to services, and in particular to the air force and air defense, logistics, and so on.

[Hodzic] Are we going to have our own navy?

[Delic] We have planned to have it, and we shall see how we are going to develop it. We have also planned to have an inland combat fleet. We shall have that possibility when we get access to Brcko, that is, to the Sava River.

[Hodzic] Have the conditions been created now for the implementation of the program "train and equip?"

[Delic] The conditions have been created, and there is no reason why the program cannot be implemented in a month or so.

Party and Army

[Hodzic] Some generals in our army are also party officials. Will that be possible in the army of the Federation?

[Delic] Yes, and in that regard rumors are spreading that some generals will be put on party lists in the coming elections. However, what has been agreed upon and what is specified in the Defense Act will apply to them as well: Commanders in the federal army cannot hold office in political parties. Those who are party officials now (which also occurs in other parties, not only in the Party of Democratic Action) will have to choose between the party and the army.

[Hodzic] Are you a member of some party?

[Delic] I am not a member of any party, nor do I have any political ambition. I chose the army, and I will most probably end my career in it.

[Hodzic] Do you believe that the army of the Federation will really become fully integrated in three years? It has already been three years now since the Federation

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was officially founded, and things are not still going so smoothly....

[Delic] I think we will be able to create the joint army at the beginning of the next year. However, the political interests of the Croatian side at the moment do not favor the establishment of the joint federal army. Which means that it is more realistic that in three years we will finally have the fully integrated federal army. If, even after three years, the current two armies happen to still exist in the Federation, then one will not be able to speak about a federation.

[Box, p 5]

[Delic] As for soldiers, they are given the possibility, rather than right, to choose where they will perform their army service. Whether their preferences are taken into consideration or not will be eventually decided upon by the defense minister, that is, by his deputy. This possibility is given to reservists as well. Still, I think that the training of draftees will be standardized, so they will be able later on to continue their army service wherever they want.

B-H: Gorazde Bus Comes Under Hand-Grenade Attack 29 May

AU3005184796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 May 96

[Report by Anka Curova]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A letter has been forwarded to Implementation Force [IFOR] commander Admiral Leighton Smith, and Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community, concerning the incident that happened yesterday near the village of Mokro.

On that occasion, a hand grenade was thrown at one of the buses that was traveling in a convoy escorted by IFOR. Fortunately, it did not explode on time [words indistinct] passengers on the bus. So now it is the turn for hand grenades after the stoning and sniper attacks, the letter says. We wonder what weapon is next, what should happen for IFOR and the UN international police [words indistinct] and, at the same time, we express our concern that IFOR might behave [words indistinct] UNPROFOR.

We demand in the strongest of terms that IFOR and the UN international police undertake urgent and concrete measures to effectively protect the vehicles and passengers traveling along the blue road from Sarajevo to Gorazde, says the protest letter sent by the members of the government of Bosansko-Podrinje Canton from today's session. [passage omitted]

B-H: International Police Present Document on Federation Forces

AU3005150796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At today's news conference at the headquarters of the Implementation Force [IFOR] in Sarajevo, Peter Fitzgerald, commissioner of the UN international police, presented the [words indistinct] of the democratic police in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Fitzgerald stressed that the goal of these [word indistinct] was to restructure the federation police force and introduce work ethics in the federation police in line with the international police force. He stressed that this document was the result of the work of the commission set up two months ago, which was made up of representatives of IFOR and the international police, Federation Interior Minister Avdo Hebib, his deputy, and local police commanders. This document sets the standards of the police work, [word indistinct] of the new police force and the types of activities that this police forces would carry out, Fitzgerald said.

He stressed as particularly important the fact that the document determines the number of policemen in the new police force. We expect that the new police force will not exceed 12,000 members once it is restructured, Fitzgerald said. At the moment, there are some 20,000 federation policemen. He stressed that the training of the future federation police is the greatest unsolved problem and should be dealt with as soon as possible. Fitzgerald said that the new police force would be set up in each canton separately and that the Sarajevo canton was envisaged as the first region in which the police would be restructured.

According to Fitzgerald, the formation of the new police force in Sarajevo should be completed by the beginning of July. He stressed that the entire federation police would have gray uniforms, as was agreed in Petersberg. These policemen will not wear any national symbols. The policemen in each canton will be allowed to wear the symbols of that canton, Fitzgerald added.

Asked by the reporters why the same process had not been initiated in the Serb entity, Fitzgerald said that this had been discussed with the minister of the interior of the Serb entity and that he believed that an agreement would be reached by the end of June on the restructuring of the Serb police.

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B-H: Army Protests Restricted Freedom of Movement in HVO Area

AU3105112796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The international forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina have still not secured freedom of movement to the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was stated in a communique issued by the Press Center of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Frequent maltreatment of the citizens of the Bosniak nationality, especially while transiting Kiseljak, provides proof that the organs of authority in the area under the control of the HVO [Croat Defense Council] have enough will to deal with the irresponsible extremists and definitely secure freedom of movement to all the citizens of the Federation.

Regarding this, verbal and written protests have been sent, and the public, IFOR [Implementation Force], and the international police have been informed. The result of all these protests, and even agreements, was the release of some of the arrested persons, (?but we have) the cases of maltreatment and arrests, and even murder in [word indistinct]. The arrest and disappearance of the Bosniaks have this time had as a consequence the arrest of six members of the HVO brigade from Kiseljak, as the behavior of the federal partner so far has again given grounds to doubt them.

Rasim Delic, commander of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, has taken measures to establish the circumstances under which they were arrested, and has decided to release them. This was done in the hope that the organs of authority in the area under HVO control would take measures to secure the full freedom of movement for all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the same time, the HVO has officially announced the arrest of members of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army on the territory under HVO control. In connection with this, the commander of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's General Staff has sent a letter to Colonel General Zivko Budimir, chief of the HVO's General Staff.

B-H: Muslims Refuse To Release 6 Croat Soldiers

LD3005185596 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Six members of the 3d Guard brigade of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] have not yet been released from Muslim detention in Fojnica. Danijela Bosnjak reports from Kiseljak:

[Bosnjak] In connection with the arrest of six members of the HVO 3d Guard Brigade by Bosnia-Herzegovina military police and their detention over the past six days, the Kiseljak HVO of the Vitez operational zone has issued the following statement for the public:

The general public is aware of the fact that the Muslim side arrested six guardsmen in a terrorist action in Fojnica on 25 May, having accused the military and civilian leadership of Kiseljak of the alleged disappearance of two Muslim army members and one vehicle in Kiseljak municipality on 24 May. Investigation has shown, and IFOR [Implementation Force] has confirmed that the two Muslim army members were arrested by Serb police in the Trnovo area at about 2200 on 23 May, while engaged in banned and criminal activities. These two are now kept in a Serb prison in Kula. Contrary to any logic, the Muslim side is now pressurizing IFOR into releasing the Muslim criminals from the Serb prison and into arranging their exchange for the six Croat guardsmen, wrongly imprisoned in the Muslim prison.

The Dayton agreement has no such provisions. The HVO, the families of imprisoned soldiers, and the civilian authorities of Kiseljak, Kresevo, and Fojnica are urging the unconditional release of the imprisoned Croat guardsmen. It is up to IFOR now, the statement signed by Colonel Josip Tola says in conclusion.

B-H: Bosnia Investment in Port of Ploce Construction

96BA0297B Sarajevo FOCUS in Serbo-Croatian 2 May 96 p 24

[Article by Sejo Omeragic: "Bosnia Needs Ploce, but Without Bosnia No One Needs Ploce!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The port of Ploce, largely constructed with Bosnian money, has through many years of investment by enterprises from Bosnia-Herzegovina become an essential hub of economic traffic in the context of the Balkans and Central Europe, but because of the war and the stubbornness and economic "blindness" of the authorities in Zagreb, both the port and the city are threatened by the fate of complete ruin and economic neglect, even though Zagreb is announcing a compromise.*

Why Croatia "is not giving up" Ploce; absurd demands for an exchange for Neum; five terminals with an annual transshipment volume of five million metric tons; Bosnian Railroads have invested 55 million German marks [DM] to extend track to the port; what is the value of "Energoinvest's" property in Ploce; what has "Sipad" invested; can the Port of "Bar" be a last-resort alternative to the Port of "Ploce."

What will become of the Port of "Ploce" and will the Croatian side ultimately provide clear answers and

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offers of new contracts, which have served as the basis for previous operations? The first main issue was the concession of the port for 99 years, which is customary in international law. It is likely that all the Croatians' haggling cannot be logical even to their own economic experts. A couple of months ago, Bosnia-Herzegovina was offered a contract for use of the port for one year, and then for six months. Why? Even the other side's negotiators are probably unable to answer that.

It is obvious that politics in the neighboring state does not exactly have a rational basis, so that any problem is solved only after it is taken to absurd lengths. There may be an internal logic to this "cutting off the nose to spite the face," but still.... For now, it can be said that the port of "Ploce" is not regarded as strategic by the Croatian side. There can be no prosperity for any nation in the Neretva valley without this modern and mighty port. To have such options and not take advantage of them is a matter of metaphysics, not the normal weighing of merits.

Games Surrounding Ploce

One of the main reasons for such a policy, insiders say, could be the problem of the people from this city who suffered in the fighting between the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Army. On the other hand, however, there are also positive voices being heard from Ploce, because the people finally want to get back to work and abandon politics. One can also hear absurd demands for some sort of tradeoff of Neum for conceding the port to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, many people believe that turning the port over to Bosnia-Herzegovina ultimately constitutes abandonment of the futile dreams of some sort of Greater Croatian plan. But is not Ploce, in both war and peace, the victim of this very political option? One of the solutions being mentioned is that financial heavyweights from so-called Herceg-Bosna take out a one-year lease on the port and then charge the Bosnia-Herzegovina economy service fees for use of the port. But that would be robbery. Negotiations on leasing the port have been under way with the Croatian state's political structure and representatives of the city of Ploce for years now. Sometimes things appear to be simple, but then are suddenly complicated by the Croatian side, without anyone knowing why.

The port of "Ploce," with its five terminals—for bulk and liquid freight, for wood and loose freight, for livestock, with closed warehouses for general freight, with a silo for alumina and warehouses for petroleum coke—used to transship as much as five million metric tons of cargo annually. It depended on and shared the fate only of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland were also served through it. One very indicative fact is that the ministers who visited Sarajevo in succession after Croatian Minister Mate Granic's stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who arrived in Sarajevo with solutions for opening the port, were in fact from those very countries. Thus, Thessaloniki, Greece is not exactly a solution for the world's businessmen because of the considerable tension between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.

All Bosnian Investments in the Port

Ploce has great prospects and opportunities for a better life, and pure economic interest mandates that it be used. It is enough to note simply that the Bosnian economy created the port almost on its own, through major investments. The Bosnian Railroads (ZTO BiH) laid 22 km of modern track from the Bosnian-Croatian border to the entry into the port. That job cost DM55 million. Around 15 km of track, costing nearly DM40 million, was laid across the port itself, between the terminals and the station. All the work done by the Bosnian Railroads could be valued at nearly twice as much.

The value of the "Energopetrol" terminal comes to an astronomical DM350,140,000. The Bosnian economy has constantly and strategically invested in development of the port, so that there is no job in and around the port itself in which powerful Bosnian enterprises have not been involved. It is known that "Energoinvest" invested 15 percent of the capital in the construction of the Adriatic oil pipeline. The warehouse for 20,000 metric tons of alumina cost "Energoinvest" $8 million, while only one year later the handling capacity of that warehouse was increased with a further investment of $2 million.

"Sipad" also invested millions of dollars to set up its terminal for wood, and numerous Bosnian firms have practically brought in suitcases of money to persistently develop the port of "Ploce." It is estimated that the value of Bosnian capital invested in the port of "Ploce" is more than DM1.5 billion. And it is as if none of that is important under the new conditions.

Politics Is Stronger Than Interests

The question that arises is whether politics can be stronger than the interests of both nations, the economies of the two states, and so much invested capital. Businessmen know best of all that some day they will regret every hour of inactivity at the port. During the latest high-level negotiations, when Bosnian Ministers Koluder and Smailbegovic asked for only part of the port, the Bosnian Croat delegation was more unequivocal in its demands, proposing "either all or nothing."

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As far as we can tell for now, the Bosnian economy is ready for new investments in the event of a long-term lease of the port of "Ploce" by Bosnia-Herzegovina, an arrangement that is normal in international law. But if the political sphere continues to act irrationally, Bosnian businessmen will be willing to negotiate—and why not?—for use of the port of "Bar." There, it appears, people are no longer in the mood for politics.

[Box, p 24]

Bosnian Property in Croatia: Huge Amount of Alienated Wealth

In an attempt to protect Bosnia-Herzegovina property in Croatia, Bosnian delegations have for three years now been negotiating on tourist and catering facilities that are the property of companies and citizens of this state. Rough estimates show that a huge amount of public and private Bosnia-Herzegovina capital invested in the Adriatic tourism industry is at stake here. There are between 58 and 70 publicly owned facilities with 9,500 to 10,700 beds and between 535 and 775 privately owned weekend homes, with 7,200 to 8,800 beds. All of these structures are located on land that companies and citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina either own or have the right to use. The size of this land is between 1,292,000 and 1,644,000 square kilometers. The only question is when the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina will finally regain possession of their property.

B-H: Mostar Croats Concerned About Future of Dayton Agreement

LD3005143596 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The elections in Mostar are to take place on 30 June. This was announced to journalists by Ricard Perez Casado, the EU administrator in this town, after today's session of the advisory council. Here is a report by Anton Mrkonjic:

[Mrkonjic] I took the decision to hold the elections on 30 June on the basis of an agreement with the sides in Mostar; the new elections' decree includes new amendments we have also agreed on, Administrator Casado said briefly after today's meeting of the Mostar advisory council.

Voting will take place in Mostar and in EU offices abroad in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway. All sides will have to submit new electoral lists 20 days before the elections themselves or earlier—in other words, by 10 June—and decisions of the electoral commissions and supervisory committees will have to be repeated.

Mostar Mayor Mijo Brajkovic after the meeting said the Croat side had been prepared to take part in the elections on 31 May, and this will be the case on 30 June, too. He confirmed that the sides will be able to check on the voting in foreign countries, but he was unable to say in which towns the voting will take place in these foreign countries.

Asked whether he knew the places where voting would take place in Yugoslavia or in the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where several thousand Mostar citizens of Serb nationality live, Brajkovic said that they would probably be able to vote in Mostar.

The mayor of Mostar expressed the belief that the elections would finally go ahead and sent word that the Croat side is concerned about the future of the Dayton agreement, which in Mostar alone has been amended three times. We will be persistent, and will raise the question and seek clear answers to the issue of who has violated the Dayton agreement, first, over the city's statute, second, over the specification of the central zone in Mostar [supposed to be under joint Muslim-Croat control], and third, the one month delay in the timetable for Mostar's elections, Mijo Brajkovic said at the end.

B-H: Croat Mayor Criticizes Postponement of Mostar Elections

LD3005180596 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The municipal elections in Mostar will be held on 30 June. This is what Ricard Perez Casado, European administrator of Mostar, told journalists after a meeting of the advisory council today. [passage omitted]

[Begin Mijo Brajkovic recording, mayor of Croat part of Mostar] We agreed to these elections today, but this is something very indicative. I fear for the Dayton agreement, which has been altered three times already. First, it was altered when we did not approve a statute on 31 December 1995, as was set out in the Dayton agreement. Then a central zone was invented, and today—this is the third instance—the elections have been postponed.

We have demanded, and will continue demanding, a clear statement on why the elections have been postponed. Not for personal gratification, but once and for all it must be said clearly who is obstructing the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

The Croat side was perfectly ready for the elections. This is no empty phrase. Our commissions are working today as well and we will be ready by 30 June. Believe me, it is very important for us to hold these elections,

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to verify the situation in the town, and to elect city authorities in order to make normal life and work here possible. [passage omitted] [end recording]

B-H: Opposition Officials Comment on Mostar Elections

AU3005161196

[FBIS Report] Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian on 29 May on page 6 publishes statements by officials of five opposition parties regarding the Mostar elections.

Sejfudin Tokic, deputy chairman of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, UBSD, stated the following on behalf of five opposition parties (the UBSD, the Croatian Peasant's Party, the Republican Party, the Muslim Bosniak Organization, MBO, and the Socialist Democratic Party): "We still have the attitude that in Mostar at the moment there is not even a minimal degree of safety for citizens, freedom of movement, freedom of political organization, or an evenhanded presentation of parties by the local media. In such a situation, the elections in Mostar could turn simply into a vote based on citizens' ethnic affiliation and result in their homogenization around political options or politicians who cannot contribute to the restoration of interethnic confidence and the overall normalization of life in the city. Therefore, representatives of the opposition have demanded to talk with EU Mostar Administrator Casado, and, on that occasion, he will present his conditions under which the opposition will be able to run in the Mostar elections. After these talks, the opposition will announce its final attitude regarding its possible participation in the Mostar elections," Tokic said.

Since the MBO does not have branches in Herzegovina, especially in Mostar, Mujo Kafedzic, MBO deputy chairman, stated regarding the party's possible participation in the elections later in June that "it supports the organization of the elections as agreed upon." "As for the MBO, we shall run in the elections together with the five opposition parties if they, too, decide to participate in the Mostar elections," Kafedzic said.

Rasim Kadic, leader of the Liberal Party, commented on the Mostar elections as follows: "At this moment, we plan to hold a new round of consultations on the manner of participation in the elections in Mostar, and we shall probably run in them. We are relatively satisfied with such a solution, but we are dissatisfied with the way we reached it. That is, we are stuck in a tragic discrepancy between the need for a multiparty system and the reality of the agreement between the so-called national representatives. One result of such an agreement is an alleged leader of the Serbs in Mostar, who signed some document.

"In fact, the EU will not produce any long-term solution for Mostar, for it is constantly formally postponing the issue, and what we are going to have there eventually is an ethnic census of the local population. By such a concept, which includes only sides in negotiations rather than parties, we shall not accomplish any significant step toward a multiparty future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am afraid that Mostar is a matter that has been quite precisely agreed upon in advance between Sarajevo and Zagreb, and the results of that agreement are already well known," Kadic said.

Muhamed Filipovic, chairman of the Liberal Bosniak Organization, stated the following: "We shall participate in the Mostar elections, because I think that we have deserved that in view of the consistent policy we have pursued over the past years. I recall my tour of western and eastern Herzegovina in January 1990, right after the elections, whereupon I returned to Mostar. Then, I stated clearly that a Croatian state was formed on the right bank of the Neretva River, and I said the same for eastern Herzegovina, where I saw only pictures of Slobodan Milosevic all over the place, which nobody believed I did. Therefore, I consider that, in Mostar, we, as a party, are entitled to seek the support of all forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and particularly of the Croats who have understood that Herzeg-Bosnia has been just an extended arm of Croatia," Filipovic said.

B-H: IFOR General Says Freedom of Movement Does Not Exist

LD3005185496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1641 GMT 30 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, May 30 (TANJUG)—Absolute freedom of movement does not exist in any country, international peace Implementation Force (IFOR) commander for southwest Bosnia, General Michael Jackson of Britain, has said.

Gen. Jackson told a press conference in the city of Banja Luka, southwestern Bosnian Serb State Republika Srpska, that the issue of the freedom of movement is specially sensitive in this ex-Yugoslav republic.

Freedom of movement between the two entities in Bosnia is a very complex issue, Gen. Jackson said and added that this is why it should be resolved in an organized way by the Bosnian Serb police and the police force of the Muslim-Croat Federation.

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IFOR is here to prevent "collective and uncontrolled crossings of the border which could be provocative and dangerous," Jackson said.

Regarding the release of all prisoners, Jackson said that all three until-recently warring sides in Bosnia are still holding a certain number of POW's but that IFOR's mandate is not to "break into jails and set them free."

Responding to a remark by TANJUG that Croatia is holding the biggest number of POW's, Jackson said this is highly probable and that "the international community should pressure Croatia to fulfill this obligation as soon as possible."

The spokesman of the Banja Luka office of the U.N. International Police (UN/IPTF), Alun Roberts, spoke about the incidents which occurred during the unannounced visits by a group of citizens of both entities in Bosnia.

Roberts referred to recent attempts by Muslims from the city of Sanski Most, central Bosnia, to enter neighboring Prijedor, the arrest of six local Croat soldiers by Muslims near Travnik, and the arrest of three Croat policemen in Bosnia by Serb authorities near Mrkonjic Grad.

B-H: War Crimes Suspect Erdemovic Testifies on Srebrenica

AU3105095496 Paris AFP in English 0921 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] The Hague, May 31 (AFP)—A soldier who fought for the Bosnian Serbs pleaded guilty Friday before the UN war crimes tribunal to charges of taking part in the killing of hundreds of Moslem civilians in Srebrenica in July 1995.

"I plead guilty," an emotional Drazen Erdemovic, a 24-year-old ethnic Croat, told the court. [passage omitted]

Charged with crimes against humanity for killing Muslims when Serb forces overran Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia, Erdemovic said Friday: "I was forced to do it. If I had refused, I would have been killed along with the victims."

"I am not sorry for myself, but for my family, my wife, and my son, who was only nine months old at the time."

As Erdemovic spoke, his voice broke with emotion and he had tears in his eyes. Judge Claude Jorda of France asked Erdemovic to sit down and regain his composure and then informed him that once he pleaded guilty, there was going back on his statement.

Jorda set the dates of July 8 and 9 for another hearing to determine whether there were attenuating circumstances and, in light of them, to decide Erdemovic's sentence. He also decided that the defendant should be examined by a psychiatrist, a move which was agreed by the prosecution and defence. He explained that if there were no extenuating circumstances, the accused could face life imprisonment, the maximum sentence which can be imposed by the court.

The court has no guidelines of its own on sentencing, relying instead on those which existed in Yugoslavia before the Bosnian war broke out in April 1992.

Erdemovic was arrested in Serbia on March 2 along with another suspect.

When he appeared in court in Nov Sad, northern Serbia, he acknowledged taking part in a summary execution at a collective farm at Pilica, near Zvornik, in eastern Bosnia.

A few days earlier he told a journalist with the French newspaper LE FIGARO, "I did not kill more than 70." [passage omitted]

B-H: Arsovic Questions Legality of Dayton Accord, Hague Trials

LD3005193296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1620 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 30 May (SRNA)—In a report submitted to government members in Pale today, Serb Justice Minister Marko Arsovic said that the Dayton documents were of very little value, because many were written in a "cunning political language" that could not be interpreted by any legal method.

"From the legal point of view, the provisions whose meaning cannot be detected through interpretation are not binding for anyone. No party—signatory to the agreement—can replace an unclear provision with a clear one without the consent of the other party," states the analysis of the Dayton Agreement.

Stressing that the Dayton Agreement had the character of international agreements, Arsovic explained that the Serb Republic, despite its willingness, will be unable to meet the obligations it had taken upon itself unless the other sides—parties to the agreement—do the same.

"This is a normal consequence of the very definition of the agreement as a legal institution," the report says, adding that—from the legal point of view—no party, not even international organizations involved in this process, can insist on solutions that are not contained in the Dayton Agreement.

Arsovic believes that serious controversies, above all the Dayton constitution, should be overcome by insisting on the strict and consistent application of those provisions

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of the constitution that spell out the areas of authority of the "so-called entities and those of the joint state, which is undefinable by its character."

In his report, Arsovic also said that some of the documents of the Dayton Agreement "seriously threatened its own implementation by predicting cooperation with The Hague tribunal."

"Such provisions seriously threaten the implementation of some strategic goals of the agreement, such as freedom of movement, the repatriation of refugees, and free democratic elections," the report says.

The Dayton Agreement's stipulations, according to which individuals indicted by The Hague tribunal cannot be elected to any post, cut off any possibility for fair and democratic elections at the root, Arsovic has said.

In his report on the implementation of the Dayton Agreement submitted to the government in Pale today, he pointed out:

"This is obviously a mechanism intended to exclude from the elections any candidate unacceptable to the international community. This is how puppet governments are created."

Arsovic recalled the absurd fact that the agreement on the elections was based on the protocol of the second session of the OSCE conference on human rights held in 1990 which "identifies the will of the people as the basis for every government's power."

The Serb justice minister believes that The Hague tribunal has been unlawfully established and that its decisions will, sooner or later, be proclaimed null and void.

Annulling the essential political right of every citizen—to be elected—the Dayton Agreement, the report notes, "has violated the universal UN Declaration on Human Rights and Treaty on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms signed by all the member states of this world organization."

"All these international documents, which in my opinion override the Dayton Agreement, affirm the so-called presumption of innocence—the essence of it is that anyone is presumed innocent until proved otherwise by a decree absolute," the justice minister concluded his report.

B-H: UN War Crimes Team Uncovers Bodies in Eastern Region

AU2905202396 Paris AFP in English 2007 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Nova Kasaba, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 29 (AFP)—UN war crimes investigators on Wednesday unearthed the remains of four men at a roadside site in eastern Bosnia where hundreds of Moslems from the town of Srebrenica are believed buried. [passage omitted] On Wednesday—making their fourth visit to the Srebrenica area since January—a team of six court investigators searched a new roadside site at Nova Kasaba on the road between Srebrenica and Vlasenica, broadening out the scope of their inquiry into the alleged killings.

After probing the ground with long poles, and marking out areas to be investigated later, they then moved on to a previously visited site on a muddy track leading up from Nova Kasaba to the nearby village of Cerska.

The four bodies were discovered when the UN team, backed by NATO peacekeepers and watched by journalists, dug three holes at the side of the road.

In one hole, dug at random, they found two pairs of leg bones lying askew in two pairs of shoes. Digging another pit, they found a skull with a bullet hole. In the third hole an entire skeleton was uncovered, partially clothed, still showing some hair on the head, and again, with a bullet hole in the back of the skull.

The skeleton was buried only 30 centimetres (one foot) deep, covered by earth which had apparently been scooped up from the other side of the track and laid over with planks of wood.

Hundreds of empty bullet cases lay scattered nearby.

The early evidence from the investigation appears to lend weight to still officially uncomfirmed reports of mass graves around Srebrenica—evidence of what US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright has called the worst single warcrime since World War II. [passage omitted]

An investigator told AFP it is unlikely that any of the dozen or more suspected mass grave sites currently being inspected will be fully excavated during the current visit, but added that this was likely to happen "soon."

Many ordinary Bosnian Serbs interviewed by AFP in recent weeks deny that any "special event" took place at Srebrenica and claim that reports of mass killings have been hatched by the western media and the US government to discredit the Serbs.

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B-H: World Congress of Serbs: IFOR Plans To Destroy RS

AU3105091296 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 30 May 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Destruction of RS Is Being Prepared"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Paris-based World Congress of Serbs, the Foundation for Truth About Serbs in Belgrade, the "Nemanja" Serb Association in Bielefeld, and the "Vuk Karadzic" Association in Bonn have received "from a reliable and confidential source information regarding the decision to finally destroy the Serb Republic [RS]." This was stated in a communique issued by the World Congress of Serbs, signed by Vladimir Umeljic, Radmila Ninic, and Vera Bojic.

According to this source, French troops, with or without the participation of the Army of Yugoslavia, would carry out an assault on Pale, while the IFOR [Implementation Force] Nordic battalion would defend the line dividing the RS in two parts, the line from Tuzla to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, "alternatively below Zepa."

The World Congress of Serbs states that the reliable source said that the Americans would not take part in the action, but would only protect the corridor, and that "Clinton will be the supreme commander, and Leighton Smith coordinator of the entire operation on the ground."

Also, it is claimed that "the British in Banja Luka will set up a new government headed by Rajko Kasagic." "The action could be carried out as early as tomorrow, or in the next few days. All that is awaited is the answer of French President Chirac," the source claims, and the World Congress of Serbs based in Paris reports. It also adds that the 2 June meeting in New York "will only represent the public confirmation of everything that has been agreed." The communique also says that the Congress and the Foundation for Truth About Serbs have sent a protest to the world powers, expressing the belief that this "infernal plan will not and cannot succeed if all the Serbs oppose it and stand behind the RS president as the symbol of Serb struggle for freedom."

[Box, p 5]

"Discount" for Mladic?

"Radio and television stations would be in the hands of IFOR, and everything that comes out of Pale will be blocked. Any attempt by Karadzic to address the people would be prevented. "Only Karadzic would be handed over to The Hague immediately. Mladic would only be handed over in the event he refuses to cooperate," sources at the World Congress of Serbs claim.

B-H: NATO Spokesman Denies Plans 'To Break Up' RS

AU3105093596 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 31 May 96 p 5

[Report by D.B.: "There Are No Plans To Break Up RS!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] NATO spokesman Jamie Shea yesterday stated that the "NATO headquarters is completely unaware" of any plans for NATO and IFOR [Implementation Force] military action, in alleged cooperation with the Army of Yugoslavia, to break up the Serb Republic and to install new authorities, as reported by the World Congress of Serbs in Paris.

"This is completely unfounded," senior NATO official Shea told VESTI, adding that, considering the claims that the alleged action could be carried out "immediately or in the next few days," we in the NATO headquarters would in that case know at least something about it. Preparations for the action of that type would be under way and would hardly escape the eye of the observers in NATO, let alone on the ground," the NATO spokesman said.

He said that these were "obviously arbitrary claims." Shea said that he had "never heard" what the World Congress of Serbs in Paris claims, nor that the British troops would take Banja Luka and "install Kasagic in power there," or that the French IFOR battalion, with or without the cooperation of the Army of Yugoslavia, "carry out an assault on Pale," or that the IFOR Nordic battalion would "protect the line dividing the RS in two parts," or that "only Karadzic would immediately be handed over to the Hague Tribunal," while "General Mladic would be handed over to The Hague only if he refuses to cooperate...."

B-H: Milosevic's Willingness To Extradite Karadzic Pondered

AU3105111496 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 31 May 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "From Belgrade to The Hague?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The secret talks for the extradition of these two leaders to the UN tribunal in The Hague started under U.S. pressure, Belgrade media report, citing well-informed Bosnian Serb sources.

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The meeting was not officially announced, however, it was reported that Karadzic and Mladic were present in Belgrade.

Diplomats believe that the outcome of these talks could be of key significance for the international efforts to gradually implement the Bosnian peace agreement.

Under Washington's threat that economic sanctions against the FRY could be restored, Milosevic gathered the Bosnian Serb leadership on the eve of the new visit by U.S. mediator John Kornblum in Belgrade.

The group consists of Bosnian Serb Parliament Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik and Vice President Biljana Plavsic, to which Karadzic has recently transferred some of his authorities.

Bosnian Serb sources claim that these talks will define the expansion of the Serbs' cooperation in the peace process and the future of the arbitration on Brcko.

Bosnian Serb hardliners claim that Radovan Karadzic is willing to abandon public life while other sources claim that Milosevic might make him do so today.

The West nevertheless fears that Karadzic could continue to exert strong influence from "behind the scenes" and that only his "removal" to The Hague would fully guarantee that he would not have any authority whatsoever.

Mediators believe that Milosevic has the power to extradite Karadzic and Mladic to the court, the only question is whether he has the desire to do so.

B-H: Modrica Rally Shows Serbs Support Karadzic, Mladic

AU3105111996 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 30 May 96

[Report by Mihajlo Orlovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last night in Nemanjic Square, in the grand atmosphere for people of Modrica remember, the inhabitants of Posavina, Trebava, Ozren, and other areas of that part of the Serb Republic once again demonstrated their support for President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic. They came by bus, train, and however they could from Teslic, Doboj, the villages of Ozren, and Posavina. It is estimated that the rally was attended by over 7,000 people. They carried little flags and signs with messages from their hearts: "We created the Serb Republic and saved the people from extinction, and we will save our leaders, too."

[Begin recording] [Dragan Kojic, member of Modrica Association of Soldiers] Those of us who fought in this war call on you to say an all-Serb no to those who want to hear us say an obeisant yes. The international community demands that the leaders of the Serb nation be extradited to the Hague Tribunal or eliminated from the political and military scene of the Serb Republic. The Hague Tribunal is the epitome of the unjust and unfair position of the international community toward the warring sides on the territory of former Bosnia. Only the leaders and representatives of our Serb nation are prosecuted, and this actually puts the entire Serb nation in the dock.

[Vladoje Simic, SDS vice president] We will not let our president leave his position in the Presidency of the Serb Republic. [crowd cheers] No pressure or force will make him resign. Only we can decide whether he will be our president. [end recording]

The following messages were heard at the rally: "We will cultivate and develop our country as we see fit. We will make it better for our children. Honor and pride is the very fabric of our country. We cherish our honor." After this rally held in Modrica, the potentates of this world will hopefully realize that the people of the Serb Republic are behind their president and general.

B-H: Gradiska Serbs Rally in Support of Karadzic, Mladic

AU3105110396 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 30 May 96

[Report by Rade Grbic]

[FBIS Translated Text] As national parties and organizations always do, today's rally in support of the Serb Republic leadership and its president Radovan Karadzic and Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic, chief of RS Army General Staff, organized by the municipal committee of the Gradiska [Bosanska Gradiska] Serb Democratic Party [SDS], began with the national anthem. In the presence of many people supporting the president and the general, speeches were delivered by members and supporters of the SDS, both from the Serb Republic and the FRY. Workers, soldiers who fought in the Serb liberation war, refugees, doctors, engineers, scientists...they all concluded: By prosecuting the two leaders of the Serb nation on this side of the Drina River, the international community is making a mistake and a Sisyphean labor, because knowing the peaceful manner of the Serb people, whose history only knows of defensive wars, the Serbs would not dream of extraditing President Karadzic and General Mladic.

[Begin recording] [Mladen Babic, RS Army soldier] What kind of a soldier, officer, and Serb would I be if I betrayed my commanders. That would make me a follower of Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo Tudjman, and

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all the thieves of this world who want to prosecute our leaders—leaders who only wanted to preserve Serbhood, the Serb nation, and to survive 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, etc. [end recording]

The words of this soldier best epitomize the feeling of the entire Serb nation as well as their criticism of the part of the international community which, in the war imposed on the Serbs, without any proof whatsoever, accuse the entire Serb nation by summoning it to The Hague, thus siding with traditional enemies of the entire West and civilized world. In conclusion of the rally, a group of citizen members of the Podgradac choir sang songs to President Karadzic and Gen. Mladic.

B-H: Opposition Leader: Karadzic Should Be Judged in Elections

AU3005202096 Paris AFP in English 2007 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 30 (AFP)—A Bosnian Serb opposition leader called Thursday on Serb leader and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic to stand in elections so he could be judged by the people.

"We think Mr. Karadzic should be a candidate in the elections," said Zivko Radisic, vice president of the Socialist Party of the Republika Srpska (SPRS), the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"Whether he wins or loses, it will be (because of) the will of the people and not outside factors," he added.

As an indicted war criminal Karadzic, under the Dayton accord, cannot hold public office, but he nevertheless remains in power in the Republika Srpska.

Elections are due to be held in both the Serb entity and the Moslem Croat Federation by the end of September.

Radisic said his SPRS wanted to beat Karadzic and the ruling Serb Democratic Party on the political front.

As for Karadzic's indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Radisic said: "If there was injustice and crime, our people will know how to judge (them), and those who are guilty will have to answer to the people."

He said attempts by the international community to sideline Karadzic only strengthened his interests and that of his party.

Radisic said the SPRS saw the Dayton accord as an opportunity to forge an entity "with all the attributes of a state."

The party is holding its first congress Saturday [1 June] in Banja Luka.

B-H: French Ambassador Discusses Disarmament With Klickovic

LD3105120896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1035 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 31 May (SRNA)—Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, had talks in Pale today with Eve Godain, French ambassador in Sarajevo, on questions in connection with the disarmament process, which is regulated by the Dayton Agreement.

Ambassador Godain handed Klickovic a note from the contact group members who are monitoring and supervising the Vienna disarmament negotiations. A note has also been handed to representatives of the Muslim-Croat federation.

"For our part we promise that, in keeping with the provisions of the Dayton Agreement, we will bring our influence to bear on our negotiators in Vienna to ensure that they have a platform according to which everything accepted by us in the Dayton Agreement is implemented," Klickovic said.

He added: "If there are no major problems with the other participants, and if the equality of the Serb Republic is respected, I believe that a disarmament agreement will be signed in Vienna on (?8) June." [passage omitted]

B-H: VREME Provides Biographic Sketch of Gojko Klickovic

AU3005155396 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 25 May 96 p 13

[Unattributed report: "Martic's Reincarnation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gojko Klickovic is the new prime minister of the Serb Republic. He was appointed by Radovan Karadzic, and the Assembly, chaired by Momcilo Krajisnik, confirmed his appointment.

Klickovic was born on 25 March 1955 in Krupa na Uni [Bosanska Krupa]. He graduated from the Faculty of Sociology in Sarajevo and, according to Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI, he "finished his postgraduate studies in Osijek and Belgrade, majoring in legal-economic sciences."

Klickovic's political career in the Serb Republic began in his native town. There, during the war, he did all sorts of jobs save that of Orthodox priest: chairman of the Municipal Committee of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS], deputy chairman and chairman of the Executive Committee of the city assembly, chief of the Crisis Staff, chairman of the municipal Wartime Presidency, chairman of the municipal assembly.... Today, Krupa na

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Uni belongs to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its Serb citizens are living as refugees.

A VREME correspondent met Klickovic for the first time in the communal kitchen of the Red Cross in Banja Luka. He was in charge of refugees. He stood there dressed in a white overcoat, chopping up cabbage for refugees' meals. Asked whether people who are not Serbs could get something to eat there, he replied in time with the rhythm of his chopping: "Uncle Gojko feeds only Serbs!"

In the meantime, Klickovic has advanced. He became the deputy minister for health care, labor, and welfare. At the same time, he was able to continue caring for his fellow countrymen as the head of staff for the reception of refugees, first from [Croatian] Krajina and then from the Bosnian Krajina as well. During his term, he also cared for the citizens from Serb-controlled Sarajevo: Most of them spent the winter, nearly starving, in collective accommodation centers in Zvornik, Bijeljina, Brcko, Srebrenica....

Klickovic's appearance and manners are rather reminiscent of an unsophisticated version of Milan Martic. We have heard from our foreign colleagues that, asked whether he met Klickovic, an officer of the Implementation Force replied: "What am I supposed to discuss with him?"

B-H: Koljevic Criticizes Press Statement on SDS Membership

AU3005171396 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Serb Republic Vice President Nikola Koljevic denied a part of his statement to Doboj ALTERNATIVA: "I did not say I was not a member of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS], although that is true and is no secret since I said so at the assembly session. To put it mildly, I consider such a fabrication to be an incorrect manipulation that does not contribute to the patriotic and state interests of the Serb Republic, which I have always thought to be more important than party interests."

B-H: SDS Head Voices Party Desire To Unite With Serbia

AU3105110996 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 30 May 96

[Report by Veljko Babic]

[FBIS Translated Text] "We fought a bitter battle and lost many lives in creating the Serb Republic [RS]. We shall therefore not let anyone toy with us and our state. The Serb Democratic Party [SDS] bore the brunt of creating that state and organized the Serb people to defend their homes," said participants in the election meeting of the municipal committee of the Novi Grad [Bosanski Novi] SDS. Going over the activities since its foundation, Vlado Vrkes, president of the Secretariat of the RS SDS, said the following:

[Begin Vrkes recording] We want to unite with Serbia, with FRY, if possible. If that is not possible, we want to have an independent state that will reunite with Serbia. As long as the SDS exists, we will never relinquish that goal. The Serb nation fought for independence in the framework of former Bosnia-Herzegovina. When that was no longer possible—you saw what happened in the former parliament of former Bosnia-Herzegovina—the Serb nation seceded, formed its own state entity, and started creating its own country. When that stage of fighting the Serb nation fell through, certain centers of power, chiefly through the Muslims and the Croats, started a war against the Serb nation with the main goal of eradicating the Serb nation in this region. [end recording]

Following a discussion by guests and several assembly members, 34 members were appointed to the SDS municipal committee, while 11 members will be appointed by party president Radovan Karadzic. A five-member supervisory committee was also elected, and as many delegates were appointed to the party republic assembly [republicka skupstina stranke]. The session participants demonstrated support for the leaders of the Serb Republic. The message of the session is that the Serb nation will not relinquish those who led and guided them for five years, no matter how much our enemies crave it.

B-H: New Bosnian Serb Party Established in Krajina

LD3005191396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1536 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 30 May (TANJUG)—The Serb Party of Krajina [SSK—Srpska Stranka Krajine] was presented in Banja Luka today. Party Chairman Predrag Lazarevic said that "the party will be set up on a regional basis, which does not represent a division of the Serb identity" but "the harmonization of regional and shared interests."

According to him, the SSK is a modern party that will insist on solving the Serb national issue, a commitment identical with the creation of a Serb civic state, not a unitary one, but one based on regions with the final aim of uniting with Serbia "when historic conditions for that are ripe."

The SSK will advocate "the Scandinavization" of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which implies the creation of

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clear borders between nations, with the possibility of resettlement, exchange of property or compensation for it, as well as every individual's inalienable right to live in the other entity and exercise his minority rights.

Djordje Umicevic, chairman of the SSK executive committee, stressed that the people from Krajina have nothing against Pale or any other part of the Serb Republic, and that they are certainly not in favor of causing disunity among the Serbs, but that they are against favoritism toward any one region at the expense of another.

It was announced that the SSK would participate in the parliamentary elections in September.

B-H: Serbs Arrest Muslim in Zvornik

AU3005201396 Paris AFP in English 1959 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 30 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb authorities Thursday arrested a Moslem man in east Bosnia and told UN police he was connected to a group of seven Moslems held since mid-May, a UN spokesman here said.

The man, who UN spokesman Andrea Angeli declined to identify, was being held at Zvornik police station.

He was visited Thursday by UN police and told them he was not being mistreated. The UN police had been allowed to inspect him for marks of bruising and had found none, Angeli said.

The Serb authorities told UN police the man was connected to a group of seven Moslems who surrendered to NATO peacekeepers near the eastern town of Zvornik in mid-May and were turned over to Serb authorities.[passage omitted]

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Croatia: Susak Views U.S. Ties, B-H, IFOR Mandate

AU3005202396 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 29-30 May 96 pp 4-5

[Interview with Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak by Branko Tudjen; place and date not given: "Each Time Around You Must Get Credit With the Electorate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gojko Susak, minister of defense of the Republic of Croatia and vice president of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], is one of the most prominent personalities in Croatian political life. He has been defense minister for five years, in which time the Croatian Army has walked a path from its dramatic creation in the time of Greater Serbian aggression to the splendid victories and liberation in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1995.

As the vice president of the HDZ, Mr. Susak is directly involved in all Croatian domestic questions. Apart from that, he performs a very important and delicate role in the Croatian policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the Croatian people on that territory and for the protection of their equal position there.

[Tudjen] Mr. Susak, what is your view of the state of the Croatian Army today after all the Storms, Flashes, and other operations, after the excellently accomplished tasks? Is the task of liberating our country completed, considering that Croatian Podunavlje [the Danube River basin] is still not under our full sovereignty, and is the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina definitely solved?

[Susak] The process of liberation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is over. The Croatian Army has ended the phase in which it had to have many more troops than in the peacetime organization, and we are now continuing with the normal organization and reorganization of the Croatian Army. We need not even one soldier more than what is normal under peacetime circumstances and, therefore, our goal is to ensure that the professional part of our army—maintaining the level of readiness, discipline, and morale we have today—is capable of guaranteeing, if necessary, Croatian sovereignty in eastern Slavonia and Croatian interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the interests of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, if any of that will be necessary.

We Are Not Settling Our Accounts With the West

[Tudjen] What is behind the block on Croatia's admission to the Council of Europe? The Croatian opposition, too, recognizes that it is not the allegedly jeopardized freedom of the media or the Zagreb case [dispute over control of Zagreb city authorities] in the background, but that there are some other games involved. In what way is the West putting pressure on Croatia and with what objective?

[Susak] We are used to such games, and I do not want this to be understood as our settling accounts with the West. No Croatian official wants something like that. The West has its standards and its conditions, we have our goal—the democratization of Croatia. We want to join the West. There are no set terms. Therefore, recent suggestions in the Croatian public that we have set a time limit for those objectives, that we did not succeed in accomplishing them, and that everything collapsed are not realistic. We must accept this as a process of democratizing Croatia, and we will be as attractive to Europe as Europe will be attractive to us. Let us allow that process to continue, however, so that both we and Europe will get to that.

Did they postpone Croatia's admission for some other reasons? In my opinion, yes, they did. I will mention only one situation. I had lunch with Ambassador Galbraith perhaps a week before the Washington meeting on the confederation. Then he told me explicitly: We consider the Zagreb case to be your own internal affair, we do not question it at all. However, over the following seven days in Sarajevo the situation regarding the Defense Law of the Federation became complicated, and we had had to reach an agreement by the day of the meeting in Washington. Now all the U.S. representatives asked why that had not been achieved and even mentioned the Zagreb case. That shows, although they put it differently, that they use such pressures sometimes. However, that is a part of politics, I can see no reason to panic. I have no doubt that Croatia will be in the Council of Europe and then in the European Union, and the question of whether that will be today or in six months does not stop Croatia.

In the Partnership by the End of This Year

[Tudjen] Can our membership in the Partnership for Peace be jeopardized by some such move or pressure at a given moment?

[Susak] We assess that important things regarding that will happen in the fall. By then we will already have the agreements on military cooperation signed with the majority of our neighbors, but not with all of them, and Defense Secretary Perry will visit Croatia in August, perhaps in September. The meeting will take place in autumn. Perry will advocate Croatian membership, and we will have support from all sides. It is my belief that it is realistic to expect that Croatia will be admitted into the Partnership by the end of the year.

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[Tudjen] Is the policy of the United States toward Croatia nevertheless more credible, more courageous, and more realistic than the policies of the west European countries?

[Susak] Yes, it is, but you must understand that when we talk about west European policy, we are actually talking about the delirium of interests that exists in Europe. The English policy is one thing, the French another, the German a third, not to mention the Spanish and all the other policies. We can love U.S. policy or not, but it has its directions, and it is united at a given moment. It can change. The United States' relations with Croatia in 1991 is one thing and the United States' relations with Croatia today is something completely different; they are like night and day. We are partners today, but then [1991] we were seen as someone who disturbed the system that, in some way, was suitable for them. We cannot compare the policies of Europe and the United States in that way. We can only talk about individual European countries.

Sympathy From Washington

[Tudjen] How would you comment on certain articles that say that you, in full accord with President Tudjman, brought about the U.S. policy on the Republic of Croatia? Or perhaps that question is asked in the wrong way, and one should say that you contributed to the rapprochement with the United States?

[Susak] One could say that what was going on in my field of work helped U.S. policy, which conditioned the establishment of communications with Croatia. I think that everyone, each and every one of us from the president downward, in his own way, at his own level, contributed to that. Because the Croatian Army was necessary to make the Dayton Accord possible, it is perhaps overemphasized in public that the Ministry of Defense has been the key to relations between Croatia and the United States. Perhaps, at that level, the Ministry of Defense is the ministry with the highest interaction, which is Croatia's wish and is, to some extent, confirmed by the United States.

[Tudjen] What is your estimate of U.S. sympathy for Croatia now? Is it cooling down, or is that only the assessment of those who wish it to be so?

[Susak] Some people in discussions in the Presidential Council—and it can often be heard in the media and in analyses—claim that U.S. interest in Croatia will wane. I think that assumption is wrong. What U.S. interest will be like depends more upon Croatia than upon Washington. Geostrategically and geopolitically, we are situated in an area that will never be uninteresting to the United States—that is, if we continue the policy that we have conducted so far and if at the head of the state ministries we—regardless of who is there, today it is I, tomorrow it will be someone else, just like Granic's place, too—do not occupy the front pages of American newspapers, and I pray to God that Croatia will not make the headlines as it has done so far, but that it will be on the third, fourth, or fifth pages of articles that praise good cooperation at all levels, both military and in peacetime.

Unfortunately, Our Opposition Is Not Strong

[Tudjen] Local and county elections are scheduled for the fall. A part of the opposition and the sensationalist press is trying to impose a thesis which says that the HDZ is growing weaker. How do you interpret such suggestions?

[Susak] Nothing gives me reason to draw such a conclusion, although we are entering a new phase in which people ask different questions and one easily forgets all what has been done so far.

[Tudjen] There is no gratitude in politics.

[Susak] That is the reality of politics and political life. I think that is justified and, as a voter, I would support that in some way. Each time around you must get credit with the electorate so that one can represent the people. At this moment, I simply cannot see anyone serious enough, organized enough, or politically and organizationally equipped enough who could take over at any level and rule efficiently. Will that process happen? Not once in the past six years have I stated publicly that it is a pity our opposition is not strong. For some time the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] had potential, but what happened to it has happened and that is all. Unfortunately, there is no opposition party in Croatia strong enough, which is a pity for Croatia, but a strong opposition would not be at the expense of HDZ. The ruling party in any free society should know how to use a strong opposition in the implementation of the current programs. Unfortunately, we have no such thing; we only have criticism. Let me put it straight; that is a part of the democratic process, and I do not deny anyone's right to criticize, but we have nothing but criticism. We have no program created by an oppositional party, no draft laws, or anything, nothing we could reject. There is only what we have offered and there are critics who say it is not good.

About All-Croatian Reconciliation

[Tudjen] The idea of all-Croatian reconciliation has created a lot of noise in public life. For some people it is an inappropriate or pointless question; for others no reconciliation is acceptable with the others. As a man

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who, for political reasons, lived outside his homeland during the time of the former regime, how do you approach this issue?

[Susak] For me, too, it is, to some extent, an inappropriate and pointless question. It was not inappropriate in 1987, 1988, or 1989 when I met the president. It was not inappropriate when the party had that in its program, when it was a necessity, the only way in which Croatia could survive and create a certain, needed independence. But today, six years later, I think that is a hackneyed subject used by someone for some other purposes.

In only a month and a half we took 2,100 officers of the former army that led the aggression against Croatia into the Croatian Army. They were Croats, but in the first days there were misunderstandings, there were misunderstandings in the first couple of months, but those men—to the pleasure of Croatia and myself, as minister—fought for the freedom of Croatia. Many of them were children of Ustashas or partisans, many of them were communists, and many were noncommunists, but when the interests of Croatia were at stake, at that historical moment, they registered with the army and fought shoulder to shoulder.

[Tudjen] Mr. Minister, how do you see the future of Croatia? What, in your opinion, is the greatest danger from the domestic political viewpoint? Political differences, differences in attitude and origin, perhaps the revival of some old ideas, or simply the problem of development?

[Susak] One must give precedence to those things we all would like to have, which are necessary. This generation can look back with pleasure, because it has established an economic system that grants all the freedoms that the people in the West and the Western democracies have. The adoption of laws is no longer a problem because the majority of such laws has already been adopted. Now one has to work upon their implementation, to accept the rules of the game, and then, fight against the mental framework that we must defeat in this generation. We must establish security of employment, legal security, and the implementation of the laws. People must feel the state is their own.

Taxes Must Be Paid

An average citizen of Croatia still does not pay taxes. For him, it is something unusual. But in that way he harms the state and also himself because what kind of health insurance his child will have, whether his child will go to school, and many seemingly small things that his child will have depend upon taxes. We have avoided many things in our hatred for the systems we have lived in and in the states we did not accept, but that is now counterproductive to the creation of the Croatian state and its development.

The worst thing that could happen would be for this process to be not realized as quickly as it should be, in our own interests and in the interests of our own children, who will be our heirs. I do not worry that such political disunity could jeopardize Croatia's survival because too high a price has already been paid. There is too high a national consciousness; I saw that also at the session of the Presidential Council. The question is whether we are going a step too fast or a step too slow? Are we maintaining the pace we intended? That was the question of the Presidential Council, and that is where we needed agreement, not on the question of the survival of Croatia. I am optimistic about this. Nevertheless, we must also be cautious about all the initiatives that come from abroad. We have disturbed the world program in this part of the world, and many people who can inflict significant damage on us are still in office. We must be aware of that, but it must not become a handicap.

[Box, p 4]

We Are Satisfied With General Klein

[Tudjen] Are you satisfied with the way Gen. Klein is solving the situation in Podunavlje? Klein has mentioned July next year as the deadline for a solution. What if things get complicated?

[Susak] We have already repeated on many occasions that there is also another option, and we have also pointed out that we will, if there will be no return and particularly no disarmament this year, as we expect, find ways to make this mission shorter. I think that the entire Croatian leadership is satisfied with Gen. Klein's stand and the way he performs his duty. Looking realistically at the situation in which he has found himself and at the support he has from everyone there, I think he is a fantastic person. Gen. Klein has set a deadline for himself—July next year—which would be a guarantee of success as he sees it, but, judging by the speed at which things are developing at the moment, our assessment is that it will be even sooner than that.

[Box, pp 4-5]

IFOR Mandate Will Be Prolonged

[Tudjen] In your opinion, what is the situation like in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what is it like in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina? There are different opinions about the Federation, from those who say that it will never be implemented, to those who say that it

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will be implemented. What is the feeling of the Croatian people and their leadership?

[Susak] There is a lot of fear about what will happen in the end. Unfortunately, it is inappropriate to talk about Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regarding the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it depends upon the expectations and the order of their fulfilment. From my point of view—at the military level, including the Defense Law—I think that enough has been achieved to fulfill grants, primarily, the survival and satisfaction of the Croat aspirations, but also those of the Bosniak nation. So that should be one of the preconditions for implementation of the Federation. In the economic and political field, however, particularly in the economy, Europe and the world community are not solving the problems on the ground upon which the survival of the Federation or anything else depends. There is no such support from the world in Bosnia-Herzegovina yet, and that will slow the process down.

Our objective is to implement the Federation, but there must be understanding for the terms that have been set and the speed at which the process develops. Sometimes it does not look as what we would want it to. It will demand great patience, complex political maneuvers, and resolution to persist to the end. I think that the leadership of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina (I mean, the Federation), but also Croatia's leadership, is resolute and ready to persist in that process.

[Tudjen] How do you comment on the postponement of the Mostar elections?

[Susak] That is just one more of those petty political games. It is good that the elections will nevertheless be held in June, but that is one more of those political games by the Bosniak side. Something has developed there that, I am afraid, will turn up more and more. They have been successful in maintaining tension in the Bosniak political body so far in two ways. First, they were always fighting someone and, second, they have blamed some third party for all the negative things that have occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now reality is arriving. One cannot blame someone else when there is no war. Then the normal questions arise: Are there pensions, jobs, appartments, and blankets? This set of politicians is not ready to answer those questions, it is not ready professionally.

I am afraid that this will not be a moot point but something that will force them perhaps to make moves like this one in Mostar. Because when the elections in Mostar take place, then even the crazy people will be able to see that the difference between eastern and western Mostar is not only that the eastern part suffered greater damage but also see what has been done in the three years without destruction.

One will start raising such questions sooner or later, but the answers will be asked of some legitimate authorities, since, at the moment, there is a kind of anarchy and there are no responsible individuals. And someone will have to take responsibility for all that. That is what will almost force them to postpone those processes to buy time. How successful they will be and to what extent the international community will be able to force them to fit in with the determined schedules, we will see. But I do not doubt, not for a moment, that we will—I am talking about the Croatian people in general—hold out.

[Tudjen] Do you think that the IFOR [Implementation Force] mandate will be prolonged? And what if it is not?

[Susak] The IFOR mandate will certainly be prolonged. Perhaps one should add something to your question. Will the Americans stay? Because this is their election year. It is realistic to expect that they will find a way to withdraw, but other forces will stay. And they, if they withdraw, will withdraw to Hungary. IFOR will not be able to leave, because there will be no conditions for them to do so: on both sides, in both the "Serb Republic," and the Federation.

[Tudjen] You visited some Croatian parts of the Federation recently. Are there misunderstandings about where the seats of the counties will be, and so on?

[Susak] That is a normal process. We have similar things here; on the island of Pag and around Sibenik and Zadar. The inhabitants of Livno think that Livno should be the seat of a county. I can see no reason for such things. A part of political leadership had promised the inhabitants of Livno that even before it was known what the canton would look like, how big it would be, and who will be in it. It is incredible that they have come up with that. That is one. Second, the assumption that the largest town must be the seat of a county is not justified. Livno will probably have the largest number of cultural and economic institutions, but I can see no reason why it should be the political seat of a county.

[Box, p 5]

Spitefulness of the Zagreb Opposition

[Tudjen] What do you, as the vice president of the HDZ, think about the situation in Zagreb? Who is responsible for the complications, and is there a way out?

[Susak] I think that this has been more a question of spitefulness than of common sense by the opposition. Since I returned to Croatia, I have not been able to

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understand something. In the first elections, some 50 men turned up with the intention to become president. I had not seen anything like that before then, and I had lived in a democratic society. For a small country with a population of 4.5 million, I could not have even imagine that. I thought that it might have been the liberation; many people thought that they had played the crucial role. In the second elections, some 50 parties turned up, and that is an entirely abnormal process. According to Western standards, the measure by which one respects one party is the number of those who win a seat in parliament, but those who are loudest in our newspapers are those who have no representative in the National Assembly, and such people sometimes win more media space.

It is now the same with those who have nobody at the higher level in the Croatian National Assembly but at the lower level have somebody. Regional parties exist everywhere and that is all right, but a union of the parties from the far left to the far right, not with an goal of creating a good atmosphere, but of removing the HDZ from power is entirely unnatural. I would understand it if they asked for a coalition with the HDZ, which has won the majority of votes, and if they they sought other coalitions if they reached no agreement with HDZ. Everything is, I think, overexaggerated by some smaller parties, and somehow harms Croatia. I can see no reason for that, but the legal and constitutional situation is a bit too complicated and the time limits for solving things in a normal way are a bit too long.

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Poland: Polish-Ukrainian Battalion Probable by Yearend

WS3105110096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 31 May 96 p 2

[Report by "PW" under the "Poland in Brief" rubric: "Polish-Ukrainian Military Units"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first Polish-Ukrainian military units are to be formed during international exercises that begin 1 June in Ukraine. The Polish-Ukrainian battalion is being established for the needs of UN operations. It will probably be completed by the end of the year. Participants in the exercises in Ukraine include U.S., Russian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian soldiers.

Poland: Military Daily Comments on Relations With U.S.

WS3005131996 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 29 May 96 pp 1, 4

[Commentary by Maksymilian Berezowski: "Poland and the United States; More Than a Partnership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Kwasniewski's coming visit to the White House invites a number of observations on Polish-U.S. relations. For several years now, Poland has been looking upon the United States as its major strategic partner in the field of security and in crucial domains of public life. America's attitude toward Poland, on the other hand, may be best illustrated by a statement made by Franklin Kramer, U.S. under secretary of defense [name and title as published], during his recent visit to Warsaw: "Poland is joining NATO not to become a Western state, but because it is one." "Your country," he said, "is considered to be a part of Western civilization." We do not have any doubt that these words are true. Yet in the mouth of a U.S. politician they acquire a slightly different meaning: Being part of the West remains the basic binding agent of the system in which the United States is the major force.

That system, encompassing Europe, is related to a security and culture commonwealth. Having said that "the United States must remain a European superpower," U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher explained in the course of his visit to the Czech Republic that the United States is interested in the well-being of citizens in our region because the welfare of the United States depends on a Europe open to U.S. "exports, investments, and opinions."

The decision to enlarge NATO, initiated by Washington and, as is widely acknowledged, of fundamental importance for Poland, has a beneficial effect on overall relations between Poland and the United States and encourages both states to be allies. This is particularly noticeable in military cooperation, where, apart from the Partnership for Peace program, the number of bilateral projects is increasing—for example, developing interoperability on tactical and strategic levels.

It can also be said, without a trace of doubt, that Polish-U.S. relations were enhanced by the fact that we sent our battalion as part of the IFOR [Implementation Force] forces in Bosnia. Serving under U.S. division commanders, they are being praised by U.S. military officers and politicians.

The high level of mutual trust is largely due to the significant contribution the United States had made to the development of systemic and economic reforms in Poland and our contribution to creating a security zone in Central Europe, which U.S. exporters and investors find beneficial. The Stabilization Fund, coordinated by the United States, provided a protective shield for the difficult transformations launched by the Third Polish Republic in 1990. U.S. creditors largely influenced the favorable result of negotiations on Polish debts in the West.

As time went by, financial and organizational aid from U.S. state agencies in such areas as adapting our economy to market conditions, developing the banking sector, protecting the environment, and so forth has developed into cooperation on a partnership basis. The rectified economy encouraged overseas corporations (for example, General Motors, IPC, Procter & Gamble, Ameritech) to become the number-one foreign investors in Poland. Despite popular belief, big business and big politics are not two different things in the United States.

It is obvious that both large and small countries base their policies not on sentiments, but on interests. We will reveal no secret by pointing out that public opinion has an impact on relations between states. The sympathy traditionally felt by the Poles for America—and it is reciprocated—certainly facilitates cooperation at institutional levels.

The West will also benefit from admitting Poland into its structures—most of all NATO, the EU, and the OECD. The U.S. supporters of our bid point out that it will enhance strategic political, military, and economic equilibrium on a vast stretch of the continent. They have a vested interest in eliminating the sources of past problems and instability in the center of Europe which, as they repeatedly stress, led to two world wars and the Cold War. The United States was involved each time.

Stability in Poland will naturally make us a more attractive partner for the superpower that the United States

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is. U.S. authorities already clearly state that they consider Poland a "good partner" in multilateral relations on the international arena, including the forum of the UN. Nothing is more conducive to friendly relations between states than a clear mutual understanding of predilections and capabilities.

Poland: Kwasniewski Says Oleksy Affair Required Clearing Up

LD3005201896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Aleksander Kwasniewski described yesterday's television speech by Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz as firm and decisive. The prime minister accused State Protection Office [UOP] officers gathering evidence about Jozef Oleksy's alleged collaboration with a foreign intelligence service of serious transgressions. According to the president, the case should be fully cleared up.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] Those who today have doubts will be able to confront their doubts with information provided by Interior Minister Siemiatkowski and by the prime minister himself. On the other hand, I would like to say that those who today are criticizing Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, well, they did not criticize [former Interior] Minister Milczanowski, who, as is evident today, while possessing very weak arguments, made totally unprecedented accusations. And I think in his speech yesterday, Prime Minister Cimoszewicz was much more guarded in formulating conclusions or accusations. But this case has to be brought to an end; it has to be cleared up. [end recording]

Poland: Experts on UOP Commission Report on Oleksy Case

WS3005145296 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 30 May 96 p 3

[Article by Agnieszka Kublik: "Prime Minister Criticizes UOP, the Opposition Criticizes the UOP Report; Arguing Over UOP's Sins"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Yesterday morning key posts at the Office of State Protection [UOP] were filled by new people. In a televised address to the nation in the evening, Prime Minister Cimoszewicz fiercely criticized officers who had handled the Oleksy case.*

Members of the extraordinary Sejm commission investigating the legality of state organ operations in the Oleksy case will be acquainted with the UOP commission report only today.

The prime minister said on television that having read the report compiled by the UOP commission, which was established to explain whether officers handling the Oleksy case had observed the law, he is "convinced that UOP operations violated basic principles of proper and credible procedures."

Jacek Merkel (Freedom Union) from the Political Advisory Committee to the Interior Minister and Ryszard Bugaj (Union of Labor) from the special Sejm commission are critical of the UOP commission and its report.

GAZETA WYBORCZA sources claim that UOP did not question the fact that the Russian intelligence officer had indeed been doubled by Zacharski. This practically excludes Russian provocation.

The basic charge raised by the commission is that the doubled Russian agent was not used to the fullest extent: The authors of the report say it was a mistake to focus attention exclusively on information on "Olin."

Our sources claim that the report is a compilation of accounts of officers handling the Oleksy case and protocols of their testimony before the UOP investigation commission.

As we learn, the UOP commission did not confirm that officers in charge of the Oleksy case had violated the law. The special Sejm commission had issued a similar statement earlier. In yesterday's address, the prime minister spoke of violating not the law, but of "principles of proper procedures."

Deputy Ryszard Bugaj, member of the special Sejm commission investigating the Oleksy case, yesterday expressed his surprise in an interview for the Third Program of Polish Radio that, in the course of the hearings, [UOP Chief] Colonel Kapkowski did not see anything wrong with the UOP operations. He has, however, signed the report and the motion for their dismissal. "We will ask Col. Kapkowski about that," Bugaj announced.

Bugaj was equally surprised that Colonel Izgorski signed a statement claiming that he had taken part in the Majorca operation against his will. "He was heard by our commission and said something entirely different. In fact, his testimony led us to believe the operational material in the Oleksy case was highly credible," says Bugaj. "The question now arises of when was he speaking the truth."

"I find it very puzzling why the UOP investigation commission was set up," Jacek Merkel, a member of the Political Advisory Committee to the Interior Minister, told us yesterday. He claims it was not necessary, considering that the special Sejm commission has been working since the beginning of the year. It has the

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authority to appoint any experts it wishes, also from UOP, and solicit any type of expertise it requires.

Among procedural infringements listed by the UOP commission is the fact that recordings with the Russian source were incomplete; there was no full recording of a six-hour-long conversation. The commission suggested Zacharski did not account for operational expenses. It only has a statement of what he did with the money; there are no documents.

Poland: Milczanowski Criticizes Prime Minister's Statement

LD3005114196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Minister of Internal Affairs Andrzej Milczanowski has, in a radio interview today disagreed with the statement by Prime Minister [Wlodzimierz] Cimoszewicz that the activities of the State Protection Office [UOP] in the Jozef Oleksy case were unprofessional.

[Andrzej Milczanowski] I do not and cannot agree with the fact that the prime minister has here, even before handing over materials to the [Extraordinary] Sejm Commission [for the examination of the legality of the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Jozef Oleksy case], stated firm opinions. That is the first issue.

Second, I feel that the officers whom the prime minister accused of lacking competence and of errors ought to have the opportunity of addressing the entirety of the report by this UOP examining commission as much as the conclusions and resolutions of this report. I feel that they ought to have the opportunity to address this before the Sejm Commission.

Poland: Prosecutor's Office: Oleksy Case Verdict Warranted

WS3005145396 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 30 May 96 p 3

[Report by "AN," PAP: "Opinion on Investigation Headed by Gorzkiewicz Issued; Decision To Drop Proceedings Warranted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Gorzkiewicz committed several mistakes in the course of the investigation and in the text of his verdict, yet the decision to drop proceedings is warranted and remains valid.*

Colonel Jaroslaw Kieronski, appointed by the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office to head an inspection into the investigations supervised by Prosecutor Slawomir Gorzkiewicz, stated the above yesterday in front of the extraordinary Sejm commission investigating the procedures of state organs in the Oleksy case. (The Prosecutor's Office of the Pomeranian Military District is still trying to assess whether there exist legal grounds for instituting an investigation against Gorzkiewicz for disclosing a state secret—the name of a doubled Russian intelligence officer—to Oleksy).

Gorzkiewicz's decision to drop proceedings in the case of Oleksy's alleged contacts with Russian intelligence services remains valid.

"The inspector found that several mistakes had been made in the course of investigations and in the explanation of the verdict but concluded that the decision to drop the proceedings was accurate and justified," Dariusz Wojcik (Confederation for an Independent Poland) told GAZETA WYBORCZA.

Col. Kieronski told the commission that the text of the verdict unnecessarily commented on the incredulity of General Marian Zacharski's operations and testimonies. He said it was a mistake not to confront Zacharski with Colonel Skoczylas. The latter, chief of the Control Inspectorate of Police Headquarters, approached Oleksy's defense lawyers as a voluntary witness and incriminated Zacharski.

The commission rescheduled the hearing of Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz that had been planned for yesterday. It first wishes to get acquainted with materials on the investigation he headed and read the report by an investigation commission at the Office of State Protection [UOP] on officers who had worked on the Oleksy case.

Commission members are to read the latter document at UOP today. Also at UOP, the commission will hear Defense Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski and UOP Chief Andrzej Kapkowski.

Poland: SLD Deputy: Oleksy Case Commission Should End Work

WS3005134496 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 30 May 96 p 2

[Report by "GOL, ZBW": "Gorzkiewicz 'Dismissed' from the Hearing; Where Are the Limits of the Commission's Powers?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Prosecutor Slawomir Gorzkiewicz appeared and vanished like a meteor. The Sejm extraordinary commission that is looking into the legality of the actions taken by state organs in the issue of Jozef Oleksy's alleged cooperation with a foreign intelligence service "kept" Gorzkiewicz for 15 minutes...and dismissed him from the hearing.*

Why? Because Gorzkiewicz had not brought along the necessary files the commission wanted to familiarize

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itself with. The commission did interview Colonel Jaroslaw Kieronski of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office, who is trying to determine whether it was justified to discontinue the investigation. He will submit his findings to the commission.

No one wanted to discuss the results of the hearing; however, some members of the commission were "outraged" by a statement made by Jerzy Szmajdzinski, secretary general of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic. He said that the hearing of Minister Siemiatkowski on Thursday should spell the end of the commission's activities; it should already be trying to formulate the final conclusions. Szmajdzinski believes that the fact that the work of the commission is being drawn out is negatively affecting the credibility of not only the commission itself, but also that of the Sejm and its speaker, Jozef Zych, under the "fatherly care" of whom the commission is working. "All the motions regarding the summoning of new witnesses show that the commission is exceeding its powers," Szmajdzinski declared.

Janusz Zemke, a member of the commission and a deputy of the Democratic Left Alliance, confirmed that an attempt to work on the issue longer than necessary "is an attempt to cause a political commotion." According to him, some members of the commission are going too far: the commission has not been established to verify whether the proofs are good; this is the task of a prosecutor's office. "It is not good when someone tries to do something that should be done by someone else," he added.

Waldemar Pawlak (Polish Peasant Party) stated that "Mr. Szmajdzinski's ideas are quite unique." He added that the commission is working on the basis of a resolution passed by the Sejm and is already nearing the end of its work. Asked about the vote on the candidacy of Colonel Kapkowski for the head of the Office of State Protection [UOP] on 28 May (Pawlak was absent from the session of the commission on that day), he replied that, if the opposition had looked at the substantive, not the political, aspect of the issue, there would not have been any doubts. Pawlak believes it was a good candidacy.

Jerzy Ciemniewski and Bogdan Borusewicz (Freedom Union) "agreed to attack" Jerzy Szmajdzinski's statement. They said that the statement reminded them of the "times of the politburo"; they also argued that it "undermined the authority of the Sejm" and "encouraged the commission to commit the sin of not elucidating the issue until the end."

On 30 May, the commission is to become acquainted (probably in UOP) with the confidential report on the activities of the secret services and interview [Interior] Minister Siemiatkowski and [UOP head] Colonel Kapkowski.

Poland: Minister to NIE Editor: Some Articles Harming State

LD3005162596 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1300 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Internal Affairs Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski has told Jerzy Urban, editor in chief of the weekly NIE, that some articles carried by the weekly are damaging to the interests of the Polish state, including international contacts of the State Protection Office [UOP]. Urban assured the minister that it is not the intention of the editorial office to damage these interests.

The conversation, which took place in the presence of Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski, head of UOP, was reported by Internal Affairs Ministry spokesman Ryszard Hincza.

The weekly NIE has often revealed secret or confidential state documents, including correspondence between the Vatican and the Polish Foreign Ministry concerning ratification of the Concordat. Recently, it announced that it will publish a secret agreement between UOP and the CIA.

Poland: Interpol National Bureau Chief on Activities

WS3005120896 Warsaw Radio RMF FM in Polish 0605 GMT 30 May 96

[Interview with Inspector Andrzey Koleszko, Polish Interpol Bureau chief, by Radio RMF FM commentator Tomasz Skory in Warsaw on the "Guest of Radio RMF FM Morning Program"—live; first paragraph is Radio RMF FM introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] A 3-day meeting of the 25th European Interpol conference opened in Warsaw yesterday. The subject of the meeting is car thefts, drug-related crimes, and crimes against children. Polish Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz participated in the opening of this conference, which for the first time is being held in Poland. Today Tomasz Skory is interviewing Inspector Andrzey Koleszko, Polish Interpol Bureau chief.

[Skory] Are you satisfied with the fuss and mess you have created? Forty-six countries have sent their delegates here, and for each delegate you had to provide a seat in the hall and a personal translator.

[Koleszko] This fuss is only illusory. Everything is under control.

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[Skory] I know you are handling this situation in an almost iron-fisted manner.

[Koleszko] I will not comment on this. But I try to supervise things in a soft manner. Thanks to this, a small team of people has managed to organize a regional Interpol conference, which is the largest one—a record-breaking one—in the history of Interpol. Over 140 delegates from 43 countries [as heard] have arrived to participate.

[Skory] In addition, this is a jubilee conference. Has it been difficult to force the Interpol leadership to do this?

[Koleszko] The principles of negotiations and diplomacy are mandatory within Interpol. One does not demand anything. We simply tried to do this in a manner acceptable to this organization.

[Skory] The meeting will begin in a moment. Tell me, please, what do they talk about behind these closed doors?

[Koleszko] The discussion addresses various technical details and nuances, which, to a great extent, influence the [word indistinct] performance of the police in many European countries, the way they exchange information and conduct their search for criminals. In general, this implies the effectiveness of the police.

[Skory] Do you, for example, discuss types of data bases, means of satellite communications, and other such things?

[Koleszko] We are also addressing these issues, but we rather focus on computer—not satellite—communications, although we also discuss the issues you mentioned. We are also discussing how we will exchange and transmit information to make it available to the police so that they can act quickly and are able to detain criminals before they manage to move to another country.

[Skory] How many employees are on the staff of the Polish Interpol Bureau?

[Koleszko] A little over 40. It is very insufficient for us.

[Skory] Too insufficient? A very common answer. What does a regional national Interpol bureau deal with?

[Koleszko] A national Interpol bureau daily coordinates the exchange of information between police and law-enforcement bodies. I wish to stress that our bureau, as well as other Interpol national bureaus, cooperates not only with the police, but also with the Prosecutor's Office and border guards, as well as with the Environmental Protection Inspectorate, which also, to a certain extent, performs police functions. For example, they investigate and resolve crimes against the environment. I do not imply only the eggs of the white-tailed eagle mentioned by me once, but also crimes related to the transportation of poisonous and radioactive substances, and so on.

[Skory] What about such spectacular activities as detaining notorious criminals? Are they also part of a regional bureau's activities?

[Koleszko] Our primary purpose is to detain dangerous criminals. Not all dangerous criminals are so notorious, but I wish to say that detaining dangerous criminals is one of the priority directions in Polish Interpol Bureau activities. Precisely, I imply detecting Polish criminals who try to hide abroad and often perform their activities there.

[Skory] Thanks to the Polish Interpol Bureau activities, Schwarzenneger, Bagsik, and many other criminals have been arrested.

[Koleszko] Yes, thanks to the Polish Interpol Bureau activities, Schwarzenneger, Bagsik, and many other criminals like Grobelny have been arrested. They are people who, even if they were detained by foreign police for crimes committed in foreign countries or for other suspicions activities.... [changes his thought] The Interpol's good point is that by declaring a search on a global scale—among 176 countries—it could help the local police quickly identify a criminal and determine that precisely this criminal is being searched for by another country.

[Skory] Do you remember how many people are being looked for now?

[Koleszko] Over 2,000.

[Skory] On a global scale?

[Koleszko] No, our bureau has launched a search for over 2,000 people. Generally speaking, this number is about 8,000-10,000 on a global scale. But a search is also conducted on a regional basis. If we consider this regional factor, the number of people who are being searched for will stand at some 30,000.

[Skory] You are head of a team that deals with quite new issues. I heard this here when the conference began its work. What is criminal analysis?

[Koleszko] This is a new specific form of police activity that makes it possible to quickly analyze a set of information, because now police activities, or the work of our policemen, lead to the accumulation of a lot of information that cannot be assessed by our investigation and operations officers.

[Skory] This implies that you are processing this material.

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[Koleszko] Simply put, yes. In reality, however, I often use the following example: One takes a computer, equips it with a text editor, and assigns an individual to name a person for whom the bell tolls. A few will be able to do so.

[Skory] Thank you.

Poland: Threats to Stability of SLD-PSL Coalition Viewed

WS3105092096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 30 May 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Ewa K. Czaczkowska and Eliza Olczyk: "What Can Cause Conflicts Between the SLD and the PSL? The Coalition Reefs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] does not intend to form any coalitions without the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] to try to carry out a reform of the powiats [small administrative units that may be reestablished], argued Deputy Sejm Speaker Marek Borowski of the SLD at a news conference on 29 May.*

Technically, it is impossible to carry out a second-level administrative reform prior to next year's elections. Incidentally, one cannot reform the central administrative bodies and self-governments at the same time. Members of the SLD and the PSL are convinced that, despite the problems that the coalition is bound to encounter, it will manage to govern until next year's parliamentary elections.

The issue of the powiats once again caused friction in the SLD-PSL coalition. At the news conference, leaders of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic tried to take the edge off the sharp statements their colleagues had made a few days ago. They pointed out that Minister Krzysztof Janik of the Presidential Chancellery is enthusiastic about the idea of introducing powiats as the second level of self-governments. However, such a reform must be very well prepared (especially where the finances and powers of powiats are concerned); thus, it cannot be implemented too hastily.

Therefore, it seems that this time the conflict, even though it was rather acute, was settled—powiats will not be established before the elections.

The Danger Did Not Vanish

The issue of the powiats is not the only barrier that represents a threat to the stability of the SLD-PSL coalition. A few more may appear by next year's parliamentary elections.

Contrary to how it may appear, the problem of selling land to foreigners should not affect the stability of the coalition because it is not part of the coalition accord. Of course, the PSL will try to amend this law, but the SLD clearly does not intend to budge, and, along with the Freedom Union, it is in a position to torpedo any amendment attempts. According to SLD representatives, this may go on for as long as a year.

Nonetheless, aside from the issue of the powiats, limiting the liberalized regulations on the sale of land to foreigners is a fundamental issue to the PSL. The peasants are counting on support from at least some trade unionists within the SLD when it comes to voting on amendments to the law on selling land to foreigners; the law in question bans the sale of agricultural land, lakes, and forests to foreigners, but it allows the sale of up to 0.4 hectares of nonagricultural land to investors (the same goes for plots of land in towns).

The coalition may face a serious problem linked to the regulations regarding subsidies to diesel oil for agricultural machines (the PSL believes that these subsidies should vary depending on the size of a given farm) as well as to the idea of introducing a tax on real estate that would depend on its value, which is unacceptable to the PSL.

As early as this year, we will most certainly witness disputes over the income tax paid by natural persons in 1997. The PSL is bound to lobby for an 18-percent tax for the poorest. Meanwhile, the SLD is likely to back the government's proposal, which sets the taxes at 20, 31, and 43 percent.

Another thing that may trigger a conflict is the reform of the central government bodies and the consequent changes in the government, which will cause tension within the coalition. The past three years have shown that personnel issues in the coalition were the cause of acute crises.

The date of next year's parliamentary elections is yet another issue that may cause a conflict in the coalition. The SLD would like them to be held in May, before the pope's visit to Poland. The PSL has decided to opt for the fall date. However, considering the fact that the remaining parliamentary groups also believe that the elections should be held according to schedule, we have come to the conclusion that the SLD stands a small chance of forcing its proposal through parliament.

The Decision Will Not Be Made in Quiet Offices

Whether the peasants will split with the coalition or stay there will certainly not be decided by leaders in their offices. The entire party will make the decision; all of the peasant politicians who were asked about prospects of cooperation within the coalition go along

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with this opinion, which was expressed by Deputy Janusz Dobrosz, spokesman of the PSL Club. According to Dobrosz, the PSL congress in the fall will prepare a balance sheet of everything the PSL lost and gained by being part of the coalition with the SLD. It will also assess whether, despite the existing differences of opinion, further cooperation with the left in the coalition is favorable or disadvantageous, due to the fact that a bad image of the party is being reinforced among the people before the parliamentary elections.

PSL deputies are certain of which decision the congress will make. "We will break the record. It will be the first coalition to work over the entire term of a parliament," says Deputy Agriculture Minister Jacek Soska. "It may only be a shorter term; however, this would be the fault not of the PSL, but of the president."

According to Deputy PSL Club Chairman Janusz Piechocinski, a shortening of the term and early elections depend on "whether the scenario of events planned by Aleksander Kwasniewski is in line with the scenario of the SLD." "It is possible that, at the cost of holding early elections and postponing adoption of the constitution, the president will want to strengthen his position before the new Sejm is elected; he may also want to broaden his powers in the new constitution. Thus, the key to the early elections is in the hands of the SLD," Deputy Piechocinski claims.

"We are afraid of a provocation on the part of the SLD, which may want the coalition to fall apart and blame this on the PSL," says Deputy Lidia Bladek. "We are not cutting ourselves off from the Cimoszewicz government; no PSL politician has said that it is an independent government." (Such a term was used by Jozef Oleksy).

SLD members believe, in turn, that a factor that may decide the stability of the coalition is the calm political calculation of gains and losses in the PSL. If the PSL decides that it would pay off for the party to split with the government (to which, according to SLD deputies, the church is egging the peasants on), it will find a pretext to do it, regardless of what the election date is. If, however, the Peasant Party decides that it would be more advantageous for it to stay in the coalition until next year's elections, it will not try to find a pretext.

Poland: Coalition Charged With Enfranchising 'PRL Relicts'

WS3005145696 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 30 May 96 p 3

[Report by "(EK)" under the "In Poland" rubric: "The SLD Enfranchises Its Voters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Freedom Union [UW] politicians have accused the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]-Polish Peasant Party coalition of "enfranchising its political clientele" at the expense of gminas that will be expropriated by an amendment to the Law on Land Economy and Expropriation. The amendment instructs self-governments to enfranchise political parties, trade unions, companies, foundations, associations, and Workers Vacation Funds with property leased by them up to 5 December 1990. "This is yet another attempt at enfranchising relicts of the Polish Peoples Republic, targeted at gaining votes," claims UW Deputy Wlodzimierz Puzyna. The controversial provision has been questioned by the Constitutional Tribunal. Its ruling is to be voted on by the Sejm on Friday [31 May].

Poland: Lech Walesa Interviewed on Political Plans

WS2705120096 Poznan WPROST in Polish 19 May 96 pp 17-19

[Interview With former President of Poland Lech Walesa by Dobrochna Kedzierska, Boguslaw Mazur, and Marek Zieleniewski in Gdansk; date not given: "Walesa's List"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lech Walesa] I have told the politicians: Gentlemen, what is needed in Poland is not uniting the right but reparing a joint action. Let us form a common list [of parliamentary candidates] for the elections.

[WPROST] Have the workers who were lately on strike in the Gdansk Shipyard tried to contact you ?

[Walesa] Yes, I am constantly in contact with them. I have been contacting Jerzy Borowczak by phone. Although I do not interfere directly in these matters, I have been and I will be helping the shipyard.

[WPROST] Recently you were trying to help the shipyard during your stay in America. Why did nothing come out of that?

[Walesa] I am not so sure that nothing came out of that. There is a different problem. In America I talked with influential people, who were hoping they would be able to buy shares of the company on the free market. From what I have heard, [Privatization Minister] Kaczmarek is preparing some files and organizing some secret talks.

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The serious people from the West are not prepared for such behavior. I even suspect, though I do not have proof, that serious offers are being turned down.

[WPROST] What did you have in mind when you were talking about a provocative action by the government in relation to the shipyard?

[Walesa] Just that. I have heard that Minister Kaczmarek alone decides about accepting the offers. I do not know whether he really intends to kill the shipyard, but what is going on is so obscure that most anything can be expected.

[WPROST] Not long ago, the minister of your [former presidential] chancellery, Lech Falandysz, observed that your former partners more and more decisively distance themselves from your current position, while your former opponents have begun appreciating you. Would you agree with that opinion?

[Walesa] The misunderstanding results from the fact that no one wishes to accept that I have never played for myself, but for the cause. While I have lost presidential elections, I have not lost the cause. I would compare that to the work of a farmer, who sows the seeds although he knows that he could sell them right now. But he knows that, if he takes risks, he can expect to have a hundred times more of them. I have also sowed the seeds of what I would like to achieve. The results are not yet visible because the parties are growing too slowly. If Poland were a kingdom or an absolute empire, I would know what to do. But this is a democracy, and democracy means parties, training the cadres and preparing programs. This I cannot speed up.

[WPROST] "For reasons that are known only to himself, Lech Walesa is politically not active," said Jan Maria Rokita, a deputy of the Freedom Union [UW].

[Walesa] Jan Maria Rokita treats me as if I were playing for myself. Jan Maria Rokita should think for a while; after all, I cannot form a 405th political party because people would say that I want to recoup my losses. And I have told the politicians: Gentlemen, what is needed in Poland is not uniting the right but preparing a joint action. Let us form a common list [of parliamentary candidates] for the elections. If there is agreement, I would only ask: "Friends, can I help you?" If they say "yes," I will go from one public meeting to another. And if they do not form such a political alliance until the end of August, I will come up with my own list. I will invite all those convinced of its necessity, and I will say: "Gentlemen, I am here for you."

[WPROST] Waiting may cost you your public support, as the polls make clear.

[Walesa] The polls today show support for "Mr. Poland, Lech Walesa"! It is about 20 percent. If I play for myself, I may have 30-percent support. But I will tell the politicians in August: "Gentlemen, I have asked you, and you have not done the right thing. Then you do not have a choice, you must go into action with me. Then we will have 75-percent support. After the action, I will withdraw and come back to my Danuska [the name of Lech Walesa's wife] and to Gdansk. But I will lead the action because, otherwise, you will lose it completely."

Now I am thinking about details of this project because, if 20 parties go for that together, it will be impossible to govern the country. Thus, it is necessary to decide that only the three biggest parties will form the government. The rest of the parties will be well-meaning and neutral; they will not overthrow the government or the parliament. Having won a couple of parliamentary seats, each of them will return to its own "party sofa." They will have parliamentary offices and can build strong political groups.

[WPROST] You have often waited like that. Have you ever been too late because of that? Have you made an error?

[Walesa] If there has been an error, it might have been when I made the decision about breaking up the Solidarity Movement and starting the "war at the top." I knew that such a split was inevitable, so I was thinking about ways to control it. At the same time, many of the activists from the Citizens Committee were ignoring me. I had a choice of allowing the split or preventing it for a time. But what could have been accomplished by maintaining unity? Would I have been able to achieve more in the field of establishing ties to the European Union or NATO? No. There are opinions that, if I had preserved the unity of the movement, I could have thrown the communists into jail. But should democracy be thrown into jail? Political parties are like sausages at a store: Black pudding is the communists, headcheese the greens. The customers can chose whatever they want. Why should I forbid them to buy black pudding? Was it an error that I did not forbid that or that I did not throw people in jail?

[WPROST] Now you are talking about forming an alliance. And right now the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR], the forming of which was initiated by you, is splitting.

[Walesa] I have not interfered in the BBWR's affairs; I have given it a free hand. But there is a different problem. There people are confronting each other, instead of political concepts. For half the century, we were unable to learn about normal political behavior. That is why our party system will be built over 15-20

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years. How do we survive that period? Here nothing can be speeded up. Let us also look at another problem: When the communist party was dissolved, there were 400,000 professional activists left. The opposition had aboutd 8,000 well-trained people. And the 8,000 were divided according to the principles of pluralism. Today that side still has 400,000 activists, and we do not have even 100,000. How do you win in that case, especially since we were all set against each other and ready to fight, from the bottom to the top? My sowing was good, but now I can only appeal to the politicians: "Do not join the parties together; this is not what we divided our movement for. Go for joint action!"

[WPROST] "For the past four months, Walesa has been doing nothing but making a fool of himself. Every one of his statements has been ridiculous. Again he is talking about building the two legs. One leg here, one leg there, and he is to be above them or between them," says Jacek Kurski, who is the spokesman of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP]. What is you answer?

[Walesa] I will say: Kid, you do not understand anything! When I was talking about the "two legs," I meant creating two political blocs, each of them of the same [political] origins...

[WPROST] ...now you are talking about one list.

[Walesa] This is because we have gone sufficiently far to consider that option. It was too early for one list back then.

[WPROST] Today the head of Solidarity, Marian Krzaklewski, thinks about creating a "tripod"—that is, forming a political bloc that would be supported by Solidarity, the ROP headed by Jan Olszewski, and by you. How does it relate to your proposal to create the list?

[Walesa] I am not interested in that. August has 31 days, and what I am interested in is whether I will have to build [the alliance] after the end of the month, or whether others will do it.

[WPROST] So you do not support Krzaklewski's idea?

[Walesa] I wish him luck, but I am concentrating on 31 August, when I will invite Marian Krzaklewski and ask him: "What have you managed to do? Have you achieved your goal? You have not? Then, Mr. Krzaklewski, are you with me or against me? Because, you see, all the others are with me." Today they have already agreed upon that.

[WPROST] Who has agreed?

[Walesa] Everyone who really counts. And do you know who counts on the political scene?

[WPROST] The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]...

[Walesa] No.

[WPROST] Solidarity?

[Walesa] No!

[WPROST] ROP? The Freedom Union [UW]?

[Walesa] No, no, no! The Hundred!—the strongest one is the 100 Movement! And do you know why? Because they have listened to me, gathering real leaders of important social circles: lawyers, doctors, and the like. They have only one weakness: What they miss is "the face"—that is, one easily recognizable leader. If they do not gain "the face," the movement will become another citizens committee, created this time not in cooperation with Lech Walesa but with [Czeslaw] Bielecki and [Andrzej] Olechowski.

[WPROST] Whose "face" should that be?

[Walesa] This is of no importance. What matters is that it is easily recognizable because joining different social circles in one group requires a person and a program that will keep them together. Otherwise, the group will have to split, in the same way as the former Citizens Committee.

[WPROST] Would it be possible for Jan Olszewski to join your action, as it is possible for the Movement of the Hundred?

[Walesa] There will be no need for that. Jan Olszewski will win his revolution and gain a dozen parliamentary seats, nothing more than that. But we, obviously, need Olszewski, because there is a possibility of social upheavals and mass demonstrations. I do not want to search for leaders of the revolution on the streets. Let Olszewski become the leader—and a kind of a safety valve. That is why I keep on saying: Let us protect Jan Olszewski.

[WPROST] Could UW join the alliance?

[Walesa] There is no problem with that. Rokita has visited me. Before I leave for London, I will meet with Balcerowicz. But a conflict exists between us over the enfranchisement referendum. I asked Balcerowicz: Why, in response to one of the referendum questions, did you chose a different option from Solidarity? We all lost because of that. He replied that he was driven by cultural motives. Now he has done it; he messed up everything I did.

[WPROST] Still, you find it easier to communicate with politicians from UW than with Marian Krzaklewski.

[Walesa] That is because he is the chairman, and I do not want to be the chairman. When will you finally understand that I am not playing for myself? Do I earn

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anything sitting here in the trade union headquarters? I do not. Meanwhile, I could use this time to take better care of the construction of my house, or cook soup for my wife.

[WPROST] Incidentally, your public image is affected by, among other things, the news about your building a house. Not long ago, you were saying that you were without means, you were going to work at the shipyard, and then, finally, it turned out that poor Walesa is building a house.

[Walesa] I do not have the means that would be earned in a normal and secure way. Still, I have some savings. But the money is for different purposes than supporting the family. So, what seems to be the problem? I have devoted enough of my own money for social purposes. And do I still have to explain myself?

[WPROST] But why did you make a manifestation of your returning to the shipyard?

[Walesa] What kind of manifestation? Now what do you mean? I was delegated by the shipyard. When the game was over, I said: "Colleagues, I am coming back to you. Do you want my return, considering that I will give up my activities?" I did not stage a show, I did not invite journalists to see my comeback, I just behaved like a decent employee.

[WPROST] Repercussions of the Oleksy case are a more important question that could influence the chances of your project. Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, the former minister of foreign affairs, has disclosed that you demanded Andrzej Milczanowski, the minister of internal affairs of that time, to direct the case to the Military Prosecutor's Office.

[Walesa] When Minister Milczanowski and Minister Bartoszewski came to me with that case, after due consideration, I told them to act in accordance with the law. Directing the case to the Military Prosecutor's Office was done in accordance with the law. I think that Mr. Bartoszewski said these things you have quoted because it seemed to him that I was forsaking the attacked Milczanowski. This way, he was trying to get me involved more actively than I was in defense of Milczanowski. Meanwhile, Milczanowski knows that I will be the first to defend the trusted people. Up until now, there has been no need for that, so I have not involved myself in this case.

[WPROST] Still, a note has been found in which you commanded Mr. Milczanowski to direct the case to the prosecutor's office.

[Walesa] I only said: Please, act in accordance with the law. Those who were writing the note translated that into such an order. I do not write [such] notes, do I?

[WPROST] Is the Oleksy case closed, in your opinion?

[Walesa] Please, understand that this has not been a case of spying that would involve the use of a photo-camera or something. This has been a case of an excessively talkative man of great knowledge who drank with an agent. The fact that Oleksy has admitted to the partying and drinking is, alone, sufficiently compromising.

[WPROST] On several occasions, you have insinuated that you know something compromising about Aleksander Kwasniewski.

[Walesa] Many people would think immediately about spying and treason. I do not mean that. People of communist origins, who are now visiting different foreign capitals, keep on informing others about things I would not talk about because such informing is damaging and even treasonous. But they do not perceive it in that way. For me, this is neglecting national interests; for them, it is internationalism. And this is the important thing that we should all understand. I have the knowledge about cases of such informing—meetings, prattle and so on. But what can be done? I know about it, but I cannot prove anything; the nation knows about it, but it voted as it did. As a democrat, I have to honor that choice; this is a fact, so, please, do not ask me about it. Though, I thought that, due to the Oleksy case, the people would learn how to judge the politicians' behavior. This has not happened. We have chosen a short-cut.

[WPROST] Who has chosen the short-cut, the nation?

[Walesa] No, the politicians. Now the people hear that Oleksy and company want to publish a white paper covering the whole case. Very well, we can uncover internal agents; in the worst case, someone will lose his teeth. But disclosing agents of the external intelligence means a death sentence for them. And here the easy game is over. This cannot be done.

[WPROST] What kind of person is Lech Walesa, nowadays?

[Walesa] The same person he used to be, but with bigger opportunities for action and with a smaller burden. As president, I could not do a number of things. Today I can be more effective. I do not know whether I will be successful. But I have a chance.

[WPROST] Do you really have any personal political ambitions?

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[Walesa] I have already had everything. I have more medals than did Brezhnev. Even without any new ones, I could not wear all of them at one time because I would be unable to get up. Anyway, I have already given my whole life to this fight. Now I only want to live a normal live. But, still, I cannot withdraw from the fight.

Poland: Priests To Be Paid for Teaching Religion in Schools

WS3005150596 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 30 May 96 p 1

[Report by "EK": "Joint Commission; Catechists To Get Salaries in 1997"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Starting in September 1997, priests will receive salaries for teaching religion in public schools. Deputy Prime Minister Miroslaw Pietrewicz said after yesterday's session of the Joint State and Episcopate Commission that salaries for nearly 10,000 priests will cost the budget some 150 million zlotys annually. "The church greets the government decision with satisfaction. It waited six years," said Archbishop Tadeusz Goclowski.

Deputy Sejm Speaker Marek Borowski said at a conference held by the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic that teaching religion in schools cannot mean that priests and catechists are to be employed and paid from the state budget. "Parliament should decide about this by passing laws," he added.

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Romania: PD President Roman on NATO, Minority Issues

AU3105091096 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 23 May 96 p 7

[First of two installments of a report by Liana Sega on a news conference by Democratic Party President Petre Roman with unidentified reporters in Braila Municipality; date not given: "Nobody Wants To Create Problems Within the Existing National States"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Democratic Party [PD] President Petre Roman was recently the guest of Braila County, where he visited several places, met with members and supporters of the PD (FSN) and residents of that county, and participated in the launching of his political party's candidate for mayor of Braila. On that occasion, Petre Roman held a news conference, which we report here:

[Reporter] What is the PD's position toward the discrepancy between the proportions on your centralized lists and those of the Central Electoral Bureau [BEC]?

[Roman] The BEC, which includes two of our representatives, Mr. Bostinaru and Mr. Stancov, knows that the percentage announced by Mr. Cozmanca is not real, it is severely reduced. [passage omitted]

I can tell you the correct results: For the lists of councilors and the county lists, we have 90.5 percent, for the candidacy of mayor, 84 percent. These are the correct figures which, no doubt, will also be validated by the BEC, unless there is indeed a case of ill will, which I hope there is not.

[Reporter] What will the international implications be if the treaty between Hungary and Slovakia is ratified, given the fact that Romania has still not concluded such a treaty with Hungary?

[Roman] I noticed some wavering that should not have been there in the Presidency's and Foreign Ministry's reaction to this treaty. When the treaty between Hungary and Slovakia was signed, the first reaction was that the introduction of Recommendation 1201 was unacceptable; then it was said that reference could be made to the recommendation in a separate document. After it had been said that this was dangerous from a judicial viewpoint, recently it was said that there was no problem with it whatsoever because Recommendation 1201 does not pose any difficulty. You can probably still remember the very pernicious debate for Romanian diplomacy, when the PD was accused of interpreting Recommendation 1202 in a way that does not suit our country. That evidently was an interesting but erroneous declaration. Meanwhile, the Council of Europe and Social Democratic International made some remarks: Recommendation 1201 does not mean autonomy and collective rights, and it does not mean autonomy on ethnic criteria. In other words, a situation has been reached wherein Recommendation 1201 has become a sort of scarecrow. It is time to overcome that moment. But the scarecrow already exists in the consciousness of the great majority of Romanian citizens. Therefore, my answer is the following: It is necessary to sign the treaty with Hungary, and the obstacles in the path of its signing could have been overcome at a time when the Hungarian Government was more willing. Meantime, rather radical, nationalistic, and revisionist voices have appeared also in Hungary as well as in our country, and, as you know, the political majority in Romania was not willing to agree to the signing of the basic treaty with Hungary, and we could say that we missed the boat. Currently, it is difficult to imagine that this basic treaty will be signed before the elections, although—and I repeat—it is necessary to sign it. However, conditions for its signing can be fulfilled by showing consistency in supporting certain viewpoints.

[Reporter] Could you tell us what the NATO secretary general was trying to say when he warned the Eastern European countries to think carefully about whether they really wanted to join NATO? Does this have any connection with the situation in Russia?

[Roman] No. The issue raised by NATO, mainly the structure of the NATO leadership, is connected with the costs of integration. From that perspective, he was telling us to get to know how much each component that is supposed to be part of the integrated NATO structures costs. NATO made some calculations in connection with the costs of integration, and we are talking about $50 billion up to the year 2005 if Romania is included among those countries, that is, if it were among those four or five countries. Those are the costs for them. The costs for us should also come into consideration. What does it mean to form a ground battalion that is compatible with NATO? What does it mean to make an air squadron of the airforce compatible with NATO? What does it mean to make command points compatible with NATO, and what does it mean to have air and antiaircraft communications and logistic systems compatible with NATO? Se we are talking about details and not a political warning. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] If and when you become president, what can we expect in connection with Recommendation 1201? Will you sign it and how will you sign it?

[Roman] Recommendation 1201 has already been signed by President Iliescu, too, because he signed the declaration with which he was present at the Council of Europe. Recommendation 1201 is a recommen-

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dation that Romania has accepted. The problem is the following: Recommendation 1201 contained a number of provisions , especially the one referring to autonomy, which were not sufficiently clear. They have since been clarified: Nobody wishes to create a problem within the existing national states. Therefore, from the interpretation of Recommendation 1201, the autonomy on ethnic criteria, the collective autonomy, is excluded. I do not believe that the problem of signing the treaty now is connected with Recommendation 1201, because it has become, as I was saying earlier, a scarecrow. The problem of signing the treaty is connected with the confidence that Romania and Hungary, respectively—but here I am referring to Romania , and I will also mention presently what I understand by Hungary's duties—will regard the national minorities in a European manner, as something normal. We are in favor of a developed local democracy, and we are against autonomy on ethnic criteria because that is not democracy. European democracy today means mainly integration, not separation on ethnic criteria. As regards Hungary, we expect its official positions to be permanently correct toward the current reality; that is, Romania's borders, the fact that Romania is sovereign within its boundaries, that the rights of minorities in no way need to be under Hungary's umbrella, things that we know well. If there were mutual trust, the basic treaty could be signed without damage for Romania and without advantage or damage for Hungary. I do not believe that Recommendation 1201 is the key issue. I want to be understood very well—given the fact that the political majority in Romania's parliament included parties that declared a categorical aggressiveness toward the Hungarian minority in Romania, for various reasons—that there is no trust. And this is harmful for us because in reality, out in the country, many things have happened and many things have been achieved as regards minorities in Romania. I have always used the opportunity to talk about them, and continue to do so, in a fashion that makes people listen, accept, and understand it. But any type of negative inflection, any type of rejection or isolation on the basis that this is a minority and what do those people want, immediately brings about a general counterreaction because nobody can accept the germs of conflict in one country or another. I say that to be a patriot today in politics means to smooth interethnic tensions, not to instigate and provoke them. That is the difference between being a democrat and not understanding democracy. I do not believe that Recommendation 1201 is really the issue; it is a matter of building confidence. Building confidence is also the key expression regarding NATO. It is not the United States promoting NATO. In this respect, you are incorrect. NATO represents the transatlantic connection. All NATO countries categorically support the American presence in Europe. If you would like to know, the U.S. Administration was reluctant to accept the idea of NATO enlargement. The U.S. Administration made this decision much later than other countries, such as Germany and Spain, not to mention Greece, Turkey, and Norway. Thus, the NATO enlargement today has a different base. It is not first of all military, although it will stay a military alliance, but it has a political character. What is the reason for expansion? For them it is expansion of the space of stability, security, and cooperation to alleviate any conflict or new threat, while for us it is to obtain security and stability. We cannot imagine then giving us something without our giving something in return.

In addition, the idea that NATO has no more enemies to face, which is correct in principle, from our country's viewpoint does not seem to be exactly true. This vehement opposition by Russia toward NATO enlargement, believing that NATO continues to be an enemy, worries us. Why would NATO countries be Russia's enemies? Only to the extent that Russia thinks that it has its own interests and its own ambitions that oppose those of NATO. This is incorrect. There is no question of our making a coalition against someone else. The issue should not be approached in this way if we think that the Cold War meant the victory of democracy. Democracy has won. Democracy does not require us to slay and kill the adversary but to cooperate with him and become his partner. Why does Russia oppose it?

As regards security, we wish to ensure our national security. I believe we have no alternative but to join NATO. If this were not so, how could we remain safe from the dirty waves of history, which, as we know very well, the high and low tides are still bringing? History can record many facts that we like or dislike. What really counts is the current situation.

Romania: PD President on Relations With Russia, Ukraine

AU3105091196 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 24 May 96 p 7

[Second of two installments of a report by Liana Sega on a news conference by Democratic Party President Petre Roman with unidentified reporters in Braila Municipality; date not given: "Reducing Poverty, Eliminating Corruption, Ensuring Respect for the Law"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Reporter] If you become Romania's president, how much of your time will be occupied by Romania's relations with Ukraine, and especially with the Russian Federation?

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[Roman] There are four chapters in the report I will present to the NATO Assembly on 25 May: One of them is called "Russia, an Indivisible Part of Europe." This chapter includes a rather lengthy analysis of Ukraine. Romania is vitally interested in Ukraine, and Romanian diplomacy must be capable of developing normal relations with that country and a atmosphere of mutual respect with Russia. I can assure you that from the moment Russia decides to respect us, for various reasons, we must have a real opening toward cooperation and collaboration with that country. However, we must first make them believe that they have to respect us. You must know that this is one of the reasons for our NATO membership. As long as no political conditioning emerges between Romania and Russia, we are fully interested in economic partnership, in any case, with Russia. We must give Russians the feeling that we respect them and admire them for what they are in world culture, that we want to have the most extensive relations possible with them, and that we are interested in every respect that things go well in Russia. We have a vital interest in all this. They also have to accept one thing: If they have their own interests, these interests cannot be to our detriment. That is all. The moment they understand that, without aggressive behavior and without violent gestures, things can advance normally.

As for Ukraine, I mentioned normality before. Ukraine is nevertheless our big neighbor. It is no longer Russia, but Ukraine. Ukraine is the real buffer between Europe and Russia. Ukraine is a very important element, one that emerged as a result of the end of the Cold War. Ukraine is the best example of change in the political map of Europe. A large state appeared with 50 million inhabitants, enormous resources, and enormous geostrategic potential. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] What is the status f your current personal and political relations with President Iliescu?

[Roman] There are no personal relations. You can see the political relations, because the press publicizes them widely. I do not think I need to comment on them myself. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] In your view, what chances does the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] have in the general elections? Do you share the opinion of some political analysts that the PSM is a political force?

[Roman] I do not make forecasts. I make bets sometimes, but never forecasts. I can only say that, regarding its political subject or something that could advance as a political subject, the PSM is not clear. Everyone thought that the PSM could emerge as some kind of defender of the old system. We gave you jobs, and so on. Of course, these claims can be refuted, but that is not the issue here. However, I think that, for the time being, the PSM does not have a clear political course. [passage omitted]

Romania: PNTCD Leader Views 'Bankrupt' Financial Policy

AU3105103296 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 23 May 96 p 3

["Open letter" from Senator Radu Vasile, secretary general of the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party, to Finance Minister Florin Georgescu and Romanian National Bank Governor Mugur Isarescu; date of letter not given: "The Government Misused IMF Assistance"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Economic Decline Was Stopped by Certain Severe Financial Measures in 1994

The conclusion in 1994 of the standby agreement with the IMF represented a twofold gain for Romania: On the one hand, it had obtained very advantageous financing (three to three and a quarter years' grace period with repayment within the following five years) to back the country's balance of foreign payments, which in the previous years had substantially gone into the red, and, on the other hand, it meant a guarantee that the government and the national bank would implement adequate economic policies to balance and stabilize our economy.

As they worked to meet the principle performance criteria, economic decline stopped, and thus 1994 was the year in which, besides a growth in production, important progress was registered in the stabilization of the macroeconomy. The annual inflation rate dropped substantially (from 295 percent in 1993 to 62 percent in 1994), the GDP registered 3.9-percent growth, the deficit of our balance of foreign payments dropped noticeably (from minus $1,174 million in 1993 to minus $248 million,) while the net international reserves [rezervele internationale nete] of our banking system did not exceed the level projected for the end of 1994.

Unfortunately, the success registered in 1994 by implementing the aforementioned strict financial policies (which, however, were accompanied by weak measures upon the real economy) were not or could not be set forth in 1995.

1995 Is the Beginning of the End

In 1995 they gave up the policy of tight regulations in preferrance of measures that stimulate the economy, though this was still ailing and not well structured. The reshaping of large, government-run companies,

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operating at great loss and with huge debts, continued to be a problem. The debts of the companies turned out to be larger than what had been planned, and their inability to even service their debts caused a great deal of stress within the banking system, which then blocked the good running of real economy. All these problems, together with other perturbations on the hard currency market (between December 1994 and June 1995, as a consequence of the hard currency policy of sustaining the official interbank exchange rate at a level that did not entirely cover the transactions, the liquidity of the interbank market was seriously affected and symptoms appeared indicating that the market would break into segments,) as well as the rapid expansion of the loans, especially those taken in hard currency, exerted extreme pressure on the balance of foreign payments (- 3.6 percent of GDP.)

The rapid acceleration of imports in 1995, which was not counterbalanced by an appropriate increase of our exports (the majority of these imports were destined for the problematic government-run companies, which generally are great energy consumers and the products of which go mostly on stocks—in December 1995 a proportion of 70.18 percent of their products were unsold and were added to the existing stocks,) together with the blocking of the IMF financing, led to the serious limitation of our official reserves (administered by the national bank,) as well as those available within our banking system.

The Banking System Begins To Fall Apart as Well

In December 1995 they tried and managed to obtain the extension of the standby accord with the IMF. This was achieved by a letter of intent signed by Messrs. Florin Georgescu and Mugur Isarescu, which modified and completed the letter of intent of 18 April 1994, as well as the Memorandum on Economic Policies. This was, if one may say so, a new credibility test that Romania had to pass before the international organizations, and not just them, regarding its genuine wish to achieve change. However, rather unfortunately for us all, in this test they have been and are performing in a lamentable way.

After a first loan installment, which was granted at the end of 1995, the IMF again blocked the implementation of the accord. Their reasons: the lack of progress in eliminating the multiple exchange rate (the span between the official exchange rate established by the BNR [Romanian National Bank] and the average exchange rate practiced by the exchange offices, both private or owned by banks, which should not exceed a margin of 5 percent) and the abnormal functioning of the interbank market (in point of entirely covering the demand, as well as that of the access to the interbank market), symptoms which actually are nothing but the consequence of the downfall that is increasingly felt in our economic life and which is the hallmark of our banking system.

The Romanian Economy Does Not React According to Market Economy Principles

The spectacular depreciation of our national currency at the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996 (about 30 percent) did not lead to the expected results (the diminishing of imports and the stimulation of exports). The response from Romania's economy, rigid and still to a great extent unresponsive to market economy principles—a fact which has also been born out by the way the stock exchange functions (very few and low-value transactions, which are partly the consequence of the deliberate delay in the privatization process)—was just the opposite: Foreign trade dropped dramatically during the first quarter of . 1996. Imports dropped 19.1 percent compared to the same period of the previous year, but this was accompanied by a significant 13.4-percent decline in exports. Foreign financing was insufficient to cover the deficit in our balance of payments (despite the fact that this deficit dropped 56.6 percent compared to the previous year) or the servicing of our foreign debt. This further diminished the nation's hard currency reserves, whic are administered by the BNR.

The lack of a firm approach by the government to the problems of companies operating at great losses and deeply in debt (two-thirds of the debts at the level of our national economy have been created by government-run companies) dealt a further blow to our banking system.

(In the letter of intent sent to the IMF at the end of 1995, the government pledged to abstain from a centralized operation to compensate for the payment of debts or to inject new loans from the funds of the national bank or other government sources to repay those debts).

They Are Trying To Keep the Economy Alive Solely by Financial Means

The BNR finds it increasingly difficult to control the monetary mass. This is due to the fact that they must grant more and more loans to the problematic sectors of the economy, particularly the agricultural sector, whereby interest is subsidized by the government, which leads to increased inflation (they made loans worth 1,100 billion lei to agriculture and a further 650-700 billion lei to reschedule the payment of debts of companies operating in the red, most of which are run by the government). This drastically reduced the BNR's ability to use the refinancing interests as a lever to regulate the loan market. Our interbank market

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continues to be split, and the transactions are almost purely symbolic.

These measures taken by the government, lacking both pertinence and coherence, are now doubled by the electoral element, meaning that one should not expect spectacular measures to stabilize the economy, especially to restructure the real economy, as such decisions would create social problems leading to the loss of many votes.

So again they try to keep the economy alive solely by financial means (one example: The exchange rate is practically under government control, which to a certain extent led to positive short-term effects, such as keeping inflation within reasonable boundaries, but in the long run this might lead to a genuine explosion—see the recent crisis in Bulgaria). The BNR is making considerable efforts to compensate for the lack of foreign financing on behalf of the international organizations. They try to achieve this by penetrating the international capital market.

Romania Has To Repay $4.5 Billion Over the Next Three Years

However, the costs of the loans obtained on the aforementioned market is much higher, and on a medium-term basis this leads to dramatic consequences in the servicing of those debts. The amount of approximately $500 million, representing the issuing of the so-called Samurai bonds on the Japanese market (negotiations on those bonds have concluded recently) will have to be repaid in one sole installment in May 1999. This will make the payments we will have to make in that year to service our foreign debts rise to approximately $2.5 billion. I note that the years of 1997 and 1998 will not be easy, either, with respect to the servicing of our foreign debts (approximately $1 billion in each of those years.)

If the BNR (the sole institution that still tries to keep in line with the rigors of the market economy and to implement the reform-oriented measures it is expected to take according to the IMF Memorandum) is forced—as lately it obviously has been, be it deliberately or because there is no other way—to subdue itself to the bankrupt policy of the government, this will increase the chaos as well as the price society will have to pay for it in the more or less near future. Obviously, this will also have a significant impact on the performance of the government to be set up after the parliamentary elections this fall.

The lack of openness in the published statistical data (which is transmitted even to the ministries in question only after the prime minister has seen and approved the figures, the latter being taken out of context and thus inappropriate to serve as a basis for pertinent analysis) makes it practically impossible for the political opposition to present any alternatives to the economic decisions made by the government, a fact which, in turn, is vehemently criticized by those currently in power.

Romania: General Outlines Steps To Stop Army Desertions

AU3005175096 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 27 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Army Corps General Dumitru Cioflina, chief of staff and Romanian secretary of state in the Ministry of National Defense, by Nicolae Militaru; place and date not given: "They Ran Away From the Military Units, Even With the Tanks!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Militaru] General Cioflina, within less than a month, two soldiers, in an obvious state of mental disturbance, left the their units armed with guns and war ammunition, thus becoming a great social liability. What can we expect next, a defection with tanks and missiles, or an attempt to break the record of the Australian guy who recently shot down 35 people in cold blood?

[Cioflina] The leadership of the Ministry of National Defense regrets these recent incidents and assures that it has taken all necessary measures to avoid a repeat of such occurrences. The public should know, however, that such serious incidents involving soldiers took place in previous years, too, and they are not common only to us, but also to other armies with long democratic experience. Regarding the second part of your question, I must say that there have been instances when soldiers left their training camps with tanks! I recall such an occurrence in August 1968. Our troops were on a state of alert at the time. A tense soldier gave in to the pressure and drove his tank at high speed down a highway leading from the military unit to Cluj. His colleagues chased him with an ARO [expansion unknown] car, but could not catch him. The soldier, dead tired both physically and mentally, stopped the tank in a cornfield, took down the machine gun mounted on the tank, and hid in the corn. He was found fast asleep. When he woke up, he did not know what he had done. [passage omitted]

Unfortunately, we have also seen such mental breakdowns when nothing special was going on. A similar desertion from a military unit in Mihai Bravu happened in 1980. A soldier from Transylvania had just returned from his vacation at home, where his former girlfriend was marrying another guy. Although upset, the soldier behaved normally in the first few days. But then, at the

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end of another day of training, he suddenly became agitated, climbed into one of the tanks, and drove at full speed toward Giurgiu. Fortunately, the shock did not last long. The soldier regained his wits and nothing serious happened.

Some 10 years later, in 1990, two tank crew members from a unit near Pitesti got drunk. The same night, on their return to the base, one of them took a tank and drove it to the city. We barely managed to stop him on the roadway to Bucharest. The man wanted to go to his native village, where he had some personal scores to settle with his neighbors.

[Militaru] Regarding the latest two incidents caused by the deserters Cotea and Adrian Vasile, what was the cause of their behavior?

[Cioflina] In both cases, one can talk about shortcomings in their psychological and educational makeup. [passage omitted]

[Militaru] We realize that such events cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, what is the Army leadership doing to prevent such outbursts caused by the mental disorder of certain people?

[Cioflina] We have a statute on military cadres, and we are on the point of finalizing the statute on conscripts, on soldiers whose army duty has been extended on the basis of contracts, and on military students. These people will be treated as an army corps, equal to other cadres, in keeping with their duties and obligations. We have set up two new structures—a psychological expertise section and a social studies section. We also introduced the position of psychologist in the county military commands. Military conscription will begin at the age of 20, not 18, to give the young men the opportunity to take at least two university entrance exams. Military service has been reduced to 12 months for all weapons. [as published] By increasing the number of contract personnel, we have reduced the number of conscripts, thus allowing us to have a broader base of selection. We introduced an alternative civilian service for those with special religious beliefs. Some 30 to 40 percent of new conscriptions are being done locally. We have also improved the quality of the food. Likewise, the soldiers have one uniform for ceremonial occasions and another for drill exercises. Since we have many illiterate personnel, we have arranged for them to go to special units, where specialized cadres will teach them to read and write for four hours a day at the Army's expense.

[Militaru] Have the experts estimated the possible effects of such malfunctions in the case of real emergencies?

[Cioflina] Surprisingly, our studies show that in the case of emergencies—during exercises or rescue operations—no such incidents were registered. One may reach the conclusion that many of these problems appear when the hot season sets in. When the drills are over, after many hours in the sun, the young soldiers begin to think more of their problems at home—that nobody is there to do the agricultural work in their place and so forth—or of other personal problems.

[Militaru] Both Cotea and Adrian Vasile left their military units while on guard duty. They left the barracks without anyone stopping them. Does that mean that potential trespassers can get into our military bases?

[Cioflina] No. The guard points are situated in such a way that they can see each other in daytime. At night, they maintain contact by telephone or radio. [passage omitted]

Romania: Voting Slip Errors Said Not Enough To Stop Elections

AU3105114096 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting is currently under way at government headquarters at Victoria Palace. Cabinet representatives and leaders and representatives of the political parties represented in parliament are attending. The meeting is dedicated to the examination of the most recently indicated problems related to the organization of the local elections.

Our correspondent noted that no UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians of Romania] representative is attending the meeting, which began at 1000. The PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] delegation arrived at about 1200 hours.

In opening the meeting, Central Electoral Bureau [BEC] President Adrian Nitoiu referred to certain mistakes that had occurred during the printing of the voting slips, such as erroneous candidate or party names or indistinguishable party emblems. Most of these cases were indicated in Bucharest and in Arges County.

The BEC is to hold a special session later today to discuss ways to correct these mistakes.

Mr. Adrian Nitoiu pointed out that the aforementioned deficiencies are not serious enough to stop the elections.

The party representatives insisted that the media—radio, television, and press—should explain the ballot procedures more widely.

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Romania: Law on Political Parties

96P20420A Bucharest MONITORUL OFICIAL in Romanian No 87 Part I 29 Apr 96 pp 1-5

["Text" of Law No. 27 on Political Parties]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Parliament of Romania adopts the present law:

CHAPTER I—General Provisions

Article 1—Political parties are associations of Romanian citizens with the right to vote, who participate freely in the formation and exercise of their political will, carrying out a public mission guaranteed by the Constitution. They are legal persons under public law.

Article 2—In their activity, public parties promote national interests and values, as well as political pluralism; contribute to the political education of citizens and encourage the citizens participation in public life; influence the formation of public opinion; educate citizens capable of assuming public responsibility; participate, with candidates in elections and, when appropriate, in accordance with the law, participate in setting up public authorities; stimulate the participation of citizens in elections; and organize the legislative initiative of the citizens.

Article 3—(1) Only those associations that are set up in accordance with the provisions of the present law and that act to ensure the respecting of the national sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, territorial integrity, the rule of law, and the principles of constitutional democracy can function as political parties.

(2) Political parties which, by their statute, programs, ideological propaganda, or other activities which they organize, violate the provisions of Article 30, Paragraph (7), Article 37, Paragraph (2) or Paragraph (4) of the Constitution are banned.

(3) Political parties associated with organizations abroad whose orders are imperative are banned.

(4) Political parties are prohibited from organizing military or paramilitary activities.

Article 4—(1) The following cannot be members of political parties: judges of the Constitutional Court, public defenders, magistrates and the like, members of the Court of Accounts, military and civilian personnel who carry out their activities in the structures of the armed forces and of the forces for the protection of public order and national security, members of the Legislative Council, members of the boards of directors and specialized personnel of the National Radio Broadcasting Company, the National Television Company and "ROMPRES," the National Press Agency, as well as other categories of persons who, by law, are expressly prohibited from political association.

(2) Persons who occupy positions of undersecretaries of state or higher positions, as well as advisers or personnel in the cabinets of those who perform the respective functions, if they are civilians, are exceptions to the provisions of Paragraph (1).

Article 5—(1) A Romanian citizen cannot belong to two or more parties at the same time.

(2) If a member joins another political party, this is considered, by law, as his resignation from the party to which he belonged.

(3) Members of organizations of citizens belonging to ethnic minorities that run candidates in elections can also belong to a political party.

(4) No person can be forced to become a member or not become a member of a political party.

(5) Gaining or losing the status of membership in a political party does not create advantages or obstacles in regard to civil rights.

Article 6—(1) Political parties are organized and function on the basis of territorial-administrative criteria.

(2) It is prohibited to set up structures of political parties in the workplaces and to carry on political activity in economic agents or public institutions.

(3) In the framework of territorial organizations, political parties can organize their structures which will be concerned with specific problems of a certain social or professional category.

(4) Young people who have reached the age of 16 can be enrolled in the political parties' structures for the youth. They will not have the rights and obligations of party members until they are are 18 years old.

Article 7—(1) Each political party must have its own name and logo. The full name, the abbreviation, and the logo of a political party must be clearly different from that of parties that are already registered.

(2) The provisions of Paragraph (1) also apply to the election symbols of political parties and political alliances.

(3) The names and logos of the political parties, as well as the election symbols, cannot reproduce or include the national symbols of the Romanian state, other states, international bodies or religious denominations. Political parties that are members of international political organizations are an exception to this rule. They can use the logo of the respective organization as such or in a specific combination.

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CHAPTER II—Organization of Political Parties

Article 8—Each political party must have its own political program and statute.

Article 9—The political party's staute must include:

a) the full and abbreviated name, the party logo, and election symbol;

b) the central headquarters;

c) the clear statement that it pursues only political objectives;

d) the rights and duties of the members;

e) the disciplinary sanctions and the procedures by which they can be applied for members;

f) the procedure for electing the executive organs and their competences;

g) the competence of the general assembly of members or of their delegates;

h) the organs empowered to present candidates for local, parliamentary and presidential elections;

i) the competent organ for deciding upon mergers with other political parties, with political alliances, or other forms of association;

j) the conditions in which it will end its activity;

k) the management of the patrimony and the sources of financing specified under the conditions of the present law;

l) the organ which represents the party in relations with public authorities and third parties.

Article 10—The political program of the party must be presented in writing and must be approved by the general meeting of its members, by the assembly of their delegates, or by the organs empowered by the statute.

Article 11—(1) Political parties can have as subdivisions territorial organizations, with a minimum number of members specified by the statute.

(2) The local organs can represent the political party in dealings with third parties at the appropriate local level and can open bank accounts and be responsible for their management.

Article 12—(1) The general assembly of members and the executive organ are required leadership forums for the political party and its territorial organizations. The leaders of the territorial organizations are elected for a specified period, stipulated by statute.

(2) The statutes can also provide for other organs for the purpose of contribution to the formation of the poplitical will. In this case, their powers must be stated explicitly in the statute.

Article 13—(1) The general assembly of members of the political party or of their delegates is the highest decisionmaking organ of the party on the national level. It meets at least every four years. Extraordinary assemblies can be convoked in the interval between assemblies.

(2) Delegates to the assembly are chosen by secret vote by the territorial organizations. Their number is set on the basis of the number of members. The procedures for nominating and electing the delegates must be specified in the statute.

Article 14—(1) Arbitration organs are set up at the level of the party and its territorial organizations for the purpose of resolving differences between members of a political party or between party members and leaderships of party organizations.

(2) The members of the arbitration organ are elected for a term of at least four years.

(3) The arbitration organ operates on the basis of a regulation which must ensure the parties the right to be heard and equitable decisionmaking procedures.

Article 15—(1) The empowered organs of the political party decide on the admission of members under the conditions specified by the statute.

(2) Members have the right to resign from the party at any time, with immediate effect.

(3) A member can be expelled from the party only if he has deliberately violated the statute or has caused damage to the party by his behavior.

Article 16—(1) The decisions of the political party and of its territorial organizations are adopted by the vote of the majority stipulated in the statute.

(2) The members of the leadership of the political party and of the leaderships of its territorial organizations are elected by secret vote.

(3) The statute must provide for the right of each member to political initiative and the opportunity for this initiative to be examined in an organized framework.

CHAPTER III—Registration of Political Parties

Article 17—(1) The petition of a political party for registration is filed with the Bucharest Municipality Tribunal, accompanied by:

a) the party statute and program;

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b) the act of establishment together with the list of supporting signatures of at least 10,000 founding members residing in at least 15 of the counties of the country, with no fewer than 300 in each county, accompanied by a certified statement of the head of the executive organ of the party on the authenticity of the signatures;

c) the lists of party members in the county organizations or the Bucharest municipality organization, which are necessary for the registration of the parties, which will include: the person's surname, his father's initial, his first name, date of birth, domicile, identification card, and signature;

d) a statement on the party headquarters and patrimony;

e) evidence of the opening of a bank account.

2) The petition for registration is signed by the head of the executive organ of the political party and by at least three founding members, who will be summoned to the court.

(3) The petition for registration is posted at the headquarters of the Bucharest Municipality Court for 15 days and is published in central newspapers with wide circulation.

Article 18—(1) The Bucharest Municipality Tribunal examines the petition for the registration of the political party in public session, with the participation of a representative of the Public Ministry.

(2) Interested natural or legal persons can take part in the process, if they file a request for intervention in their own interest in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. The request for intervention is communicated ex oficio to the persons who signed the petition for registration.

Article 19—(1) The Bucharest Municipality Tribunal rules on the petition for the registration of the political party within 15 days of the deadline stipulated in Article 17, Paragraph (3).

(2) The decision of the Bucharest Municipality Tribunal can be appealed in the Bucharest Appellate Court within five days of its communication.

(3) The Bucharest Appellate Court will examine the appeal in public session, within 15 days of its registration.

(4) The decision of the Bucharest Appellate Court is final.

Article 20—A political party becomes a legal person as of the date of the pronouncement of the final decision of the court in regard to the acceptance of the registration request.

Article 21—(1) Political parties whose requests for registration are aproved are listed in the registry of political parties in the Bucharest Municipality tribunal.

(2) The decision to accept the registration of the political party is published in MONITORUL OFICIAL.

Article 22—(1) The modification of the political party's statute or program can take place under the conditions stipulated by the statute.

(2) Modifications approved by the competent organ of the political party are communicated to the Bucharest Municipality Tribunal for registration and the tribunal examines them in accordance with the procedure stipulated in Articles 17, 18, and 19.

Article 23—(1) If the court has rejected the request to permit the modification of the statute but the political party in question is operating on the basis of the modified statute, the Public Ministry will ask the Bucharest Municipality Tribunal to stop the party's activity and to remove it from the registry of political parties.

(2) The Bucharest Municipality Tribunal will rule on the request of the Public Ministry within 15 days of its registration.

(3) Any interested party can appeal the decision of the Bucharest Municipality Tribunal within five days of the communication of the decision.

(4) The Bucharest Appellate Court issues a ruling within 15 days of the registration of the appeal. Its decision is final and is published in MONITORUL OFICIAL.

CHAPTER IV—Association of Political Parties

Article 24—(1) Political parties can form an association with each other, on the basis of an agreement of association, which constitutes a political alliance.

(2) Political alliances file an agreement of association at the Bucharest Municipality Tribunal and request registration in the register of political alliances.

Article 25—The agreement setting up the political alliance must indicate the name, the logo, and the electoral symbol, if there is one, the allied political parties, the objectives of the alliance, the manner of organizing and the decisionmaking elements.

Article 26—(1) Political parties and political alliances can set up other forms of association, together with legally constituted nonparty groupings, for the purpose of promoting common objectives.

(2) The agreement for setting up the forms of association specified in Paragraph (1) will indicate the name, the

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logo, if there is one, the allied organizations, the objectives of the association, the manner of organizing, and the decisionmaking elements and will be filed with the Bucharest Municipality Tribunal so that it can be listed in the registry of other forms of association of parties.

(3) The annual financial contribution of each nonparty grouping which is a member of a form of association mentioned in Paragraph (1) cannot exceed the amount of 500 minumum wage salaries in the economy.

Article 27—If the political alliance takes part in the elections with common lists of candidates, the candidates must belong to a legally constituted political party which is a member of the political alliance.

Article 28—The objectives of the political alliances and of the other forms of association of the parties as well as their manner of organizing must be in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of the present law.

CHAPTER V—Cessation of the Activity of Political Parties

Article 29—A political party ceases its activity as a result of self-dissolution, dissolution pronounced by means of the judiciary or by decision of the Constitutional Court or as a result of inactivity noted by the Bucharest Municipality Tribunal, in accordance with Article 31.

Article 30—Documents on the self-dissolution of the political party are filed with the Bucharest Municipality Tribunal within 10 days, so that the party can be removed from the registry of political parties.

Article 31—If a political party does not designate candidates, alone or in an alliance, in two successive election campaigns, in at least 10 districts, or if it has not held a general assembly for five years, the Bucharest Municipality Tribunal, at the request of the Public Ministry, will order that the party cease to exist, in accordance with the norms of procedure stipulated in Article 23.

CHAPTER VI—Finances of Political Parties

Article 32—Political parties can possess property and real estate which are necessary for the realization of specific activities.

Article 33—(1) The following can be sources of financing for a political party:

a) dues of party members;

b) donations and bequests;

c) income from their activities;

d) subsidies from the state budget, in accordance with the annual law on the budget.

(2) The receipts and payments operations of the parties are carried out with accounts in lei and hard currency that are opened in banks with headquarters in Romania, in accordance with the law.

Article 34—(1) The amount of the dues as well as their distribution and utilization are set by decisions of the political party, in accordance with the statute.

(2) There are no limits on the total revenues from dues.

(3) The amount of the dues paid in a year by one person cannot be more than 50 base minimum wages on the national level. The minimum base wage on the national level taken as a point of reference is the one in effect on 1 January of the respective year.

Article 35—(1) The donations received by a political party in a year cannot be more than 0.005 percent of the revenue of the state budget for the respective year.

(2) In a financial year in which parliamentary, presidential or local elections take place, the ceiling from the preceding paragraph is doubled.

(3) A donation received from a natural person in one year cannot exceed 100 base minimum wages on the national level during the respective year.

(4) A donation received from a legal person in one year cannot be more than 500 base minimum wages on the national level.

(5) When a donation is received the identity of the donor must be verified and recorded. At the request of the donor, the identity can remain confidential, but this does not apply in the case of an annual donation which is larger than 10 base minimum wages on the national level. The total amount received by a political party in confidential donations cannot ecceed 20 percent of the maximum subsidy given from the state budget to a political party in the respective year. (6) The list of donors of amounts larger than 10 base minimum wages on the national level is published in MONITORUL OFICVIAL prior to 31 March of the following year.

(7) Donations of material goods or sums of money for the obvious purpose of obtaining an economic or political advantage are prohibited.

Article 36—(1) Political parties cannot accept donations from public institutions, corporations, commercial companies, and banking companies with the majority of capital from the state.

(2) Donations from other states or organizations abroad are prohibited. An exception to this rule is the case of

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donations of material goods necessary for political activity that are received from international political organizations with which the respective political party is affiliated or from parties affiliated with the respective party in the area of political collaboration. These donations are published in MONITORUL OFICIAL.

Article 37—Political parties cannot carry out activities specifically reserved for commercial companies. The following are exceptions to this rule:

a) editing, producing, and distributing its own publications or other materials of political propaganda and culture;

b) cultural, sports, and entertainment activities;

c) internal services;

d) renting their own facilities for conferences and sociocultural activities;

e) bank interest;

f) selling goods from the patrimony, with the exception of those received as donations from abroad.

Article 38—Publications and propaganda materials must include the name of the political party or of the political alliance or other forms of association of the political parties that published it, according to the case.

Article 39—(1) Each year political parties receive subsidies from the state budget, under the conditions of the law. The subsidy is paid on a monthly basis, to the account of each political party, from the budget of the General Secretariat of the Government.

(2) The sum allocated annually to the political parties cannot be larger than 0.04 percent of the revenues of the state budget.

(3) Political parties which, at the beginning of the legislature, are represented by a parliamentary group, at least in one Chamber, receive a base subsidy. The total amount of the base subsidies represents one third of the budgetary subsidies allocated to the political parties.

(4) The political parties represented in Parliament receive a subsidy which is proportional to the number of seats obtained. The suitable amount per seat is determined by dividing the remaining two thirds of the subsidies from the state budget for political parties by the total number of Parliament members.

(5) The total subsidy given to a political party from the state budget as a result of these operations cannot be more than five times the base subsidy.

(6) Political parties that do not have parliamentary seats but have obtained at least two percent of the votes cast receive equal subsidies, which are determined by dividing the unused sum of money, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (5), by the number of the respective political parties. The total amount given to the nonparliamentary parties cannot be greater than a base subsidy.

(7) The money which is left over after the redistribution, which takes place in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 6, is divided among the parliamentary political parties in proportion to the number of seats they received.

(8) Any money which remains at the end of the financial year is carried over to the following year.

Article 40—(1) The income resulting from the budgetary subsidies can be used for the following:

a) material expenses for the maintenance and operation of headquarters;

b) expenses for personnel;

c) expenses for press and propaganda;

d) expenses for organizing activities of a political nature;

e) travel expenses;

f) telecommunications expenses;

g) expenses for foreign delegations;

h) investments in property and real estate necessary for the parties' activities.

(2) The effectiveness and opportuneness of these expenses will be decided upon by the elected organs of the political parties.

Article 41—(1) The local authorities will provide, on a priority basis, space for the headquarters of the political parties, when their requests for space are justified.

(2) The rental of space intended for the headquarters of the political parties follows the legal system stipulated for the rental of housing space.

(3) Political parties are exempt from the payment of building taxes for the real estate which they own.

(4) Political parties which cease their activity as a result of self-dissolution, dissolution pronounced by final decisions of the courts, or as a result of their failure to register in accordance with the provisions of Article 46, Paragraph (2) are obliged to hand over to the local public authorities, within 60 days, the space which they held on the basis of a rental conmtract concluded with their agreement.

(5) The Bucharest Municipality Tribunal will inform the prefects of the cessation of the activity of a political

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party, so that its headquarters can be taken over by local public authorities, by means of the court executors.

Article 42—(1) The income realized from the activities stipulated in Article 33 are exempt from fees and taxes.

(2) Donations received from abroad, as specified in Article 36, are also exempted from customs taxes.

Article 43—Payment for all the expenses connected with telecommunications, electric and thermal energy, gas, water, and sewers is based on the fee for spaces intended for housing.

Article 44—The Court of Accounts is the competent organ for monitoring the observance of the provisions of Article 33, Paragraph (2), Article 34, Paragraph (3), Articles 35-37, and Articles 39-41 on the financing of political parties.

Article 45—Donations accepted by political parties in violation of the provisions of Articles 35 and 36 or by those parties which find themselves in one of the situations stipulated in Articles 23 and 29 become income in the state budget, on the basis of the decision of the jurisdictional collegium of the Court of Accounts.

CHAPTER VII—Final and Temporary Provisions

Article 46—(1) Political parties existing as of the date that the present law goes into effect will continue to operate on the basis of the legal acts of registration valid on the date of their establishment.

(2) Within six months of the date that the present law goes into effect, the existing political parties will conform to its provisions, following the judicial procedure specified in Articles 17-19.

(3) The six-month deadline for registration is a declining deadline.

Article 47—(1) The name of a political party, the logo, and the electoral symbol used by it, beginning in 1990, belong to it by law, if it was the first one to use it, and it cannot be appropriated by other political parties.

(2) The provisions of Paragraph (1) also apply to political alliances, under the conditions of the elections law.

Article 48—Organizations of citizens belonging to the ethnic minorities, which participate in the elections, are obliged to respect, in a proper manner, if pertinent, the provisions of Articles 2-4, 7, 16, 34-43, and 47.

Article 49—Decree-Law No. 8/1989 on the registration and operation of political parties and public organizations in Romania is repealed.

*This law was adopted in the joint session of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on 19 March 1996, observing the provisions of Article 74, Paragraph (1) and Article 76, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution of Romania and was reexamined by the Senate in its session of 16 April 1996 and by the Chamber of Deputies in its session of 22 April 1996, in accordance with Article 145, Paragraph (1) of the Constitution, as a result of Constitutional Court Decision No. 35 of 2 April 1996.**

Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies

Adrian Nastase

For the President of the Senate

Radu Vasile

Bucharest, 26 April 1996, No. 27

Footnote

*Constitutional Court Decision No. 35 of 2 April 1996 was published in MONITORUL OFICIAL, Part I, No. 75 of 11 April 1996.

Court Rules on Political Parties Law

96P20421A Bucharest MONITORUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 75 11 Apr 96 pp 7-13

["Text" of Constitutional Court Decision on the Constitutionality of Some Provisions of the Law on Political Parties]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On 21 March 1996, the Constitutional Court was addressed by 53 deputies, namely: Petre Turlea, Ioan Gavra, Ioan Pop, Vasile Matei, Aurel Jecan, Nicolae Bud, Vasile Potolinca, Vasile Ionescu, Gheorghe Dobre, Coriolan Bucur, Costica Ciurtin, Lazar Ladariu, Eugen Crisan, Vasile Suta, Craciun Floruta, Gheorghe Branzei, Petru Burca, Mitica Balaet, Dumitru Dragut, Constantin Rotaru, Marin Lungu, Mihail Paraluta, Toader Constantinescu, Mircea Chiostec, Gheorghe Fition, Fanica Danila, Constantin Emil Hoara, Feuzia Rusid, Vasile Cristea, Anghel Stanciu, Smaranda Ionescu, Iuliu Ioan Furo, Constantin Gheorghe, Florea Danciu, Tudor Radu, Tudor Manolescu, Ionel Roman, Florin Negoita, Ioan Tanasa, Cornel Brahas, Eugen Costel Popescu, Grigore Raban, Mircea Cretu, Ioan Sonea, Ilie Gatan, Marcel Moldoveanu, Ioan Marinescu, Ioan Victor Pica, Petre Banita, Anton Mangiurea, Ion Hortopan, Simion Silviu Somacu, and Ion Dutu, in connection with the unconstitutionality of Article 1, Article 5, Paragraph 3, and Article 48 of the Law on Political Parties.

The statement was also signed by 11 senators but, since their number was lower than the number of 25 senators

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specified in Article 144, Letter a) of the Constitution, the Court has been legally addressed only by the group of deputies.

In the statement, it is pointed out that Article 1 of the Law, which defines the concept of a political party, is unconstitutional for the following reasons:

—the statement that the parties "carry out a public mission guaranteed by the Constitution" conflicts with the provisions of Articles 8 and 37 of the Constitution, since carrying out a mission is an act of execution and the parties "do not receive orders, directions, or tasks from any authority"; also, the reference to a constitutional guarantee means that "any type of activity carried out by a political party is guaranteed by the Constitution";

—the status of a party, as it is defined by the provisions of Article 1 also conflicts with the provisions of Articles 8 and 37 of the Constitution, since it does not refer to the relationship between the party and society but only to the relationship of "citizens associated in a party";

—the text of the Senate—which stated that the parties are associations which "contribute in a democratic manner to the determination of national policy," a formulation which would have been in accord with constitutional provisions—was not adopted.

The statement of the group of deputies also says that the provision of Article 5, Paragraph 3—which states that: "Members of organizations of citizens belonging to ethnic minorities which run candidates in elections can also belong to a political party"

—is unconstitutional, since:

—organizations of citizens belonging to ethnic minorities are similar to political parties, according to Article 48 of the Law. Therefore, by making it possible for these citizens to also belong to a political party, "a dual electoral calling," which represents an "electoral privilege" is instituted to their advantage, which is contrary to the principle of equality of citizens before the law, as specified in Article 16 of the Constitution.

—by not adopting, in the final form of the Law, the Senate's solution for banning ethnic parties, the possibility is implicitly created for a party and an organization to be created on the basis of the same ethnic criteria

—which would imply "a dual political status and a dual electoral calling";

—the provisions of Article 5, Paragraph 3 create the possibility of the establishment of "political parties, concomitent with organizations of the same persons, [established] on the basis of other criteria such as: religion, race, social security, social status, geographic zone or territorial divisions and the like," which "presents a particular danger for the unitary and national character of the Romanian state," reminiscent, in this regard, of some political activities ascribed to the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania].

Also, on 26 March 1996, the Constitutional Court was addressed by 25 senators—Gabor Menyhert Hajdu, Gabor Kozsokar, Denes Seres, Tiberiu Stefan Incze, Gheorghe Frunda, Zoltan Hosszu, Petre Constantin Buchwald, Bela Marko, Karoly Ferenc Szabo, Iosif Csapo, Nicolae Manolescu Apolzan, Ion Paun Otiman, Stefan Radof, Stefan Augustin Popa Doinas, Alexandru Paleologu, Adrian Dimitru Popescu Necsesti, Andrei Potcoava, Tiberiu Vladislav, Sabin Ivan, Dumitru Calueanu, Mihail Buracu, Constantin Moiceanu, Gigel Grigore, Lajos Magyari, and Emil Negrutiu—in connection with the unconstitutionality of Article 17, Letter b), Article 46, and Article 3 of the same Law.

In regard to the provisions of Article 17, Letter b) of the Law, regarding the criterion for representativeness in registering a political party—at least 10,000 signatures, from at least 15 counties, but no fewer than 300 in each county—the senators' statement says that this requirement conflicts with the provisions of Article 8, Paragraph (1), Article 37, Paragraph (2), and Article 148, Paragraph (1) of the Constitution, which recognize the principle of political pluralism, since this requirement is a "threshhold set up ahead of time," serving as an "artifical impediment" to the free exercise of the right of association in parties, in contrast to the criterion for representativeness in the initial legislative proposal—only 2,500 signatures, in at least 10 counties, but no fewer than 100 in each county—which was "more rational and more balanced."

Also, the senators believe that Article 46—according to which, within six months of the date that the Law goes into effect, political parties are obliged to conform to the new regulations—violates the principle of the nonretroactivity of the Law, stipulated in Article 15, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution.

In regard to Article 3 of the Law, the senators' statement maintains that the obligation of a political party to respect the provisions of Article 30, Paragraph (7) and Article 148, Paragraph (1) or Paragraph (2) of the Constitution is in conflict with the constitutional provisions of Article 8, Article 37, Paragraph (2), and Article 20, in the latter case in reference to the provisions on the right to association in the European Convention for the Defense of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms.

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In light of the fact that both statements contest the constitutionality of some provisions of the same Law, the respective dossiers are combined.

On the basis of Article 18, Paragraph (2) of Law No. 47/1992, the views of the presidents of the two chambers of Parliament and of the Government were solicited.

In the opinion of the president of the Chamber of Deputies, the group of deputies' charge of unconstitutionality is unfounded. [passage omitted] The president of the Chamber of Deputies also considers that the group of senators' charge of unconstitutionality is also unfounded. [passage omitted]

In the opinion of the Government, the group of deputies' charges of unconstitutionality are unfounded. [passage omitted]

The Government believes that the charges of the group of senators are unfounded, since the provisions of Article 3, Article 17, Letter b), and Article 46 of the Law are constitutional. [passage omitted]

The president of the Senate did not communicate his point of view.

In connection with the two statements, the Senate's Commission on Juridical Matters, Appointments, Discipline, Immunity, and Validation, in its Memorandums No. XXII/231/1996 and No. XXII/235/1996, informed the Constitutional Court on its opinion on the objections of unconstitutionality which have been formulated. In this regard, the Commission considers, in essence, that the provisions of Article 1 and Article 5, Paragraph 3 of this Law, to which the statement of the group of deputies refers, are unconstitutional. Thus, it is pointed out that parties do not carry out a public mission which can be entrusted only "to a public, civil, or military functionary" and citizens express their option at the elections. In regard to the constitutional guarantee of the public mission of the party, it is explained that this does not hold true for every activity but only for an activity carried out in observance of the Constitution and the laws of the country. As for Article 5, Paragraph 3 of the Law, the Commission believes that ethnic minority citizens cannot be members, at the same time, of an ethnic minority organization and of a party, since these organizations are similar to political parties. Otherwise, a privilege contrary to Article 16 of the Constitution would be created.

In connection with the statement of the group of senators, the Commission believes that the objection is unfounded. [passage omitted]

The Court rules that:

1. The provisions of Article 1, Article 3, Paragraph (2) as related to Article 30, Paragraph (7) of the Constitution and Article 5, Paragraph (3), Article 17, Letter b), Article 46, and Article 48 of the Law on Political Parties are constitutional.

2. The provision of Article 3, Paragraph (2) of the same Law as related to Article 148, Paragraph (1) or Paragraph (2) of the Constitution is unconstitutional.

The decision is communicated to the President of Romania, as well as to the presidents of the two chambers of Parliament, for the purpose of beginning the procedure stipulated in Article 145, Paragraph (1) of the Constitution.

The deliberation took place on 2 April 1996 and the following participated in it: Ioan Muraru, president of the Court, Costica Bulai, Viorel Mihai Ciobanu, Mihai Constantinescu, Ioan Deleanu, Lucian Stangu, Florin Bucur Vasilescu, and Victor Dan Zlatescu, judges.

Univ. Prof. Dr. Ioan Muraru, president of the Constitutional Court

Assistant Magistrate Constantin Burada

Bucharest, 2 April 1996

No. 35

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Slovenia: Text of Decree on Defense Planning

96BA0249A Ljubljana URADNI LIST in Slovene 15 Mar 96 pp 1109-1114

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of Paragraph 6 of Article 25 and Paragraph 3 of Article 69 of the Law on Defense (URADNI LIST RS No. 82/94) and Paragraph 1 of Article 26 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Slovenia (URADNI LIST RS No. 4/93), the Government of the Republic of Slovenia is hereby issuing the

DECREE ON DEFENSE PLANNING

I. General Provisions

Article 1—This decree specifies the agents, procedure for preparation and the content of defense plans, the procedure and method for preparing, planning, and conducting mobilization, the procedure for planning production and services in wartime, the organization of material and health care support in wartime, the temporary incapacitation of economic and other facilities and installations in wartime, and the tasks of the administrators of defense plans.

Article 2—The concepts used in this decree have the following meaning:

1. A defense plan is the totality of the organizational, personnel, material, and other solutions used to ensure a gradual, organized, and coordinated transition to activity during a state of war, and specifies the organization and method of operation, in such a way as to ensure the uninterrupted conduct of the activity of a body or organization.

2. Defense documents are documents that specify individual organizational, personnel, and material solutions for activity during a state of war by a body, organization, or local community.

3. Mobilization assembly points are the areas which are specified for the assembly of people and material assets upon mobilization, i.e., the peacetime locations of a body, commercial company, institute, or other organization. Mobilization assembly points are either main or reserve ones. As a rule, protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces, commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations only have main mobilization assembly points.

4. The charter to conduct mobilization is an act by the State Assembly, the president of the republic, or the prime minister of the Republic of Slovenia, i.e., an act containing instructions or orders to conduct mobilization that is adopted in accordance with the law.

5. Material and health care support is part of economic defense, through which the supply of the Slovene Army, the police, protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces, state bodies, and the population is ensured on the basis of stated or estimated requirements, along with other defensive requirements in wartime.

6. The administrator of a defense plan or defense documents is the body or individual that is responsible for guarding and continuously elaborating the defense plan or defense documents.

II. Agents for the Preparation of Defense Plans and Defense Documents

Article 3—Defense plans, per this decree, are prepared by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia (hereafter: the government), ministries, administrative units, the Bank of Slovenia and commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations whose activity is of particular significance for defense, by decision of the government.

Government services, municipalities, and provinces prepare defense documents.

Article 4—Commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations with which a contract has been concluded to provide production and services in wartime prepare defense documents.

Public enterprises, institutes, and other organizations established by the state or a local community perform their tasks during wartime in accordance with their founding document and regulations. They are furthermore also required to perform the tasks specified by the competent state bodies or the bodies of local communities.

Article 5—Commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations that do not prepare defense plans or defense documents continue to work in wartime in accordance with the situation that has arisen and decisions by the competent authorities.

III. Procedure for the Preparation of Defense Plans and Defense Documents

Article 6—The government, ministries, administrative units, and the Bank of Slovenia prepare their own defense plans on the basis of an assessment of the threat of an attack against the state, for the functioning of the economy and other sectors in wartime. The Slovene Army's General Staff prepares a plan for the use of the Slovene Army, and the Republic of Slovenia's Civil Defense Headquarters prepares a plan for protection and rescue in the event of a military attack against the Republic of Slovenia.

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The competent ministries issue guidelines, on the basis of which administrative units and commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations whose activity is particularly important for defense by decision of the government prepare their own defense plans.

Government services prepare their own defense documents on the basis of guidelines from the government.

IV. Defense Plans and Defense Documents

1. Contents of Defense Plans and Defense Documents

Article 7—The state's defense plan consists of the government's defense plan, the ministries' defense plans, the plan for the use of the Slovene Army, and the plan of the Republic of Slovenia's Civil Defense Headquarters, along with government services' defense documents. The plan is adopted by the government, except for the defense plans of ministries and the defense plans of government services, which are adopted by the appropriate ministers or heads of government services.

The government's defense plan plans for the following:

—preparations to carry out measures for readiness;

—mobilization;

—the government's method of operation;

—the organization, activity, and measures of the economy (measures for economic defense), and other activities;

—psychological defense.

Documents that deal with the organization, activity, and measures of the economy and other activities during a state of war are prepared by the appropriate ministries, and other parts of the defense plan are prepared by the office of the prime minister and other government services.

The psychological defense plan includes solutions for guiding and coordinating psychological defense, the organization and activity of public organs and media, measures for providing information and propaganda to strengthen defensive awareness, and measures for propaganda and psychological warfare against the attacker.

Article 8—The ministries' defense plans plan for the following:

—preparations to carry out specific measures for readiness;

—the ministries' method of operation;

—the performance of activities under the jurisdiction of the ministries.

The ministers notify the government of the adoption of defense plans.

The Defense Ministry's defense plan also plans for ensuring conditions for the work of the republic president, the government, and the State Assembly, and for the functioning of administrative communications. The functioning of administrative communications is planned in accordance with special regulations.

The plan for the use of the Slovene Army also plans for the mobilization of the Slovene Army.

The defense minister specifies the contents of the plan for the use of the Slovene Army.

Article 9—The defense documents that are prepared by government services plan for the necessary organizational, material, and personnel solutions for the uninterrupted performance of the activities under their jurisdiction.

Article 10—The defense plans of administrative units plan for:

—preparations to carry out specific measures for readiness;

—the organization and method of operation of the administrative units;

—the performance of activities under the jurisdiction of administrative units.

Article 11—The Bank of Slovenia's defense plan plans for:

—preparations to carry out specific measures for readiness;

—the organization and activity of the Bank of Slovenia.

Article 12—The defense plans of commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations whose activity, by government decision, is particularly important for defense, plan for the following:

—preparations to carry out specific measures for readiness;

—organization and activity.

Article 13—The defense documents that are prepared by municipalities and provinces specify their organization and method of operation during a state of war, so as to ensure the uninterrupted performance of the tasks under their jurisdiction.

In their defense documents, municipalities and provinces also plan the necessary organizational,

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material-technical, and personnel solutions for carrying out the tasks and jurisdictions that the state has transferred to local communities.

Article 14—The defense documents of commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations which, during a state of war, engage in production and services to an extent specified by a contract specify the necessary organizational, material-technical, and personnel solutions for conducting the production or services in wartime.

Public enterprises, institutes, and other organizations established by the state or a local community prepare defense documents on carrying out their tasks in wartime.

2. Preparations To Conduct Measures for Readiness

Article 15—The government, in accordance with the law, specifies the scope and sequence of preparations to carry out the measures for readiness that are planned by the Slovene Army, ministries and government services, administrative units, the Bank of Slovenia, the Republic of Slovenia Civil Defense Headquarters, and commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations whose activity, by government decision, is particularly important for defense.

If it is necessary to adopt or amend a regulation in order to institute an individual measure for readiness, the preparations also include drafting a proposed regulation or amendments to one.

3. Mobilization

3.1. Preparations to Carry out Mobilization

Article 16—The preparations to carry out mobilization include:

—planning mobilization

—the deployment of citizens, and personnel assignments;

—material and other preparations;

—training to carry out mobilization.

Article 17—The planning of mobilization includes the preparation, coordination, and modification of mobilization documents.

Mobilization is planned at the state level as general mobilization, in such a way that it is also possible to carry out a partial public mobilization or a secret mobilization, or only the mobilization of the Slovene Army or only the mobilization of state bodies and other agencies responsible for civil defense or protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces.

The preparations to carry out general mobilization and the mobilization of the Slovene Army are coordinated by the Defense Ministry.

Article 18—The assignment of citizens to defense duties or to protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces ensures the necessary personnel capabilities in during a state of war. In the Slovene Army, they are ensured in accordance with the formation of the wartime force; in protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces, in accordance with the standards for organizing and equipping them; and in the case of those responsible for civil defense, in accordance with their organization and specialization for carrying out their tasks.

Article 19—The Slovene Army's General Staff, commands, units, and institutes of the Slovene Army, in accordance with the organizational mobilization development of the Slovene Army, prepare proposed plans for staffing the wartime force with military recruits and material assets in light of the formation of functional and personnel duties and the conditions for performing them, and the necessary material assets and equipment. The proposed staffing plans are sent to the Defense Ministry's organizational unit responsible for military affairs.

The proposed staffing plans in the previous paragraph must also make it clear which positions are being filled by members of the Slovene Army's permanent force or Defense Ministry employees, and which material assets and equipment are provided from the assets and equipment of the Slovene Army and which material assets must be obtained on the basis of material obligation (hereafter: assets from the census).

The proposed plans in the first paragraph of this article, in the case of military territorial commands, can also plan for the formation and staffing of groups to take material assets out of Slovene Army storage depots during mobilization and to maintain and guard military facilities when they are abandoned by commands and units.

Article 20—The Defense Ministry's organizational unit in the preceding article, on the basis of the proposed plans for staffing the wartime force of the Slovene Army, prepares staffing plans which it provides to the Defense Ministry's defense administrations (hereafter: defense administrations). The defense administrations are responsible for implementing them. The defense administrations are obligated to coordinate the staffing of the commands of units and institutes with the appropriate commands.

Article 21—Staffing on the basis of a work obligation or the staffing of protection, rescue, and emergency assis-

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tance forces with employees, members of Civil Defense, or citizens who voluntarily perform tasks in the protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces, and with assets from the census, are proposed to the appropriate defense administration by the leaders of civil defense preparations and the bodies or individuals responsible for organizing protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces.

The personnel staffing and material supply in the previous paragraph is ensured by the defense administration whose records cover the citizens and owners of the assets from the census to which the proposal for staffing applies. The staffing is conducted after coordination with the proposer of the staffing.

Defense administrations assign the necessary number of citizens on the basis of their military obligation to perform unified courier services.

Article 22—During a state of war, regardless of the provisions of articles 19 and 21 of this decree, proposals and requests for reinforcements for the Slovene Army that are proposed by independent battalions or units equal to them or higher are sent directly to the defense administrations whose records cover the citizens and the owners of the assets from the census. On that basis, the defense administrations conduct staffing with the appropriate use of the provisions of this decree that regulate peacetime manning.

Article 23—Defense administrations send mobilizations summons for manning on the basis of a work obligation or manning on the basis of a material obligation for the needs of those performing civil defense and protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces to the proposer of the manning, except in those cases in which the summons is carried out by the uniform courier service.

Article 24—Material and other preparations for mobilization cover primarily securing assets from the census that are needed for work or activity during a state of war, designating and setting up mobilization assembly points, and providing material and health care support during mobilization.

Article 25—Training for the conduct of mobilization includes training to provide commands to conduct mobilization and carry out the tasks, measures, and activities specified by the mobilization documents.

3.2. Mobilization Documents

Article 26—Mobilization documents are:

—documents on the organization and the provision and receipt of the command to conduct mobilization;

—documents on the organization and conduct of the call-up;

—documents on organizing the transition to work during a state of war.

Article 27—The mobilization documents of the government, ministries, administrative units, the Bank of Slovenia, and commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations whose work, by government decision, is particularly important for the state's defense, include documents on the organization and the method of providing and receiving the order to conduct mobilization, documents on the organization and implementation of the call-up, and documents on the organization of the transition to work during a state of war.

The Defense Ministry prepares documents on the organization and method of providing the order to conduct mobilization, keeps records and a map of the mobilization assembly points for the government, ministries, administrative units, the Bank of Slovenia, and commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations whose activity, by government decision, is particularly important for the state's defense, or which conduct the production of military weapons and equipment, and of the mobilization assembly points for commands and units of the Slovene Army, communications units for protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces under state jurisdiction, and municipal Civil Defense headquarters.

The mobilization documents of ministries and administrative units are an integral part of the defense plan documents in which they plan their organization and methods of operation during a state of war.

The mobilization documents of the Bank of Slovenia and of commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations whose activity, by government decree, is particularly important for the state's defense are an integral part of the defense plan documents in which they plan their organization and activity during a state of war.

Article 28—The documents on the organization and method of providing and receiving the order to conduct mobilization specify the organization and method of providing and receiving the command, reporting, deadlines for reports on the progress of mobilization, and a summary of the executors of mobilization to whom the command is provided.

The Defense Ministry's uniform courier service, organized at branch offices of the defense administrations, also carries orders to conduct mobilization to the mayors and presidents of provinces, and to the leaders of civil defense preparations and to the municipal Civil Defense

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commanders in regions and municipalities, each in the area for which it is geographically responsible, if the order cannot be relayed in any other way.

Article 29—The documents on organizing the call-up specify the methods for calling up those liable for military and labor service, members of protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces, and employees of bodies and organizations, in accordance with the organization and specialization for wartime work. These documents also specify the methods of calling up the owners of assets from the census.

The call-up of military conscripts and the owners of assets from the census in accordance with the formation of the Slovene Army's wartime force is conducted by the uniform courier service attached to the branch offices of the defense administrations. Members of the Slovene Army's permanent force are called up in the manner specified by the chief of the Slovene Army's General Staff.

The call-up of individuals liable for labor service and the owners of assets from the census, assigned on the basis of the organization and specialization for wartime work, is conducted by services organized by those heading the civil defense preparations.

The call-up of Civil Defense members and members of other protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces and of the owners of assets from the census is organized by the appropriate support services at the Civil Defense headquarters.

Article 30—The uniform courier service consists of mobilization commissions, instructors, and couriers.

The number of mobilization commissions and their area of activity are determined by the defense administrations. The defense administrations also take care of equipping the uniform courier services.

The mobilization commissions in the previous paragraph take care of the timely delivery of call-up notices, maintain communications with the branch offices and report to them on the progress of the call-up, and resolve problems that arise during mobilization. Mobilization commissions cooperate with the municipalities in conducting mobilization.

Article 31—The documents on organizing the transition to wartime work plan for mobilization assembly points, and specify the necessary changes or additions to the organization and specialization for wartime work, a list of employees in accordance with the specialization for wartime work, and the provision of weapons and protective and other equipment.

As a rule, ministries and government services do not plan changes in organization for wartime operation.

Article 32—The mobilization documents of commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations with which contracts have been concluded for providing production and services in wartime cover the organization of the call-up and a list of employees required to carry out the tasks specified by the contracts, and are an integral part of their defense documents.

The mobilization documents of public enterprises, institutes, and organizations for which tasks have been specified for wartime work cover the organization of the call-up and a list of the employees required to carry out the tasks and are an integral part of their defense documents.

Article 33—The mobilization documents of municipalities and provinces cover the organization of the call-up and a list of the employees required to carry out tasks in wartime, and are an integral part of their defense documents.

3.3. Conducting Mobilization

Article 34—A proposal to conduct a general mobilization is sent by the government to the State Assembly, and it also notifies the republic president of this.

The government sends a proposal to mobilize the Slovene Army to the republic president and also notifies the State Assembly of this.

The defense minister informs the republic president about verification of the Slovene Army's readiness for mobilization.

Article 35—The duration of the mobilization, priority in the use of transportation routes, and the scale of material and health care support during the mobilization, are specified by the government.

Article 36—The defense minister specifies the organization and method of providing and receiving the order for mobilization and reporting on the progress of mobilization. The defense minister will also regulate in more detail the preparations for and conduct of the Slovene Army's mobilization. The minister of internal affairs will regulate in more detail the preparations for and conduct of the police's mobilization.

The mobilization of communications units is conducted in the manner specified for the Slovene Army.

4. Planning Wartime Production and Services

Article 37—The documents on the operation of ministries and government services, municipalities, and

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provinces specify the tasks and basic solutions for conducting the activities under their jurisdiction in wartime.

Article 38—On the basis of the stated or estimated requirements of the Slovene Army, police, forces for protection, rescue, and emergency assistance, the estimated requirements of the population and state bodies and other defense requirements, the appropriate ministries designate the raw materials, products, and services that must be secured in a war situation, assess the possibilities for securing those raw materials, products, and services, and plan the necessary measures to secure them. In doing so, they use data from statistical research and other records in accordance with the law.

Article 39—The appropriate ministries must plan economic, administrative, and other measures to prevent economic and other measures against the Republic of Slovenia in wartime that could weaken its defensive strength. The measures must be mutually coordinated and proposed regulations to implement them must be prepared.

5. Material and Health-Care Support in Wartime

Article 40—Ministries, administrative units, municipalities, and commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations take care of organizing, ensuring, and carrying out a unified system for material and health care support for the Slovene Army, police, forces for protection, rescue, and emergency assistance, the population, and other state bodies in wartime. For this purpose, they conduct preparations during peacetime and prepare documents in accordance with the law and with this decree.

Material and health care support is planned for 90 days of war.

Article 41—The Defense Ministry concludes contracts with commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations specified by the appropriate ministries on the basis of the requirements in Article 38 of this decree for providing material and health care support in wartime for the Slovene Army, communications units, and protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces under state jurisdiction.

Regardless of the preceding paragraph, the Defense Ministry can also conclude contracts with commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations which already provide production and services in peacetime for the Slovene Army, communications units, and protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces under state jurisdiction, for providing that production and services in wartime as well. The Defense Ministry will notify the appropriate ministries of these contracts, and those ministries will take them into account in planning for ensuring the volume of material and health care support in wartime.

The Defense Ministry also concludes contracts for the production and trading of military weapons and equipment.

Article 42—The Ministry of Internal Affairs concludes contracts for providing material and health care support for the needs of the police in wartime with the commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations specified by the appropriate ministries on the basis of the requirements in Article 38 of this decree.

Article 43—The appropriate ministries conclude contracts with specific commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations for providing material and health care support for the population and other states bodies in wartime.

The appropriate ministries can transfer the authority to conclude the contracts in the preceding paragraph to the chiefs of administrative units.

Article 44—In the event that the appropriate ministries designate commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations whose founder is a municipality to provide specific production and services, and concludes contracts with them for providing that production and services, they notify the mayor of this.

Article 45—Municipalities take care of providing material and health care support for protection, rescue, and emergency assistance forces, and other activities under their jurisdiction.

Article 46—Ministries and administrative units, in the documents on performing activities in wartime, prepare the necessary documents for organizing, ensuring, and conducting material and health care support, which include the stated or estimated requirements, a summary of the commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations that will provide a specific volume of production and services in wartime, and a summary of the contracts concluded.

Article 47—The defense administrations and the military territorial commands of the Slovene Army are responsible for coordinating material and health care support for the Slovene Army in wartime, and must already coordinate operational solutions during peacetime.

The military territorial commands of the Slovene Army, and in exceptional cases other commands as well, must report movements of battalions and units equal to or higher than them to the defense administrations in the area to which they are coming, so that material and health care support can be provided in a timely manner.

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Article 48—The defense minister specifies several products and services that are to be provided for material and health care support for the Slovene Army, and the method for stating or estimating them.

6. Temporary Incapacitation of Economic and Other Facilities and Installations in Wartime

Article 49—Economic and other facilities and installations whose temporary incapacitation in wartime is planned are designated by the government at the proposal of the appropriate ministries.

Commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations are responsible, on the basis of the decision in the preceding paragraph, for planning procedures for the temporary incapacitation of economic and other facilities and installations.

The ministries guide, coordinate, and oversee the conduct of preparations for the temporary incapacitation of economic and other facilities and installations under their jurisdiction.

The documents by which the temporary incapacitation of economic and other facilities and installations in wartime is planned are an integral part of the defense plans or defense documents.

Article 50—The temporary incapacitation of economic and other facilities and installations in wartime is conducted by the decision of the government. The temporary incapacitation of transportation routes or facilities can also be carried out by a decision of the chief of the Slovene Army's General Staff or the commander of an operational command, when that is required by the situation in the area where battles are taking place.

V. Administrators of Defense Plans and Documents

Article 51—The head of civil defense preparations appoints an administrator for the defense plan or defense documents.

The administrator of the defense plan or defense documents is responsible to the head of the civil defense preparations.

Article 52—The Defense Ministry, as the administrator of the state's defense plan, takes care of the professional and organizational-technical work in connection with the preparation and modification of the plan, and takes care of its storage.

The administrators of the defense plan of the government, the defense plans of ministries, administrative units, the Bank of Slovenia, and commercial companies, institutes, and other organizations whose activity, by decision of the government, is particularly important for defense, organize the preparation and modification of defense plans, guide and coordinate the tasks and activities of the executors who prepare and modify the plans, and take care of the storage and appropriate protection of the defense plans.

The provision in the preceding paragraph is logically used to specify the tasks of the administrator of defense documents.

VI. Transitional and Final Provisions

Article 53—Defense plans and defense documents should be brought into accordance with this decree within six months after it goes into effect.

Article 54—When this decree goes into effect, the Decree on Defense Plans (URADNI LIST RS No. 23/92), the Decree on Mobilization (URADNI LIST RS No. 38/92), the Decree on the Organization of Material and Health care support in Wartime (URADNI LIST RS No. 6/92), and the Decree on the Temporary Incapacitation of Economic Facilities and Installations in Wartime (URADNI LIST RS No. 10/92) cease to be in effect.

Article 55—This decree will go into effect on the 15th day after its publication in URADNI LIST REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE.

No. 800-05/96-4/1-8 Ljubljana, 22 February 1996

Government of the Republic of Slovenia

[signed] Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek

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Federal

FRY: Official Statement Issued on Milosevic-Primakov Talks

LD3005161296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1427 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 30 May (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Russian Federation Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, who is paying an official visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [The following statement was released:]

In talks that were held in a friendly atmosphere of mutual openness and understanding it was stressed that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation have stable friendly relations based on equality, trust, and traditional closeness between their peoples.

Great mutual interest was expressed in further developing cooperation, particularly in the economic field. It was said that good results have been achieved in developing business contacts between economic partners in the two countries, in their joint projects and business, and in wide-ranging possibilities for the mutual use of complementary advantages in numerous economic branches. These results are at the focus of attention of the two countries' economies. In addition, a positive approach to the settlement of outstanding obligations arising out of past trade deals was analyzed.

During the meeting, views were exchanged on political trends and the situation in the Balkans. The two sides said that the peace process in the areas of former hostilities in Bosnia is proceeding successfully. There is no doubt that the process of the normalization of relations in the former Yugoslavia is the best way of eliminating the consequences of the Yugoslav crisis, as well as creating conditions for speedier progress in all countries of the region, they said. In this connection, it is particularly important that international players, including the Russian Federation, support the development of their future relations on the basis of equality and the reaffirmation of the responsibility of the Balkan peoples for their own future.

The two sides also drew attention to the importance of continued political dialogue between Belgrade and Moscow. President Milosevic asked Yevgeniy Primakov to convey his cordial greetings to President Yeltsin.

The talks were attended by Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, Russian Ambassador in Belgrade Yuriy Kostov, Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow Danilo Markovic, and other Yugoslav and Russian officials.

FRY: Lilic, Primakov Praise State's Role in Peace Process

AU3005150296 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zoran Lilic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], today received Russian Federation Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov who is on an official visit to the FRY, read the statement that we received in the course of the newscast.

During the constructive talks, the officials exchanged views on bilateral, political, and economic cooperation between the two countries and topical issues and problems pertaining to the peace process based on the Dayton and Paris agreements. Greeting the Russian minister, President Lilic expressed our country's gratitude to the Russian Federation for its consistent engagement in solving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the humanitarian aid donated to the FRY and the Serb Republic.

Unfortunately, the need for humanitarian aid is not over, President Lilic said. In the FRY alone, some 500,000 refugees hope that the implementation of the peace agreement will provide them with the opportunity to return home. [Words indistinct] now that we are nearing the end of the implementation of the peace agreement, and when it is actually in a critical phase in which problems accompanying its implementation are multiplying, are responsible for suppressing all types of extremist tendencies, while the international community should take concrete measures to show that it is treating all sides equally. Only the equal treatment of all three sides can maintain peace and prevent fresh conflicts that would threaten the general region, President Lilic stressed.

Speaking of this, I believe that the international War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague must also be guided by the principle of equality, President Lilic pointed out.

Yevgeniy Primakov said the Russian Federation is doing everything to ensure that the peace agreement is implemented consistently. He added that the two countries' stances are identical in this respect. The Russian minister assessed positively the initial results in the realization of the Basic Agreement for the Srem-Baranja Region.

In the context of economic cooperation between the Russian Federation and the FRY, Yevgeniy Primakov pointed out the possible types of further development of economic relations, including the formation of joint companies and presence on other markets and the

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possibility for solving our debit claims from the Russian economy.

The successful implementation of the peace agreement [words indistinct] cooperation with the FRY is our strategic course, rather [words indistinct] interest, Minister Primakov stressed.

President Lilic pointed out that peace in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the general region and economic recovery and development are the FRY policy's priorities and that the Russian Federation and our country share interests in numerous domains.

The international community should adequately value the FRY's peaceful and constructive position and role in the peace process, President Lilic stressed. The FRY's integration into international financial and trade organizations and institutions should be speeded up to facilitate our economic recovery and development. In this (?context), any new conditions for the FRY are unacceptable. Only a stable and economically [word indistinct] Yugoslavia can be a successful guarantor of peace in the area, and economic development is the best defense against all types of exclusivity, President Lilic said. [sentence as heard]

The FRY president expressed satisfaction with the continuation of dialogue between the two countries at the highest level and pointed out that Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin have an open invitation to visit our country.

The talks were also attended by Yuriy Kotov, Russian ambassador to the FRY, Zivadin Jovanovic, assistant foreign minister, and Danilo Z. Markovic, FRY ambassador to the Russian Federation.

FRY: Russia's Primakov Praises Milosevic on Dayton Commitment

AU3005202796 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 30 May 96

[Statement by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov in Belgrade on 30 May—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] I am extremely satisfied with the exceptionally constructive talks. We discussed problems pertaining to the resolution of the crisis in the region. I have again had the opportunity to see that President Milosevic is committed to the full implementation of the Dayton and Paris agreements and is investing a lot of effort into this. His efforts have Russia's full support.

FRY: Federal Assembly To Discuss Electoral Changes

AU3105105296 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 31 May 96

[Report by Zoran Vaskovic—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Although the beginning of the [word indistinct] session was scheduled for 1100 [0900 GMT] both halls are still empty. The session will evidently begin later when all the preparations are complete. The assembly bell has just sounded.

Both chambers share an identical agenda for the second session of the spring session. The main issue is a proposal of changes to the law on electoral units for the elections in the Chamber of Citizens. According to the latest proposal, there will be 27 instead of the present 9 electoral units in Serbia. In Montenegro, there will be 12 instead of 1 electoral unit.

It is expected that the Federal Assembly deputies will today also be presented with a proposal for the reconstruction of the Federal Government. This possibility was indicated by Federal Vice President Uros Klikovac in the conversation with the assembly reporters yesterday. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Serbia: Alleged FRY Demand for Karadzic Withdrawal Noted

AU2905142396 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 29 May 96 p 4

[Article by M. Kusmuk: "Withdrawal in Writing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The top leadership of the Serb Republic [RS] is in Belgrade, where it is discussing with the authorities of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the implementation of the Dayton agreement, VESTI has learned. The same was also confirmed to BETA by well-informed Serb sources in the RS.

According to the still unconfirmed reports, RS President Radovan Karadzic is being asked to confirm his withdrawal from power in writing, as demanded by Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to an agreement that has been extorted by the international community following the replacement of Rajko Kasagic, Karadzic will not appear in the public so as not to irritate the international players and The Hague Tribunal.

However, as the government sources in Pale claim, there is constant pressure on Radovan Karadzic to withdraw

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from the political life completely, and the RS and Milosevic are in contact almost daily.

Serbia: Weekly Sees Belgrade Support for Karadzic

AU3005154396 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 25 May 96 pp 12-16

[Commentary by Perica Vucinic and Filip Svarm: "Dame in the Old Deck"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When all the business with the replacement of Serb Republic Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic started, it all seemed that a big and unpredictable game was underway, but it all boiled down to just another exciting episode that ended before the spectators even had the chance to sit down properly.

A lot of things happened in just four days, from 15 to 18 May: Serb Republic [RS] President Karadzic "relieved" his prime minister of his post—official Belgrade and the representatives of the international community rushed to make statements about how they considered the replacement illegitimate; and, pursuant to this view, the replaced prime minister received Carl Bildt, international community senior representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina; NATO Secretary General Javier Solana; and George Joulwan, the European forces commander.

From Banja Luka, where they extended support to Kasagic, these gentlemen proceeded to Belgrade, only to realize two days later, on 18 May, that they had trod in the mud of inter-Serbian relations. The Serb Republic Assembly decided to replace Kasagic, and Kasagic accepted this and admitted that the Constitution did contain a clause whereby the RS prime minister can be replaced at the initiative of 20 deputies or at the proposal of the assembly speaker.

Amid the mayhem, in which Kasagic soared rapidly to his greatest heights only to sink down rapidly, Radovan Karadzic vested Biljana Plavsic, one of the two RS vice presidents, with his foreign affairs' powers and closed the affair with the proverbial: "There are more peaceful days ahead of us. Our main task at the moment is to carry out numerous tasks on the resolution of the refugees' status, the employment of demobilized soldiers, the resumption of production, reconstruction...."

The fate of the Serbs in Bosnia depends on the fate of one man—Dr. Radovan Karadzic. With him, the fate equals the evenings of gusle [local musical instrument] music recitals, misery, isolation, and homelessness. Without him, everything for which blood was shed collapses. It is Slobodan Milosevic, who is facing sanctions again, who is deciding on Karadzic's fate. Without Milosevic, the dilemma would not have existed.

RS Vice Presidents Dr. Biljana Plasic and Dr. Nikola Koljevic met with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on 21 May.

The meeting was cordial, there were "ear to ear" smiles, and the shaking of hands was particularly pronounced. Of course, there are people who recall that a disgusted Dr. Plavsic refused to extend her hand to the Serbian president (Jahorina 1993) and even demanded that he publicly renounce communism. People also remember that Milosevic proclaimed Ms. Plavsic a mental case whose place was in a lunatic asylum, while his wife, the leftist Mira Markovic, branded her a Dr. Mengele experimenting with her own people.

The Game

A statement broadcast by TANJUG stated that Dr. Plavsic was "the acting RS president" and that they discussed "the most important political activities in the Serb Republic" regarding the realization of the Dayton accord at the meeting. The term "acting president" coincided with a report by the same agency that Dr. Radovan Karadzic had vested Dr. Plavsic with his presidential powers, although both maintained that these were only the powers in the liaison with the international community. "I do not believe anyone in this game," Carl Bildt, UN senior representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, said after the meeting with Milosevic on 20 May.

Signing the decree that booted Rajko Kasagic out of the post of prime minister, Dr. Karadzic also signed a request for his own replacement. For as long as he is in power, the civilian part of the Dayton accord cannot be realized, the international community maintains. He was accused of grave war crimes and genocide, and the Bosnian Serb leader was deemed "the polluter" of any constructive policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why he must resign in a manner that will make him available to the Hague international tribunal within a foreseeable time.

NATO structures have reported that "the arrest of Dr. Karadzic is not worth shedding the blood of any of its soldiers." From Bildt all the way to John Kornblum, U.S. peace mediator in the former Yugoslavia, however, there have been numerous reminders that the removal of the RS president and the rest of those accused of war crimes was an obligation that Milosevic accepted in Dayton. Kornblum repeated this to President Milosevic in three telephone conversations (18, 19, and 20 May). Was it because the lines with Belgrade were poor and perhaps Belgrade "did not hear well" that the U.S. negotiator was compelled to arrive (22 May) to resolve the matter in person?

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Kornblum arrived following a statement by U.S. Administration spokesman Nicholas Burns that, in the earlier contacts, Milosevic had not outlined any plans on how he would fulfill the segment of the Dayton accord linked to the extradition of those accused of war crimes to the international tribunal. The statement sounded ominous, just as the presence of the uniformed General Ratko Mladic at Djordje Djukic's funeral in Belgrade. Namely, the Contact Group experts for Bosnia-Herzegovina held brief consultations on the possibility of the reintroduction of economic sanctions against FRY in the meantime. Pursuant to UN Resolution No. 1022, a report by Carl Bildt stating that Belgrade is not complying with any of the Dayton accord obligations suffices for their reintroduction, which does not require the consensus of the UN Security Council.

In an attempt to overcome the situation in which the survival in power of the RS president was threatening the reintroduction of sanctions against FRY, the card of the dame from the old Bosnian Serb political deck of cards—Dr. Plavsic—was thrown on the table.

A Trump Card

A close aide to Dr. Karadzic from the very beginning, Dr. Plavsic has become famous for her statements such as "6 million Serbs can die for the other six to live in freedom," ethnic cleansing "is a perfectly normal occurrence," and so forth. The authority with which she, in particular, negotiates with the international community is the best guarantee to Dr. Karadzic and Mladic that they will not be extradited, if they withdraw. Equally, she is an assurance that little will change in the Serb Republic.

Introducing this dame in the game also suits Milosevic. There you go, he fulfilled the demand to remove Dr. Karadzic from the political scene, even if incompletely. He did not have it easy, perhaps Dr. Plavsic was not the most suitable successor to Karadzic, however, for the time being, nothing else is possible. Kornblum and Bildt only have to swallow it now and ....

However, it all looks as though they will not. The international community is no longer demanding that Dr. Karadzic and Gen. Mladic renounce power, but that they be extradited to the Hague. It is possible that Dr. Plavsic is a trump card in Milosevic's Bosnian hand with which he will desperately try to buy some time to preserve the situation for as long as possible: Before they impose sanctions against him, he can reintroduce them against the Serb Republic.

He will try to deal the cards again. Handshakes and smiles will go, and Dr. Plavsic will again be "a mental case."

Radovan Karadzic has swum to the surface!

"One thing that any normal man can see is that Karadzic's rating has plummeted close to zero in the past year and that he is an absolute favorite at the moment. Nobody can remove him now, and this is the work of the international community," Predrag Lazarevic, one of the leading men of the Banja Luka intellectual forum, who is otherwise a very subtle analyst of the relations in the Serb Republic, told a VREME journalist. For the time being, Lazarevic is not venturing into speculations on whether the international factor consciously influenced the rise of Karadzic's rating, or whether this is just a political oversight.

Dr. Miodrag Zivanovic, the chief of the Banja Luka Social Liberal Party, observed that the RS president made an excellent bargain with the international community—he "distanced himself" from the post and emerged stronger than ever. Karadzic is in a comfortable position now: "He shed the authorities, he surrounded himself with people, he is the chief and the executor of numerous things, and yet he is not responsible for anything," Zivanovic says.

Watering Down

What is bugging Zivanovic, the philosophy professor from Banja Luka, and other opposition leaders is the ease with which the Pale leadership managed to water down the conflict with Kasagic.

The opposition, which is only strong in the Banja Luka region, rallied wholeheartedly behind the fallen Kasagic, whom it never liked before. The reason for this was very simple: Lacking the possibility to convey any of its political ideas via the state media, the opposition exploited the tensions between the RS political leadership and Rajko Kasagic to at least state what it supports and what it opposes. "Kasagic does not amount to much, however, that is what we got," a Banja Luka politician commented on the unnatural political alliance.

Rajko Kasagic was not popular as the president of the Banja Luka executive council. He had the reputation of being Pale's extended hand, the man who was grassing on Banja Luka in the capital village. When he, as prime minister, complained that he was not allowed to appear on the Serb Republic Television, many smiled ironically and remembered that Rajko, as the president of the Banja Luka executive council, also did not allow Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic to appear on Banja Luka Television to addresses his fellow residents. In the last days of Kasagic's premiership, however, Mayor Radic also sided with the prime minister. Kasagic, as they say in the biggest town in the Serb Republic, "has advanced." He started insisting on Banja Luka's regional

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specific traits, he advocated that Banja Luka be the capital, he condemned the media for being closed to the opposition parties, he tried to secure normal conditions for the electoral campaign....

Defending the prime minister's policy, the RS opposition defended the policy of opening up to the world. "We favor the concept of opening up, because it must not happen that anyone would as much as suspect that the Serbs are, for example, responsible for the postponement or cancellation of the elections in Bosnia," one of the members of the Banja Luka intellectual forum, otherwise a famous prewar politician, says.

The opposition in the Serb Republic, at least the one of some reputation, supports wholeheartedly the policy of opening up championed by Prime Minister Kasagic. The opposition calls the policy that replaced him the policy of isolationism. Kasagic was simply thrilled by the world and fascinated by the international mediators and guests who often stated that the Serbs must realize that the world means them no harm. In a program on the local BIG radio, when attacked for yielding to Carl Bildt too much, he said that Banja Luka would have fallen had it not been for Bildt. This did not go down well. True enough, in the same program, the listeners accused him of being "too cooperative."

Actually, Rajko Kasagic has only been a little late in his emancipation. In his fifty fourth year (born 1942) he, as his musical wish, wanted to hear a song by Arsen Dedic [Croatian singer]. He anticipated correctly that the audio libraries of the radio stations were as purged as Kasagic's town itself. At the end of the day, Radovan Karadzic surely did not appoint Kasagic to be the prime minister-designate last November on the merit of his international musical taste.

Without a Trump Card

Dead or alive as a politician, the opposition will still not be able to enforce another topic that they like to bring up in confrontation with the authorities. Namely, we are talking about the insistence on the Krajina's regional identity, which went hand in hand with the objections to the centralization of authorities. At this stage, in which he has agreed to duck down (behind Biljana Plavsic), Karadzic's next move could be the relocation of the government to Banja Luka. To a degree, his new prime minister, Gojko Klickovic, announced this with a statement that "in the future, all ministers will work in one place, that is, in the government headquarters, which the RS People's Assembly will determine soon." It can be heard among the Krajina deputies of the Karadzic's Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) that Karadic promised them that Banja Luka would be the center of the Serbian "entity" if they aided Kasagic's dismissal unreservedly.

We have learned from the same sources that the only voice "in favor" of the prime minister was Deputy Vojo Kupresanin. Banja Luka as the Serb Republic transitional capital is, among other things, also dictated by the forthcoming "arbitration" on Brcko. Unless the whole matter "has already been arbitrated" in advance, Brcko, as the town that could cut the remainder of the Serb Republic territory off from the capital of Banja Luka, will definitely have a different significance than it has now, and the opposition's objection that "the Krajina capital" has been maginalized will grow considerably more insignificant.

The opposition in the Serb Republic is blocked. Ivica Dacic, spokesman of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), is right in viewing Kasagic's ouster as an electoral move. However, this is only one of the dimensions of the conflict. All in all, official Belgrade did not get overtly excited by the events on the other side of the Drina River. This is unusual, because Belgrade has always reacted loudly whenever the Bosnian Serb leadership threatened Serbia's interests. One must only remember how all the Belgrade regime press mourned when the authorities in Pale obstructed the electoral rallies of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, which is a sister party of the SPS.

The atmosphere in which the, until yesterday, irreconcilable Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Karadzic's protegee Biljana Plavsic are making peace is a signal that, in the current phase, the Serbian political leadership supports what Karadzic is doing. With the "self-inflicted stripping of authority," cadre reshuffles, and the replacement of the prime minister who cited the Dayton peace plan more frequently than the Constitution, Karadzic is actually testing this peace document. The ease with which Kasagic's downfall was accepted, the muted reactions to the Pale cadre reshuffle and the division of labor, and the controversial statements by the international mediators on the fate of the Mostar elections only confirm that Karadzic has fitted into the prevailing trend, and that he sensed the moment of hesitation and cleverly exploited it.

Serbia: Assembly Party Says Karadzic Removal Humiliates Serbs

LD3005200596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1455 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 30 May (SRNA)—Jadranka Velickovic, chairman of the information committee of the People's Assembly Party, said today that "the intensive international campaign to remove Radovan Karadzic from the political scene reflects the arrogant intention of the world powers to limit the sovereignty of the Serb Republic."

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Carl Bildt's efforts to remove at any cost, and under the patronage of the U.S. Administration, the legitimate president of the Serb Republic reflect the international community's desire to introduce a kind of protectorate over the leadership of the Serb Republic, Jadranka Velickovic said at a news conference.

According to Velickovic, such a lack of political consistency on the part of the world powers humiliates all Serb people.

"The Serb Republic is faced with great challenges not only because it has been asked to give its president up, but because it is being forced to suspend by itself its sovereignty won, unfortunately, in a civil war," she said.

Serbia: SSJ's Raznjatovic Praises Karadzic, Mladic

LD3005211396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1615 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 30 May (SRNA)—Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, the chairman of the Party of Serbian Unity [SSJ] and commander of the Serb Volunteers' Guard, has said that Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic is not a war criminal and that The Hague tribunal is "a farce, put together in order to defeat the Serb people completely."

"Karadzic has borne on his shoulders the suffering of the whole Serb people in the Serb Republic. He is the leader of the Serb nation and a great man whom I respect a lot," Raznjatovic said in an interview for the latest issue of Serb [newspaper] OSLOBODJENJE.

He said that Serb Vice President Biljana Plavsic, to whom President Karadzic passed some of his competences, "is a woman who was in the right place at the right time, while General Ratko Mladic, the commander of the Serb army, is a great patriot."

Commenting on events that took place during the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Raznjatovic said that "the entire Serb people were pushed into an abyss, because at that time the state was headed by the people who were completely disorganized and did not know how to react at the right moment."

"At the beginning of the war the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] was completely disorganized, unlike the Serb Volunteers' Guard that was a well-organized formation," Arkan stressed and added: "The guard has not suffered a single defeat owing to its discipline, patriotism, bravery, and courage."

Speaking about the situation in Kosmet [Kosovo-Metohija], the SSJ chairman said that in that southern Serb province "everything is possible, because the scenario to be enacted there is the same as in Croatia and Bosnia."

"The separatists have already chosen the course of terrorism. There will be a war in Kosovo, we will have to wage war again if birds of steel [aircraft] strike against us as they did in the Serb Republic," Arkan said in conclusion.

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